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With South Africa’s momentous transition to democratic rule in 1994, the Nelson Mandela 
administration significantly underscored the need to erect the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) as a mechanism to address the grievances, racial discrimination and 
violence that characterized the apartheid era. The South African government and the TRC 
have initiated policies to expedite reconciliation among its different races with the primary 
objective to recompense those who were previously marginalized and abused by the apartheid 
regime. Such attempts include: economic and land restitution and affirmative action. Despite 
these strides however, there are still enormous challenges, especially with regards to socio-
economic imbalances, racial skirmishes, violence, and unresolved grievances among the 
victims of the apartheid era. Conceived in this way, the primary purpose of this research is to 
offer a broad analysis of rationale to transform some of the apartheid structural arrangements 
to a more egalitarian structure. 
 
1994 heralded a new era of democratization in South Africa after long years of apartheid 
regime. The transition from autocratic rule to democracy has often been an excruciating one. 
It is no doubt that the challenges of transformation and reconciliation have resulted in the 
changing of the character of conflict and violence in post-apartheid South African society. 
This study also intends to analyse the current nature of conflict in post-apartheid South Africa 
such as; black on black, political assassinations and taxi violence. Although the nature of 
violent conflict in South Africa has transformed since post-apartheid, ostensibly, these 
conflicts are nevertheless rooted in apartheid. Given the foregoing, it appears that the full 
recovery from the apartheid era is still a far cry.  In order for this recovery to take place, some 






1.1 Introduction  
 
Following the demise of apartheid, 1994 will always be honoured and cherished by the 
majority of South Africans as history was made in the rebirth of the nation. For freedom 
fighters such as Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Goven Mbeki, Desmond Tutu, Chris Hani 
and many others, it was a dream come true seeing South Africans united together in a non-
racial democratic general election after a long time of state-supported apartheid. The first 
democratic elections in 1994 led to the victory of the African National Congress (ANC) 
resulting in Nelson Mandela becoming the first elected black president. On his inauguration 
in 1994, President Mandela said “the moment to bridge the chasms that divide us has come… 
we must therefore act together as a united people, for national reconciliation, for nation-
building, for the birth of a new world” (Mandela, 1994). Subsequently, the government of 
South Africa has wanted to augment unity and cooperation through their nation-building 
program and has deliberately functioned for the construction of a new, broad, united national 
identity among its citizens. 
 
Many endeavors have been made by successive post-apartheid governments to confront the 
violent and fractious history of apartheid. These endeavors were aimed at bringing about 
transformation in the post-apartheid South Africa. This study defines Post-apartheid South 
Africa as the period (1994) from which South Africa transitioned from the system of autocracy 
that is apartheid to democracy (majority rule). There were several damaging repercussions that 
came out as a result of the apartheid era. These detrimental effects are still with us today. 
These include black on black violence, taxi violence, crime and general violence. To bring 
about a transformation in the post-apartheid era, South Africans were given the liberty to 
redefine and reassess what exactly it meant to be a “South African”.  To be a South African 
in the post-apartheid era entailed equality regardless of race, tribe or gender (Kriel, 2007).  
According to Eaton (2002: 46), “for a newly-democratized, multicultural state such as South 
Africa, national legitimacy and a subjective sense of shared group membership among 
citizens is crucial for the establishment of effective democratic governance and civil 
stability”. I concur with Eaton (2002) in that post-apartheid South Africa is trying to put the 
past behind it and overcome the inequalities, cleavages and prejudices of apartheid which is 
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crucial for an incorporated national identity (Kriel, 2007). Through an incorporated national 
identity, different races are encouraged to integrate, thereby creating a non-discriminating 
society. 
  
In addition to bringing about transformation in the new democratic South Africa, the 
government and some non-government organizations, established a mechanism for 
reconciliation. The reconciliation process comprised revealing facts about historical events. 
In addition, clemency and compensation were given to help reinstate human community in a 
spirit of respect for human rights and democracy (Kriel, 2007). This required the formation of 
an atmosphere where the likelihood of gross violations of human rights that happened in the 
past are decreased to the barest minimum (Simpson, 1998). These violations of human rights 
dehumanized the people who were previously marginalized and denied them sufficient and 
proper basic needs such as shelter and health services. Basic services were provided but they 
were not sufficient and not to the standards of the minorities. 
  
Subsequently, the evaluation of the constitutional arbitration process, mechanisms of the 
themes used for the recompensing of the past, incapacitating the apartheid legacy and nation-
building played their role and are correspondingly if not more significant (Graeme, 2000). 
The provision of Bills, in collaboration with some other sections of the constitution, is a 
significant building block in the process of transformation and reconciliation. Putting into 
place the existing constitutional provisions and views surrounding that process also has 
significant effects on the real transformation and reconciliation process (Ibid).With this act of 
political liberation, the transition from autocracy to democracy has been a painful one 
(Simpson, 1998). Nevertheless, South Africans were determined to start the difficult and 
agonizing process of transforming the political, economic and social framework of a State 
that was for a long time afflicted by partition, violence and discrimination (Graeme, 2000). 
The then President Nelson Mandela and the Government of National Unity were devoted to 
facing the challenges of transformation in the post-apartheid South Africa with an aim of 
attaining the goal of national unity (Ibid). 
  
Attaining national unity in a post-apartheid society is vital in transforming the malicious 
tendencies of apartheid. The truth for most South Africans was not only understated but also 
included unconcealed daily humiliation and the undermining of dignity. Mortification, in the 
contemporary human rights discourse, is the, ‘compulsory lowering of any individual or 
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crowd by a method of suppression that harms their dignity; ‘to be humiliated’ is to be placed 
in a situation...in a demeaning and damaging way’ (Lindner, 2006:14). As a result, this has 
left unfathomable psychological scars that are going to take a long time to restore. What is 
not often acknowledged is that offenders are psychologically damaged. There is evidence that 
people who commit atrocities are not able to rid themselves of their post-traumatic stress 
symptoms (Ibid). Studies focused on the offenders found that several individuals involved in 
intense violence against others are severely affected by their own actions (Staub, 2005:300). 
In South Africa, previous victims and offenders have to live and make sense of the past 
together. This has led to a complex and traumatic post-apartheid legacy (Ibid). In the demise 
of apartheid and over eighteen years later, in the words of leading South African academic, 
Mamphele Ramphele (2008:15), “…we still struggle to find closure on many issues related to 
the past. This is in part because the wounds are still raw.  It is also because we have difficulty 
acknowledging the depths of our trauma.” 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The new trends and elucidations of conflict in post-apartheid South Africa, in conjunction 
with the tenacity of the old patterns of violence (during apartheid) tend to pose a threat to the 
already fragile South African democracy (Bronwyn, 2008). The continuing violence within 
South Africa highlights what has been referred to as a ‘culture of violence’ within the 
country. 'Cultural violence' according to Galtung (1990:291) refers ‘to features of culture that 
can be used to validate or legitimize direct or organizational violence, and may be 
demonstrated by religious conviction and ideology, language and art, pragmatic and formal 
science’. In cultures where violence is advocated as a primary solution to the day to day 
problems and challenges there is a need for identity and group norms together with the 
structures and factors into an understanding of violence during the political transition (ibid). 
 
Conflicts in post-apartheid South Africa are evidently linked to the old patterns of violence 
during apartheid. Conflicts such as political and taxi violence are traced back from the 
apartheid era. They are still happening and it is these conflicts that trigger cultures of 
violence. The only approach to getting rid of these conflicts in contemporary South Africa is 
by getting rid of the structural arrangements of apartheid. This study serves the purpose of 





Although the nature of violent conflict in South Africa has been transformed since apartheid, 
the conflict is nevertheless rooted in apartheid. The only way to get rid of these conflicts in 
the post-apartheid era is by getting rid of the structural arrangements of apartheid. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The tenacity of the old patterns of violence (during apartheid) is still evident and poses 
greater threats to the already fragile South African democracy (Bronwyn, 2008). Most 
authors have referred to the prevalence of violence in the country as a consequence of a 
‘culture of violence’ that has taken deep root in the society.  Harris Bronwyn (2003:1) argues 
that poverty, lack of justice and inequalities are huge impediments to establishing a human 
rights culture that will counteract the culture of violence. 
  
The primary purpose of this research is to offer a broad analysis of rationale to transforming 
some of the apartheid structural arrangements to a more egalitarian structure. Also, the study 
seeks to critically analyze the nature of conflicts in post-apartheid South Africa. The research 
further aims at assessing the link between the apartheid regime and the current nature of 
present day South Africa. The study further intends to ponder on the challenges that emerge 
in the process of transformation. The study goes on to look at some mechanisms that can be 
adopted in conflict transformation in today's South Africa, while investigating the link 
between conflict, truth and reconciliation in post-apartheid conflict. Lastly, it will propose 
some structures that can help facilitate non-discriminative populaces and help resolve 
conflict. 
 
1.5 Key Research Objectives 
The research seeks to fulfill specific issues and these are: 
1. To understand the rationale for transforming apartheid’s structural arrangements; 
2. To examine the nature of the conflict in post-apartheid South Africa; 
3. To assess the link between the current nature of conflict in the South Africa of yesterday 
     and today; 
4. To ponder on the challenges that emerges in the process of transformation in South Africa  
     today; 
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5. To propose some structures that can help facilitate non-discriminative populaces and help  
     resolve conflict; and 
6. To probe the link between conflict, truth and reconciliation in post-apartheid conflict  
     transformation. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
A qualitative research approach was used when carrying out this study. This includes 
literature reviews, newspaper reports, podcasts, television and the news media. The study 
intends to specifically analyze the existing data on conflict transformation in post-apartheid 
South Africa from 1994 to 2013. The literature surveys will provide a systematic 
understanding of South African history on conflict, but with a particular focus on apartheid, 
considering that conflicts in South Africa can be traced back to before colonization. The 
review starts with a description of the nature of conflicts that existed in the pre-colonial era 
(the tribal and village cleavages), and then on to how these conflicts have transformed into 
racial conflicts during the apartheid time and will eventually analyze the current nature of 
conflicts in the post-apartheid era. 
  
The methodology in studying conflict transformation in post-apartheid is done by analyzing 
the existing data of different scholars and philosophical ideas. The study also looks at other 
scholars’ views on conflict and conflict transformation in the apartheid and post-apartheid 
eras. In the literature review, there are clear definitions of the terms such as conflict and 
conflict transformation, apartheid and post-apartheid era quoted by other scholars. Brummer 
(2005: 342) argues that secondary sources consist of data and information that have 
previously been published, and therefore is supplied via a data recovery method from 
intellectual sources, such as published books, journal articles, magazines, newspapers, inter 
alia. (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003: 4).  Dissimilarities are normally put in mind when it comes to 
social research between primary and secondary data.  Alan Thomas (2004) also remarks that 
principal data have been made by the researcher in the framework of their own research 
project. According to Welman et al (2009: 6), secondary data have been made by others, who 





Welman et al, (2009: 8) argues that research engages in secondary data seeing that it helps a 
broad assortment of interpretive practices to bring together an improved understanding of the 
area under discussion.  The reason why a qualitative method was chosen as the principal 
method for this study is because it allows the author to go deeper into the study of conflict 
transformation in post-apartheid in South Africa and to bring out the rationale for 
transforming some of apartheid's structural arrangements to a more egalitarian structure. 
 
1.7 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
The Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) and Restorative Justice (RJ) are theories that 
basically lay strategies through which a nation or community, that has just come from 
violence of varying degrees, can be reconstructed to a peaceful state. These theories support 
the principle that what has been destroyed through violence has to be mended. For post-
apartheid South Africa to achieve this goal, it has to set objectives that would support the 
transition from any conflict to peace, and economic and social development, human and 
institutional capacity building, and creating distinct investment funds to sustain communal 
solidarity during the era of economic modification and poverty alleviation and reorganization 
(Jean-Claude, 2009: 40). Furthermore, the author states that reconstruction is about building 
better secular societies and economy, culture, ethics, aesthetics, spirituality, and ecumenism. 
 
1.7.1 Restorative justice (RJ) 
Given the underlying definition of RJ that tends towards an amicable healing of hurts of both 
the victimized and the victimizer, and that of the community of which they are part, this 
theory is seen as instrumental in the South African scenario though not all conclusive. Batley 
(1997) observes that RJ is congruent with the South African experience in two ways: 
 
• The theory of RJ offers a pragmatic, comprehensible and all-encompassing retort to the 
moral challenge towards crime, and the attention is known by the Moral Regeneration 
Movement (ibid). 
• This method of justice suggests a much more pragmatic mechanism for smaller groups of 
people within society, such as families and communities, to also be included in responding 
to conflict and to restore its effects. Based on these grounds, it develops democracy and 




RJ is seen as a theory that has the capacity to bring about practical and concrete measures to 
restore moral decency and bring families and communities under the same umbrella, whereby 
each member of the community has a role to play in governance because of being sensitive, 
and responsive to the violence that is prevalent in the country. The Dalai Lama, in 
Braithwaite (2002: 80), pointed out that “learning to forgive is much more useful than merely 
picking up a stone and throwing it at the object of one’s anger, the more so when the 
provocation is extreme”. This is to say that however much harm was caused to a victim, it is 
pointless for the victim to take revenge since it perpetuates, rather than heals the hurt that 
seems unforgivable. 
  
RJ on the other hand deals with the pains and necessities of the sufferers and the wrongdoers 
in a manner that all the parties are healed (Batley 1997).This theory comprises of three 
principles: crime is viewed as the major cause of injury to victims, offenders and 
communities (ibid). In the spirit of Ubuntu the unfair justice process should seek the healing 
of pains or wounds, the redressing of inequalities and the reinstatement of destroyed 
relationships (ibid). 
- RJ calls on the government, victims, offenders and their communities to be enthusiastically 
involved to the fullest extent in the criminal justice process from the beginning(ibid). 
- In a bid to promote justice, it is the duty of the government to maintain order and the 
community’s responsibility to establish peace (ibid). 
  
Batley (1997) has conceptualized “five Rs” that are essential to RJ which, when measured 
together, link both the offender and the offended, making the healing of the broken 
relationship possible to the point that the victims are willing to forgive. This puts the 
responsibility for restoration on the offender (ibid). 
  
• Facing the truth is a critical step on the way to freedom and it is from here onward that 
restoration begins (ibid).   
• Willing to take responsibility: Facing the truth identifies the reality of a given situation, but 
the offender must also accept responsibility for his or her actions. 
• Articulating remorse or repentance: Willing to be accountable for the effects of one’s 
actions results in an articulation of remorsefulness. This establishes grief and genuine regret 
for the wrongful actions and the awareness that the actions were truly unjust and should 
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therefore not have happened. The typical method in which this is done is by making an 
apology to the person who has been wronged, and by asking for  forgiveness from the 
supernatural being to which the offender relates (ibid); 
• Knowing reconciliation: This entails being prepared to look at the full force of 
wrongfulness, and not being allowed to take refuge in justifications or validations which 
make it likely to accept reconciliation with the person who has been offended (ibid). There is 
no assurance that the person who has been victimized will be ready or able to offer 
reconciliation, but full reconciliation is not likely if the wrongfulness has not been confronted 
(ibid); and 
• Making compensation: At this point, it is a pragmatic mechanism of confronting the 
penalties of behaviour (ibid). It is a technique of demonstrating the believability of the words 
that were articulated when making an apology and of articulating gratitude for reconciliation 
(ibid). 
  
RJ, when understood broadly, not only deals with notions of crime prevention, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation but also it means, according to Braithwaite (2002: 81), 
“transformed foundations of jurisprudence and of our notions of freedom, democracy, and 
community”. The understanding or definitions we assign to notions such as freedom, 
democracy, and community influence the quality and degree of our reaction to hurts 
especially to our offenders and those who may be victims of circumstances. The ancient 
Palestinian restorative justice institution of the Sulha, says Braithwaite, is one of the richest 
survivors of the ideal of using the lesser evil of crime to build a greater good of a loving 
community. As it stands in the Sulha today: 
 
“If a serious crime such as a murder occurs, the first step in a Sulha is that the offender’s 
family approaches a number of different individuals respected as peacemakers and begs for 
their help. If they offer it, the peacemakers visit the victim’s family.  We are asked by the 
offender and his family to come and pay a visit in order to have the honour of offering their 
repentance, to express their sorrow for what has happened and to ask you to be kind and 
honourable and to let us take the case into our hands and see how we can restore peace 
between us... “ 
 
Admitting to the fury of the victims with love no matter what they do, and of mediators 
forfeiting themselves to soak up the anger, can lead victims to a point of acceptance. The 
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unpaid peace broker helps make the families of the victim and perpetrator feels more 
praiseworthy. 
  
Barrett T. & Barrett P (2004) in their work “A History of Alternative Dispute Resolution: The 
Story of a Political, Cultural, and Social Movement” traced the history of RJ from as early as 
1800 B.C. with the Mari Kingdom (in modern Syria) that used mediation and arbitration in 
disputes with other kingdoms, up to 2001 with the U.S. v. Microsoft antitrust case mediation 
effort. Eglash in Helsinki (2007:21) differentiated three types of criminal justice: retributive, 
distributive, and restorative. He asserted that ‘… the third one, however, focuses on restoring 
the harmful effects of these actions, and actively involves all parties in the conflict process. 
With RJ, Barrett T. & Barrett (2004) provide a “deliberate opportunity for offender and 
victim to restore their relationship, along with a chance for the offender to come up with a 
means to repair the harm done to the victim”. In due course both the offender and the victim 
need not feel belittled and angered, which in many instances blocks the peace process. Harm 
in such cases may be repaired either through apology, compensation or repentance. 
 
Marshall (1999:6) outlined the aims of RJ as follows: 
• The victims (as well as those close to this person) need material, monetary, emotional and 
social support (ibid). 
• To avoid re–offending by reintegrating offenders into the community (ibid); 
• To allow offenders to undertake active accountability for their actions (ibid); 
• To restore a working society that encourages the convalescence of victims’ perpetrators and 
is active in averting crime (ibid); and 
• To offer ways of avoiding intensification of legal justice and the related costs and deferrals 
(ibid). 
  
McCold & Wachtel (2003:1) state that, ‘The foundational purpose of RJ is that violation 
harms persons and relationships and that justice necessitates the restoration of the damage as 
much as possible. Out of this plain premise arise crucial questions: who is injured, what are 
their necessities and how these necessities can be met?” It is paramount to define and 
understand the depth of these questions otherwise those who felt harmed will continue from 
generation to generation. Identifying the needs of the harmed, and the way to meeting those 
needs, is another powerful means to restoring peace and unity among a conflict ridden 
society. If all these are not clearly stipulated, the RJ theory does not work.   McCold & 
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Wachtel (2003:3) argue that any damage or harm to individuals and relationships much be 
restored as much as possible (ibid).  RJ is done not only because it is deserved, but because it 
is needed (ibid). Ideally, it is attained through a supportive process that involves all the 
principal participants in influencing how best to restore the damage already done by a 
wrongdoing (ibid). 
  
RJ is needed for the healing of harm done in the post-apartheid era, although attention must 
be paid to the shortcomings of this theory.  Many views have been advanced to this end and it 
is imperative to see them. ‘Often times, RJ is overextended to accommodate the fundamentals 
that are necessarily not curative in nature, which in other incidents, are constricted to a 
concept that cannot take in all the indispensable aspects that describe its thought’ (Helsinki 
2007:15). This absurdity arises sometimes due to the complexity and difficulty to clearly 
define what RJ is. Helsinki (2007) says that ‘a lot of people have tried to simplify a 
consensual comprehension for RJ. The fact is that it is not likely for its proponents to 
articulate a much clearer description to which everyone would be able to contribute. (Helsinki 
2007:37). 
  
The RJ theory relies mainly on voluntary operations, and it is limited by its scope in 
achieving its goals. It is crucial to consider that one party may not be ready to take part in the 
process of healing; the result is that participation will be reduced. Worst of all, if all parties, 
offender and victim are unwilling, the only alternative is to allow the formal legal system to 
take its course. This means that RJ is curtailed. Christie in Helsinki (2007: 22) argues that the 
details of what society does or does not authorize are often times problematic to decipher, and 
that “the degree of blameworthiness is often not expressed in the law at all” (Christie, 1977: 
8). Helsinki (2007) further argues that the government has ‘pilfered the conflict’ among 
citizens, and therefore has deprived society of the “opportunities for norm-classification”. In 
social problems the conflicts and troubles are unavoidable parts of daily life. Helsinki (2007) 
states that this should not be delegated to professionals and specialists who claim to provide 
solutions but Christie (1977) on the other hand believes that through controlling the criminal 
procedure and law, to a strict narrow legal definition of what is significant and what is not, 
the victim and the offender cannot explore the extent of their culpability and the real effects 
of the case. Helsinki (2007) explains that the most significant variance between the 




The law itself is insensitive to many things especially when it comes to blame and 
understanding what people do in different cultural milieu. Even when amnesty was granted 
‘to those who acknowledged gross human rights violations is an intrinsically unfair policy in 
the manner that evil deeds appear to be excused, if not rewarded.  Amnesty also appears to 
make Retributive Justice elusive, if not impossible’ (Gibson, 2002: 541). Rewarding those 
whose human rights were violated is not enough. How does one expect reconciliation to take 
place when the structure that is supposed to facilitate excuses some gross evils that have been 
committed? 
  
Gibson (2002:545) observes that because amnesty is permitted, it does not necessarily mean 
that one perceives it as fair. However, there were questions as to whether amnesty is just to 
four groups: the people who passed on during the struggle for freedom, the victims and the 
“ordinary people like you” (ibid). Depending upon the frame of reference, the judgments of 
justice differ significantly (ibid). Gibson (2002) goes on to state that a great preponderance of 
South Africans (72.7 percent) trust amnesty is biased to the people who passed on in the 
struggle, and utmost (65.2 percent) trust is biased to the victims (ibid).  In addition, a 
mainstream (52.6 percent) of South Africans find amnesty to be unfair to ordinary people, 
and only 33.5 percent of South Africans take the view that it is fair (ibid). Regarding the 
question of fairness to ordinary people, the racial dissimilarities hardly attain a low level of 
statistical significance and the strength of association among races and opinions is undeniably 
slight (α, 0.05 = 17) (ibid). Consequently, amnesty can be acceptable for a majority of South 
Africans but then again its injustice renders it a necessary evil (ibid). 
  
There is a huge social gap between the cultures and age groups (ibid). Greater community 
participation would have broadened the knowledge of some communities more than others 
but the restriction for RJ is the presence of social unfairness and discrimination in and 
between communities (ibid). If RJ involves the community as a main player, there needs to 
be a community (Ibid). The extent to which effective societies exist depends mostly on other 
social policies rather than from criminal justice. Gibson (2002) gives an example of victims 
and their families who are given a chance to confer their grievances and injuries openly can 
do much to resolve fury instead of allowing of amnesty to offenders. This is simply because 
RJ is, by its nature, more manageable and attractive to persons because it offers them 




According to Batley (2001:24) RJ is not desirable because of the following outlined reasons: 
• This theory does not apt the rational of legal practitioners; 
• The RJ theory is a lenient choice that overlooks the necessity for chastisement; 
• Also, the theory results in a clear broadening meaning that more perpetrators get drawn into 
the system than would otherwise be the case; 
• In general, this theory is not inventive and sophisticated enough in its applications to tackle 
the concerns it claims to; 
• Numerous of the individual victims are not willing to partake in RJ processes but are 
instead willing to settle for compensation directly. Seemingly, the victims want retribution 
and not restoration; 
• RJ is not applicable when it comes to handling of more serious cases such as rape, murder 
and domestic violence; and 
• RJ ignores and underestimates the significance of crime. Every single charge against RJ is 
concisely conferred. 
 
1.7.2 Post-Conflict Reconstruction theory (PCR) 
The Post-Conflict Reconstruction theory (PCR) is vital for the peace building process most 
especially for the countries that are recovering from conflict (Albert, 1995). In this study, the 
tenets of PCR are instrumental in measuring and assessing the achievements and 
shortcomings of post-Apartheid reconciliation in South Africa. PCR engages programs of 
reconciliation and development and advocates for participation of every citizen of that society 
(Adekanye, 1997). PCR entails the repairing and rebuilding of physical and economic 
infrastructure in a country that has just faced a prevalent violence or where the preoccupation 
of the state is armed warfare or where a substantial part of the population is involved with 
armed struggle with the state (Albert, 1995).   
  
Anderlini and El-bushra (2004: 52) advocate for the social and economic dimensions of 
restoration. These include reconstructing the functional constituents of a society by 
reinstating internal security, structuring administrative and governance capacities, repairing 
physical infrastructure such as constructing roads and bridges, houses/homes, hospitals, 
recreation centres; reinstating supplies such as water, electricity and fuel, renovating basic 
facilities such as schools, markets and hospitals, conscripting personnel, and offering training 
that is necessary for operations and maintenance (ibid). Instituting functioning financial 
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infrastructures and economic reformation, such as creating a credible banking and financial 
system, fiscal planning and budgets, reinstating an economic base focusing on both 
traditional agricultural and pastoral production and also the prevailing industries, and creating 
an environment favorable to producing new sources of income and economic growth (ibid). It 
also entails providing credits and endowments to businesses or new projects, skills training, 
development of novel industries and commerce, eradicating delinquency and regulating 
armed actors over significant sectors of the economy; creating a trustworthy and effective 
judicial system.  All this involves a number of processes for conscripting legislation, 
restructuring courts and judicial processes, employing personnel, providing training and 
introducing a national legal and literacy program (ibid). 
  
Task framework (2002:3) states the four distinct issue areas, or “pillars” in Post-Conflict 
Transformation and these are: 
 
• Security: This addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular the establishment of a safe 
and secure environment and the development of legitimate and stable security institutions 
(Ibid). Security encompasses the provision of collective and individual security, and is the 
precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the other pillars. In the most pressing 
sense, it concerns securing the lives of civilians from immediate and large-scale violence and 
the restoration of territorial integrity (Ibid). 
• Justice and Reconciliation addresses the need for an impartial and accountable legal system 
and for dealing with past abuses; in particular, creation of effective law enforcement, an open 
judicial system, fair laws, humane corrections systems, and formal and informal mechanisms 
for resolving grievances arising from conflict (Ibid). These tasks encompass the provision of 
mechanisms to redress grievances, exact appropriate penalties for previous acts, and build 
capacity to promulgate and enforce the rule of law. Incorporating the concept of restorative 
justice, they include extraordinary and traditional efforts to reconcile ex-combatants, victims, 
and perpetrators (Ibid). 
• Social and Economic Well-Being addresses fundamental social and economic needs; in 
particular provision of emergency relief, restoration of essential services to the population, 
laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiation of an inclusive, sustainable 
development program (Ibid). Often accompanying the establishment of security, well-being 
entails protecting the population from starvation, disease, and the elements. As the situation 
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stabilizes, attention shifts from humanitarian relief to long-term social and economic 
development (Ibid). 
• Governance and Participation addresses the need for legitimate, effective political and 
administrative institutions and participatory processes; in particular, establishing a 
representative constitutional structure, strengthening public sector management and 
administration, and ensuring active and open participation of civil society in the formulation 
of government and its policies (Ibid). Governance involves setting rules and procedures for 
political decision-making, and delivering public services in an efficient and transparent 
manner. Participation encompasses the process for giving voice to the population through the 
development of civil society that includes the generation and exchange of ideas through 
advocacy groups, civic associations, and the media (Ibid). 
  
The state institutions tend to be weakened in the post-conflict situation in that they show little 
ability to carry out their traditional functions. Post-conflict reconstruction also involves a 
number of critical external interventions directed to rebuilding the weakened institutions 
(Adekanye, 1997).  These included reviving the economy, restructuring the framework for 
democratic governance, rebuilding and maintaining key social infrastructures and planning 
for financial normalization. In Adekanye’s words: 
“Post conflict intervention tends to have explicit objectives such as supporting the transition 
from war to peace, resumption of economic and social development, reconciliation and 
reconstruction, human and institutional capacity building, and establishing special investment 
funds to maintain social cohesion during the period of economic adjustment and poverty 
reduction and decentralization…”(Adekanye, 1997). 
 
As mentioned above, it is clear that PCR operations necessitate thorough monitoring to 
ensure their continued relevance, effectiveness and efficiency (Diamond & John, 1996). 
There are four pillars that are all inextricably linked and have a positive outcome in each area 
depending on the extent to the success of integration and interaction across them, and these 
include post-conflict reconstruction-security, social and economic well-being, justice and 
reconciliation and governance and participation (ibid). Francis Fukuyama in (2004) describes 
PCR as the first stage of nation-building, which is applicable to failed states after violent 
conflict and where the international community has provided security and all essential needs 
and/or services. The second phase of nation-building, according to Fukuyama (2004), is the 
creation of self-sustaining state institutions which provide security and all essential needs 
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with the help of the international community (Fukuyama, 2004).  This normally starts after 
the completion of the first phase and once the international forces have assured security and 
stabilized the situation. Strengthening of weak states is the third phase (Fukuyama, 2004, pp. 
135-136). 
  
Hamre and Sulivan, (2002:89) argued that “PCR is only needed when the international 
community is dealing with failed states, the government institutions of which are not 
functioning effectively”. The authors added that, “As a term, PCR was first defined by the 
World Bank in 1995 as “the rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of society and the 
reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the 
framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre and Sulivan, 2002:89).  If the PCRs are 
not efficiently implemented and all stake holders sufficiently re-integrated into the state (in 
the post-conflict era), there is a possibility of a re-occurrence of a war (Diamond & John, 
1996). 
  
Adekanye (1997) states that certain issues are identified as key issues in the post-conflict 
environment due to the fact that there are empirical interconnections which should not be 
ignored between the “conflict and “post conflict stage”, between “violence” and “politics” 
between “war” and “peace” (Adekanye, 1997). So the key issues that are appropriate to the 
peace process are identified as follows: the contradiction of three transitions in one, 
reintegration of ex-combatants; problems of illegal surplus arms; making committed electoral 
players out of former guerrilla leaders, power-sharing versus political inclusion, 
reconciliation versus justice; market-driven liberalization versus post-conflict peace building 
and countering the phenomenon of “return wars” (Adekanye 1997). 
 
1.8 Thesis Outline 
Chapter one introduce the theoretical framework; chapter two follows by critically analyzing 
the literature review and defining the concepts of conflict and conflict transformation. 
Chapter three will state the rational for transforming the apartheid structural arrangement and 
chapter four examines the nature of post-apartheid conflict. The study will focus on black on 
black violence, xenophobia, taxi violence, economic & social conflicts and political 
assassinations.  This chapter also examines the current nature of conflict in post-apartheid 
linked to the apartheid era. Chapter five assesses the challenges that emerge in the process of 
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transformation in the post-apartheid era and will also probe the link between apartheid and 
the Truth Reconciliation Commission in the post-apartheid conflict transformation. Chapter 
six sums up the study by presenting recommendations that can bring about reconciliation in 
conflict transformation in post-apartheid South Africa. This chapter will give a summary and 
conclusion to all the findings. 
 
 1.9 Conclusion 
This chapter started off by giving a general introduction and background. It also highlighted 
the problem of the study stating that, ‘the new trends of conflict in the post-apartheid South 
Africa, in conjunction with the tenacity of the old patterns of violence (during the apartheid 
era), tend to pose a threat to the already fragile South African democracy (Bronwyn, 2008). 
This chapter also examines the methodology that will be used later in the study that is a 
qualitative research approach. The chapter also started the hypothesis, key objectives and the 



























The literature review for this study aims at providing a systematic understanding of South 
African history on conflict but with a particular focus on apartheid. Considering that, 
conflicts in South Africa are traced back even before colonization.  Many scholars have 
written on the various conflicts that existed in pre-colonial times, the apartheid regime and in 
the post-apartheid period. 
 
Such conflicts included tribal conflicts, the apartheid era, black on black, political 
assassinations, xenophobia and so on. As such, the literature review of this study fills in the 
missing gap of elucidating in depth as to how the conflicts in colonial/apartheid and post-
apartheid eras are linked together the apartheid regime and most of all, traces the conflicts 
from pre-colonial South Africa.  It will start by looking at what other scholars argue about the 
concepts of both conflict and conflict transformation.  A qualitative research approach is used 
when critically analyzing the literature review of this study. The approach used mainly 
includes articles and books written by other scholars and authors on conflict particularly in 
South Africa. There are also sources obtained from newspaper reports, podcasts, television 
media, and magazines that will be used. The study determines to specifically analyze the 
existing data on conflict transformation in post-apartheid South Africa from 1994 to 2013. 
 
2.2 Concept of Conflict 
Draman (2003: 4) defines conflict as “an interaction between interdependent people who 
perceive incompatible goals and who expect interference from the other party if they attempt 
to achieve their goal”. Conflicts are found everywhere in human society making them 
common, normal and bound to happen in human relationships. There is generally an aim we 
are trying to achieve through conflict and there are various possible means of attaining our 
goals (Dahrendrof& Collins 2006). The presence of the likelihood of different paths creates 
opportunities for negotiation and different types and levels of conflict (ibid). Since conflicts 
are a functional part of human life, they are regarded as a motor of change (Lederach & 
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Michelle, 1995). Each time ideas, activities, structures and people’s relations to each other 
change, conflict is expected to be experienced. Considering that change is inexorable and at 
the same time desirable so is change inevitable, conflict can be handled either cooperatively 
or competitively (Francis, 2002).   
  
Swanstrom & Weissmann (2005: 9) define conflict as “a situation in which two or more 
parties strive to acquire resources at the same time”.  Conflict is visceral for us, so we find 
conflict with each other if there is unequal distribution of scarce resources.  Resources are not 
only economic in nature but also involve class, status and power (Wallensteen, 2002). 
Dahrendrof & Collins (2006) sited in Weber (1995) and Simmel (1998) states the 
significance of the crosscutting influences that are invented with the various structures of 
inequality. An example is given by Dahrendrof & Collins (2006: 216) of ‘a working class 
black person who may not share the same political interests as a working class white person’. 
Dissimilarities in the status between these two persons may cut across their similar class 
interests. Therefore the fact that this tends to become vital as a source of conflict is the 
covariance of these three systems of stratification (ibid). Once the public identifies that a 
certain set of people controls accessibility to all three resources, there is a huge possibility 
that the legitimacy of the system is being questioned considering the fact that people see their 
social mobility to be disadvantaged (ibid). In addition, Dahrendrof & Collins (2006), argues 
that conflict in its nature fluctuates and it may vary by its level of violence. If people perceive 
conflict as a means to attaining evidently conveyed rational goals then they tend to be less 
violent and sometimes not even violent at all. For example, workers may go on a strike to 
attain express goals such as an increment in stipend. 
  
Conflicts on the other hand can be violent (Dahrendrof & Collins 2006). There are two major 
factors that trigger violent conflict and this includes emotional involvement and transcendent 
goals (ibid). For a conflict to be regarded as violence there has to be an engagement 
emotionally. Scholars such as Durkheim maintain that group interaction has a possibility to 
escalate emotional involvement and even create moral boundaries around group values and 
goals (ibid). Dahrendrof & Collins (2006: 217) go on to state that, “the more involved we are 
with a group, the greater is our emotional involvement and the greater the likelihood of 




The violence associated with conflict such as cultural, tribal, ethnical or racial context is 
classically aggravated by differences among the conflicting individuals or group of people. 
The dominating motives imputed by others, and “otherness” is regarded as a threat (Francis, 
2002). Once there is a connotation with difference in power irregularities, fear and mistrust 
escalates. As those in power anticipate insurrection, it makes the ones underneath them feel 
threatened and marginalized. Subsequently, racial difference is not a source of amelioration 
but that of alienation, misapprehension and misconception. It is affiliated with 
discontentment or non-respect with a feeling of victimhood, bitterness and affront on the 
other (ibid). 
  
When it comes to conflict, there are forceful factors in human life that all of us live and as 
such they compel us apart and even provoke disjointed groups to fight each other. Some of 
these factors like ethnicity or religion may not appear to be conflict-ridden. The same factors 
may also harbour lenient and cooperative prospects (Malan, 2008). Conflict is a common part 
and parcel of human relations and therefore conflict is an instrument of alteration (Lederach 
& Michelle, 1995). Every single time ideas, activities, structures and people’s relations to 
each other alter, some type of conflict is likely to be experienced. Since that change is 
inescapable and at the same time desirable, so is change inevitable, conflict can be handled 
either cooperatively or competitively (Francis, 2002).   
  
Wallensteen (2002) states that conflict refers to when two or more parties endeavor to obtain 
at the same time an existing set of already limited resources, which can be either material or 
immaterial.  It is argued by Malender & Pigache (2000), that conflict in itself is frequently a 
constructive element of a dynamic society though it becomes detrimental and problematic 
when the involved parties opt for violent means to advance their causes (Ibid). Essentially 
conflicts are not only about economic resources in nature but also involve class, status and 
power (Swanström & Weissmann 2005). In most cases, conflicts are based on perception 
rather than on attitudes or behaviour (Ibid). 
  
Lastly, intergroup conflict exists between groups in the same society or organizations. 
Bornstein (2003; 129) states that it is unavoidable to have tensions between the interest of the 
individual researchers and the collective interest of the group. It stems from the fact that the 
benefits associated with the outcome of intergroup conflicts (e.g., territory, political power, 
status, pride) are public goods that are non-excludable to the members of a group, regardless 
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of their contribution to their group’s effort.’ There are three sources of intergroup conflict; 
Cohesion- “sticking together’’ within a group usually causes out-group hostility, structure 
type of leadership and status within a group are factors that tend to escalate the conflict 
(Swanström & Weissmann, 2005).  A conflict between states can fall under the above three 
categories that is out-group hostility, structure type of leadership and status due to the various 
causes of conflict between states which subsists from the three categories. Such causes 
include the following: contrasting capabilities and interests (precise sociocultural similarities 
and differences between the parties), contact and salience (awareness), significant change in 
the balance of powers, individual perceptions and expectations, a disrupted structure of 
expectations, and a will-to-conflict. These are aggravated by coercive state power, 
sociocultural dissimilarity, status difference, cognitive imbalance (Rummer, 1979). 
  
According to Mitchell (2002) conflicts are changing all the time.  They arise from 
incompatible interests in the parties’ consciousness through the mobilization of support for 
the accomplishment of shared objectives.  There is also an increase in coercive and violent 
behavior between the sponsors, allies and intermediaries.  
 
The structure of conflict has three parts; attitudes, behavior and circumstances and they 
correlate and create conflict amidst actors (Mitchell, 1981).  Swanström & Weissmann (2005) 
argue that often the circumstances tend to impact the behavior. The failure to accomplish the 
targeted goals, particularly central goals, generates frustrations and escalates the willingness 
to reach these goals at all costs even if it means through conflict (Ibid).  The circumstances 
also affect the attitudes in such a manner that discordant goals escalate the suspicion and 
cynicism amidst the actors. Behavior on the other hand effect the circumstances in that 
success can present new questions in the conflict as demands intensify.  Also, the behavior 
impacts the attitudes in a way that destruction proliferates hatred.  Eventually success impacts 
the group solidarity and the idea of “us” (Swanström & Weissmann 2005). Also, attitudes 
impact the behavior in that, as expectations such as “our traditional enemies will attack 
again”, will impact the defensive planning and preventive actions.  Finally, attitudes impact 
the situation in such a manner that the conflict continues and the more questions will be 
presented (Ibid).   
  
According to Swanström & Weissmann (2005), a conflict is not a static situation. The level 
of intensity transforms over a conflicts’ life cycle (ibid). Conflicts tend to have different 
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stages and for one to have a full understanding of the conflict cycle, it is crucial to 
comprehend how, where and when to apply different strategies of conflict prevention and 
management (Ibid). Scholars have come up with many suggestions and models of conflict 
patterns and among these models and suggestions there are a number of patterns that stand 
out. Usually, conflicts are described as cyclical in terms of their intensity levels (ibid). They 
intensify from relative stability and peace into crisis and war and subsequently into relative 
peace (ibid). These cycles are occurring and durable, making peace an extra stage in which 
the conflict is considered to be resolved. Likewise, most models divide both the escalation 
and de-escalation of the conflict cycle into phases. 
  
The divisions into phases and the reoccurring perception of conflict have become the starting 
point of investigating conflict prevention, management and resolution (Swanström & 
Weissmann, 2005).  Conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution in 
principle are considered as appropriate measures of different phases of conflicts that is 
escalating from (relative) stability and peace into crisis and war, thereafter de-escalating into 
relative peace (ibid). Conflict prevention is significant as it is intended for the early phases 
before a conflict has become overt. Conflict management on the other hand, is important as it 
is applicable to the later stages when a conflict is manifest but before the occurrence of 
violence. Conflict resolution is applicable in the de-escalation phase after an intense conflict 
has transpired (ibid). 
 
2.3 Concept of Conflict Transformation 
  
Conflict transformation according to Hugh (2004), refers to a process of engaging with and 
transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of 
society that supports the continuation of violent conflicts. With conflict transformation, it is 
not merely enough to resolve one set of issues among parties who then continue in a mental 
frame of mutual suspicion and resentment, in relation to loathed interdependence and 
protected in a structure from which major salient contentions will unavoidably arise 
(Mitchell, 2002). Transformation in a society like South Africa is vital as it brings into focus 
the horizon towards which we journey, especially in the building of healthy relationships and 
communities both locally and globally (Lederach & Michelle, 1995). The term 
‘transformation’ certainly suggests coming up with some changes in some aspects of the 
conflict or the social-political system in which it is embedded (Mitchell, 2002). The central 
22 
 
concept of transformation includes some sort of significant change.  A major problem is that 
conflicts themselves are intrinsically a forceful phenomenon much as they are in the initial 
phases when no-one either involved in the conflict or observing it is even considering to 
settle, resolve, terminate or change it (ibid). 
  
Conflict transformation does not recommend that we eliminate or control conflict but rather 
recognize and work with its dialectic nature. Social conflict is naturally created by individuals 
who are involved in relationships. However, as soon as it happens, it transforms the events, 
people and relationships that created the initial conflict. Therefore, the cause-and-effect 
relationship goes both ways. That is from the people and the relationships to the conflict and 
back to the people and relationships. Consequently, conflict transformation is a natural 
occurrence and as a result conflicts change relationships in expected ways, altering 
communication patterns and patterns of social organization, changing images of the self and 
the other. 
  
Similarly, conflict transformation is a prescriptive concept. It advocates that left alone, 
conflict can have dire and destructive consequences. Conversely, the consequences can be 
adjusted or changed so that self-images, relationships and social structures improve as a result 
of conflict rather than being affected by it. This frequently involves changing perceptions of 
issues, actions and other people or groups. Conflict Transformation tends to improve mutual 
understanding since conflict itself usually changes the perceptions by accentuating the 
differences between people and position. As much as people’s interests, values and needs 
differ and may even be non-reconcilable, progress can be been made so that each group gains 
a relatively accurate understanding and an indulgence of each other. 
  
Transformation involves transforming the way conflict is articulated.  It may be uttered 
competitively, antagonistically or pugnaciously or it can be uttered through nonviolent 
advocacy, conciliation, and cooperation.  Unlike several conflict theorists and activists, who 
recognize mediation and advocacy as being in disapproval to each other, Lederach (1989) 
perceives advocacy and mediation as being different stages of conflict in raising people’s 
awareness of an issue. Therefore activism uses a nonviolent advocacy to intensify and 
confront the conflict. When awareness and concern is generated, mediation can be used to 
change the expression of conflict from “mutually destructive modes toward dialogue and 
interdependence” (Ledereach, 1989; 14). Thus, such transformation must take place at both 
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the personal and the systemic level. Conflict transformation at the personal level, entails the 
pursuit of awareness, growth and commitment to change which may happen through 
recognition of fear, anger, grief and bitterness.  The author also advocates that emotions need 
to be outwardly acknowledged and dealt with so as to attain an effective conflict 
transformation. 
  
Peace-making necessitates a systemic transformation. The process of increasing justice and 
equality in the entire social system may require the elimination of oppression, improved 
sharing of resources and the non-violent resolution of conflict between groups of people. 
Each of these actions reinforces the other. That is to say, transformation of personal 
relationships simplifies the transformation of social systems and systemic changes enables 
personal transformation (ibid). Truth, justice, mercy, empowerment and interdependence are 
core concepts to both kinds of transformation. In as much as the core concepts are observed 
to be in contrast to each other, they must come together for reconciliation or peace to happen 
(Lederach, 1995). 
 
2.4 The natures of conflicts during the pre-colonial and apartheid eras 
  
The nature of conflict in post-apartheid South Africa is considered to be a violent one and this 
possibly contributed to the history of South Africa. They are traced back to before 
colonization. Prior to colonization, the conflicts were characterized as tribal and village 
cleavages. According to Uzoigwe (1975: 23), “warfare appears to have been rare, and when it 
did occur, it was usually a struggle for power between a chief and his relatives”. The 
pronounced conflict that existed in the pre-colonial times was the Zululand civil war that took 
place from 1808 to 1818 and argued to have significantly changed the situation (Uzoigwe 
1975: 24). Some of the changes included the; enlargement of political scale and instigated a 
tradition of militarism among the Zulu which exists to the present day (ibid). Some scholars 
do not concur with Shaka’s much vaunted revolution and state that it is not as original as his 
numerous admirers like to advocate (ibid).  In fact, it has been noted that, “he duplicated in 
his great new nation early Nguni tribal organization, though on a much larger scale and with 
a deeper hierarchy of officials” (Uzoigwe 1975: 24). 
  
Uzoigwe (1975) further states that the political organization of the pre-ShakaNguni state, was 
no different from the southern Bantu states.  It was headed by a hereditary chief, abetted by 
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sub-chiefs (usually members of the royal family) who administered the districts together with 
the other officials called indunas. Senior indunas also had the rank of deputy chief and were 
powerful officials; they were not chosen from among the ranks of the royals eligible to the 
throne (ibid). The chief and his officials were superiors of their people in war and political 
leaders in war and peace. Ordinarily, the chief was a great warrior and his officials were 
appointed in large measure, as a consequence of their military valour (ibid). In the pre-
Mfecane Zulu state for instance, the military and politics were perilously fused. The normal 
citizens had no means of removing an unpopular government. A “palace revolt” occasionally 
transpired, but the system of government did not change (ibid). 
  
There was progressive change from power conflict between a chief and his relatives during 
pre-colonial South Africa to a racial conflict during colonial times. The nature of conflicts 
intensified to racial groups during the colonization when the first settlers arrived in 1652 and 
when the Dutch East India Company established a refreshment station at the Cape of Good 
Hope (Maharaj 2008).  Initially these settlers originated from Netherlands and Germany and 
also involved the French Huguenots absconding from religious persecution in Europe. At the 
beginning, they identified themselves as, ‘ burgher’ and  later as,’boers’ their  descendants, 
over a period of over 150 years developed the trappings of a new identity known as 
Afrikaners, creating an adaptation of Dutch called Afrikaans (ibid).  Slavery followed 
immediately after the settlement of the Dutch and the slaves were brought from the 
Indonesian archipelago, Bengal, South India, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Madagascar and the East 
African coast (ibid). Under the British rule in 1815, slavery ended with 36,000 slaves in the 
Cape. Descendants of the slaves and the indigenous population, the Khoisan and the off-
springs of the initial mixed relationships were referred to as, ‘Coloureds’ (ibid). 
  
There was contention among European powers that resulted in the control of the southern 
corner of Africa changing hands at different times, ultimately leading to the rise of a single 
state (South Africa) in 1910 within the sphere of British hegemony. Under the domination of 
the British, the social hierarchy was the foundation on which racial discrimination was 
established in South Africa from the period of its creation. There were numerous divisions 
that occurred among the Afrikaners and the English-speaking whites, the two groups were 
united in their willpower to ensure that blacks stayed in a state of ever-lasting subordination 
(ibid). The Cape was under the control of the Dutch East India Company from 1652 to 1806 
and while under their rule, social hierarchy developed (Maharaj 2008).  During this time, 
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individual rights rested on one’s place in the company’s hierarchy of employees: settlers, 
mixed races and the slaves (ibid). The social hierarchy was the foundation on which racial 
discrimination was established in South Africa from the period of its creation. Even though 
there were numerous divisions that occurred among the Afrikaners and the English-speaking 
whites, the two groups were united in their willpower to ensure that blacks stayed in a state of 
ever-lasting subordination (ibid). 
  
Under the rule of the National Party in 1948, apartheid was developed and this was used as a 
mechanism to cement their control over the economic and social system (Maharaj 2008). 
Originally the main objective was to sustain white domination and increasing racial 
separation. Apartheid was implemented, emphasizing territorial separation and police 
repression. With the enactment of the apartheid laws of 1948, racial discrimination was 
institutionalized. The race laws affected every facet of social life including a prohibition of 
marriage between non-white and white and the endorsing of “white-only” jobs (ibid). By the 
1950s, the Population Registration Act necessitated “that all South Africans be racially 
classified into one of three categories: White, Black (African) or colored (of mixed decent). 
The colored category included major subgroups of Indians and Asians” (Maharaj 2008).  
Classification into these Categories was based on appearance, social acceptance, and descent 
(Ibid).For example, a white person was defined as ``in appearance obviously a white person 
or generally accepted as a white person'' (Maharaj 2008). A person was only considered to be 
white if both parents were white people while taking into account his or her “habits, 
education, speech, deportment and demeanor.”  A black person would be accepted as a 
member of an African tribe/race, while a colored person was one that was not black or white 
(ibid). 
  
The department of native affairs was in control of the cataloguing of the populace. Defiance 
of the race laws led to arrest, beatings and even death (Price 1991).  The black populace 
carried pass books showing fingerprints, photo and individual information when entering 
non-black areas.  By 1951, the Bantu Authorities Act established a basis for ethnic 
government in African reserves referred to as “homelands”. The intention was to have 
independent states to which each African was allotted by the government according to the 
record of origin (this was frequently inaccurate). All the political rights that involve voting, 
held by an African, were restricted to the designated homeland. This was on a presumption 
that they would be citizens of the homeland, losing their citizenships in South Africa and any 
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right of involvement with the South African parliament, which held complete hegemony over 
the homelands. From 1976 to 1981, four of these homelands,  Transkei, Bophuthatswane, 
Venda and Ciskei were created, denationalizing nine million South African people (ibid).   
 
Generally, the system of apartheid was characterized and imposed by a sequence of laws that 
banned most inter-racial social contacts, imposed discrimination of public facilities and the 
separation of educational standards, shaped race-specific job classifications, restricted the 
powers of non-white unions and curtailed non-white participation in the government. With 
the help of the Population Registration Act of 1950, the Group Areas Act of 1950 allocated 
races to dissimilar residential and business sections in urban areas, and the Land Acts of 1954 
and 1955 restricted non-white residence to specific areas.  The laws controlled the formerly 
limited right of black Africans to the ownership of land, embedding the white minority’s 
control of over eighty per cent of South African lands (Price 1991). As though that was not 
enough, in 1953 the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act were passed.   
 
In these acts the government was empowered to declare stringent states of emergency, and 
increased penalties for protesting against or supporting the repeal of a law.  The penalties 
included fines, imprisonment and whippings. In 1960 this resulted in the Sharpeville 
massacre of a large group of blacks after they refused to carry their passes forcing the 
government to declare a state of emergency. The emergency lasted for 156 days leaving 69 
people dead and 187 wounded. The white regime had no intention of altering the unjust laws 
of apartheid when they exerted the Public Safety Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
(Prince 1991). Such penalties that were imposed on political protest were severe, even though 
they were peaceful. Through the state of emergency period that went on to 1989, any person 
was likely to be detained without a hearing by a low-level police official for six or more 
months.  Thousands of individuals lost their lives in custody, frequently after horrific acts of 
torture by the white minority. Those who were tried, were sentenced to death, banished or 
given a life imprisonment, such as Nelson Mandela (ibid). 
 
Even though racial discrimination was predominantly conflict based during apartheid, there 
were also other conflicts triggered by the structure of apartheid. These included inter-political 
conflicts, black on black violence and taxi violence. Some of these conflicts are still in 
existence today.  The main objective of apartheid was to sustain white domination and 
lengthening racial separation. One of the mechanisms used to attain this goal was to 
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implement the Population Registration Act that which, according to Maharaj (2008), meant 
that all South Africans be racially classified into one of three categories: White, Black 
(African) or colored (of mixed decent). The colored category included major subgroups of 
Indians and Asians. Considering the black population was the majority, they were still sub-
divided into their tribal groups; IsiZulu, Tshwana, Pedi, Sotho, Venda, Xhosa, and so forth. 
Even with separation already in place,  apartheid employed the divide and rule strategy to 
sustain their domination. Also the Afrikaner right wing found it impossible to create a 
depoliticized stability considering that they were aiming at entangling blacks in ideological 
and strategic conflicts (Heribert & Moodley, 1986). Prior to 1994, in the struggle against the 
principle of white supremacy, the black population who were oppressed was so determined to 
attain national liberation at any costs. 
 
As a result, different political parties emerged from the oppressed group (blacks) in a bid to 
fight against supremacy and attain freedom. In bids to fight against the white supremacy, they 
ended up fighting each other. The National Party used the divide and rule mechanisms to 
incite hate feelings and further their parochial games. This was aimed to create conflicts 
among the blacks and prolong white supremacy. In the wrath of apartheid, the difference 
between political and criminal conduct was indistinct. The opposition (the marginalized 
blacks) who regarded themselves as ‘freedom fighters’ justified their conduct as legitimate 
and an appropriate weapon against the racist regime (Heribert & Moodley, 1986). Although, 
there was a common goal of fighting for unity, there were numerous disarrays amongst the 
black opposition which in turn resulted in conflicts amongst them.  For instance, the 
emergence of the National Forum (NF) in 1983 and of the United Democratic Front (UDF) a 
few months later, revived the debates amongst the Congress-oriented careerists and black 
consciousness adherents (ibid). Also, in the mid-1980s, violence in the Eastern Cape and in 
the Witwatersrand industrial complex, between supporters of Black Consciousness (AZAPO 
followers who came to be named ZimZims), the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the 
African National Congress (ANC). In KwaZulu-Natal, there was an all-out turf war among 





2.5 Post-apartheid conflict transformation 
Given the foregoing racial discrimination, the struggle and transformation from autocratic 
rule to democratic rule has often been a painful one (Graeme, 1998). The race-based structure 
of South Africa encouraged a sense of separateness among the black communities and a sense 
of unity based on common experience.  The two propensities towards disparity and 
assimilation determined the conformation of the freedom struggle in South Africa.  Each 
black community established separate political organizations to champion its cause. The 
Natal Indian Congress (NIC) was formed in 1894; the African People’s Organization (APO), 
which came to be identified with the Coloured population, in 1906 and the African National 
Congress (ANC) in 1912.   
Ever since 1994, under the rule of the ANC, some South Africans believe that, since 
apartheid is a thing of the past, racism too is a thing of the past (Puttick, 2011). Yet the reality 
is that racism remains a minefield in South Africa and ‘race’ still impacts on the lives of all 
South Africans (ibid). Over 18 years after the abolition of apartheid, provides an opportune 
moment to consider new and changing contexts of ‘race’ radicalized identity and racialization 
in South Africa (ibid). 
Some scholars like Obasanjo (1991) argue that South Africa has not reached the post-
apartheid era although it is shifting slightly to a volatile manner to the extent that apartheid 
can be avowed dead even if not buried. As South Africa is emerging from a history 
considered to be violent and repressive, the country faces new challenges with the slow 
maturation of democracy (Harris 2001). Conflict today is intricate, dynamic and creative in 
form shaped by both apartheid and the mechanisms of transition itself (ibid). Post-apartheid 
South Africa is notable for the intensity of its racial and ethnic antagonisms (Puttick, 2011). 
Among others, the nature of conflict includes xenophobia, taxi violence, political 
assassinations, violent service delivery protests and labor unrest as part of the nature of the 
conflict in post-apartheid South Africa. These conflicts are in some way or another to the 
historical conflict of apartheid in South Africa. 
 
According to Neocosmos (2006: 1), “South Africa has experienced a massive problem of 
xenophobia since its liberation in 1994, a problem which is particularly shocking given the 
massive international support for the struggle against apartheid particularly during the 
1980s.” Kollapan (1990), Tshitereke (1999) use the term xenophobia to signify a strong 
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dislike of foreigners. In this way, xenophobia is an aversion or fear characterized by negative 
attitudes towards foreign nationals, or even animosity. 
 
As such, racism in post-apartheid South Africa would not be complete without an elaboration 
on the issue of xenophobia (Fine & Bird: 2006). Xenophobia according to SAHRC (1998) is 
referred to as the deep dislike of non-nationals by nationals of a recipient state. Media 
Monitoring Project (2003) in Fine & Bird (2006) points to the connection between racism and 
xenophobia: 
  
Racism and xenophobia are independent concepts but invariably support each other and share 
discriminatory discourses. They are both anti-democratic, the abuse of human rights, and 
promotion of unfair and unjustified discrimination. Racism and xenophobia operate on the 
basis of the profiling of people and making negative assumptions about them. While the 
former profiles individuals in terms of their race, the latter profiles individuals in terms of 
their nationality. These profiles are often negative and lead to the creation and perpetuation of 
generalizations and stereotypes (MMP, 2003:82-83). 
  
In light of the above, Fine & Bird (2006) assert that issues of xenophobia in the post-
apartheid South African state would not be complete without an elaborate narration on the  
account of racism and selective discrimination perpetuated by the apartheid regime. 
According to Nhala (2003: 1) Xenophobia equals the deep dislike of non-nationals by 
nationals of a recipient state. Xenophobia in South Africa is accounted for as a comparatively 
topical singularity that has attracted much attention, most notably since the end of apartheid 
(Fine & Bird, 2006). This explains why in 1996, a study conducted by the Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) cited in Fine and Bird (2006) categorized South Africa as a decidedly 
xenophobic state The country turned progressively xenophobic in recent years, with an 
enormous fraction of South African nationals identifying foreigners, specifically black 
immigrants from elsewhere in Africa, as a direct menace to their overall welfare and future 
economic well-being. The same groups are also blamed for the troubling rise in violent crime 
in South Africa (Fine & Bird, 2006). 
  
Neocosmos (2006) argues that the intensification in xenophobic enmity is directed at those 
who are believed to be non-citizens amounts to a denial of rights and entitlements, expressed 
through prejudice and stereotypes. It reveals itself through incitement to and actions of 
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obvious exclusion, hostility and violence against people just because of what is believed to be 
their foreign status (ibid). The intense tension and violence by South Africans towards 
immigrants from elsewhere in Africa is on the alleged grounds that black African immigrants 
pose a threat to their jobs, health care, education and so on. 
  
It was evident on the 11th May 2008 when the world woke to reports of shocking attacks on 
foreign nationals of African descent by South African nationals (CRAI 2009). The violence 
started in poor neighborhoods of Alexandra in Johannesburg and rapidly spread to other cities 
including Cape Town and Pretoria (Ibid). Over 62 people were reported dead by the end of 
May and a vast majority were in Gauteng Province, where the country’s economic capital, 
Johannesburg and administrative capital Pretoria are situated (ibid).  As a result, thousands of 
migrants and Africans were victims of criminal violence; women and children were attacked 
and raped and thousands had their houses and belongings either looted or destroyed. The 
most severely affected groups were Africans from Mozambique and Zimbabwe, although the 
migrants from elsewhere in African countries such as Somalia, Nigeria, and Ethiopia together 
with a substantial number of the South African nationals also became victims of the conflict 
(ibid).   
  
Taxi violence is another form of conflict in the post-apartheid era. It emerged in 1987 in the 
wake of the apartheid rule’s policy of economy deregulation (Sekhonyane & Dugard, 2004).  
Before deregulation, the taxi operators, who were black, had to repel apartheid rules and the 
severe principles that were disadvantageous to blacks (ibid). Transport regulations were 
mainly embodied in the 1930 Act of Motor Carrier Transportation. It stipulated that no 
transportation of goods or passengers were allowed without permission from the Local Road 
Transportation Board (ibid). Due to the discriminatory control system, it was impossible for 
black operators to procure a permit from the LRTB. It was impossible to prove that they had 
a good formal employment record. Most of the black operators survived in the magisterial 
district as lawfully registered tenants for decades and even owned a daily labourer’s permit 
(ibid). This meant that the system had over 90% of taxi permit applications by blacks were 
disallowed. In these difficult conditions most black taxi operators worked illegally using 
private saloon vehicles as taxis (ibid). 
  
Even if an applicant was eligible for a taxi license, this act only sanctioned the use of 
particular cars that are small (limited to transporting only four passengers) and there was a 
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quota system where only a limited number of licenses were issued each year (ibid).  Buses 
and trains were insufficient and extremely costly and so there was a high demand for taxis 
that far surpassed the supply.  In the 1980s and onwards, taxi operators started to use bigger 
‘kombi’ minibuses that carried approximately 15 passengers. Such taxis were banned until 
the formal deregulation in 1987 (ibid). Nevertheless they were prevalent among the black 
commuters simply because there services ran late at night, unlike the other means of transport 
options, journeyed to places that were considered to out-of-the-way; collected the commuters 
from their homes and dropped them back and made expedient stopovers on elongated 
distances.  The fares charged were quite reasonable and saved a lot of time spent in lengthy 
queues at bus and train stations (ibid). 
  
Considering that there was an increasing number of illegal kombi taxis, there were changes 
happening in the apartheid government that had intense effects on the industry. In the early 
1970s the apartheid regime started to observe its near-monopoly on the public transportation 
sector, which had originally been used to defend and prop up the South African Transport 
Services (SATS), as an economic burden (ibid). The 1977 Van Breda Commission of Inquiry 
into the Road Transportation Bill found that South Africa “had reached a stage of economic 
and industrial development which enabled it to move towards a freer competition in 
transportation”. The Commission’s findings reflected a neo-liberal shift in economic policy 
that resulted in generalized deregulation, commercialization and privatization, beginning in 
the late 1970s. 
  
Sekhonyane & Dugard (2004) mentions that in the period between 1987 and 1994, the formal 
endeavors to tackle the taxi industry were close to not existing. As soon as the violence 
exploded, the South African government consistently became a part of the problem (ibid). It 
is as though in the best of times, the police attitude and behavior was remiss during the period 
when apartheid was concluding and at the worst of times the police were already used to their 
positions of power to support rifts amongst associations and to subvert the marginalized black 
communities (ibid).  In numerous regions within South Africa, the police were connected in 
attacks or somehow were at least in other forms partisan (ibid).  Also, at large, their 
premeditated inactions that encompassed a failure to disarm the attackers or even at least to 
answer to forewarnings of innate attacks instead, the police increased the conflict (ibid). 
Nonetheless, despite the numerous expectations, the sequences of taxi violence stimulated in 
the period when apartheid was concluding did not necessarily end with the demise of 
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apartheid (ibid). Undeniably, among the different forms of political violence that vanished or 
disappeared after 1994, taxi violence actually worsened in the immediate post 1994 era (ibid). 
  
In a conflicting society like South Africa, transformation is vital as it brings into focus the 
perspective towards which we take a journey especially in creating strong relations and 
societies both in the vicinities and universally (Lederach & Michelle, 1995). Conflict 
transformation according to Hugh (2004), refers to, “a process of engaging with and altering 
the relations, discourses welfares and, if essential, the very constituents of society that 
supports the continuance of violent conflict”. With conflict transformation, it is not merely 
enough to resolve one set of issues amidst parties who then continue in a mental frame of 
mutual suspicion and resentment, in relation to loathed interdependence and protected in a 
structure from which major salient contentions will unavoidably arise (Mitchell, 2002). 
  
Mitchell (2002) and Hugh (2004) argue that conflict transformation suggests a lot more than 
merely finding a solution to one set of conflicting interests and standards required. The notion 
of ‘transformation’ suggests bringing about some key changes in some aspects of the conflict 
or the socio-political system in which it is surrounded or in something else while the idea of 
‘resolution’ suggests the process of finding a solution to some problem. Nonetheless, the 
conception of profound change is implied (Mitchell 2002 & Hugh 2004).  Lederach (1995, 
15) states that nonviolent resistance and conflict transformation strategies have a conjoint 
commitment to a collective change and increased justice through peaceful means. Essentially, 
the discipline of conflict management or resolution initially ascended from peace movements 
and social justice activism (Dukes 1999, 169). 
  
Dudouet (2008) argues that a nonviolent resistance should be perceived as an integral part of 
conflict transformation proposing a potential approach to attaining peace and justice together 
with other methods of conflict intervention concentrating on dialogue, problem solving and 
the restoration of cooperative relationships, for instance mediation, negotiation, restorative 
justice and so forth (Dudouet, 2008). This is mostly significant at the first transitional stage of 
dormant asymmetric conflicts as a strategy for empowering grievance groups that is the 
oppressed minorities or disempowered majorities and looking for productive and efficient 
ways to achieving justice, human rights and democracy without the alternative of violence 
(Dudouet, 2008). Also, Curle (1971) states that the asymmetric relationships can be 
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transmuted through a shift from unbalanced to balanced relationships attained through a 
process of conscientization, confrontation, negotiation and development. 
  
Consequently, people within the opposing parties of the society affected, and those outside 
the conflicting society that have significant human and material resources, all have 
complementary roles to play in the long running process of peace building (Hugh, 2004).  
This advocates a broad and widespread approach that accentuates support for groups within 
society in conflict rather than the mediation of the outsiders. It further identifies that conflicts 
are gradually transformed through a series of minor or greater changes and also with specific 
steps in which a variety of actors may play significant roles. In the words of Lederach, 
“Conflict transformation must actively envision and include respect, and promotion of the 
human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new set of lenses 
through which we do not primarily‚ see ‘the setting and the people in it as the problem and 
the outsider as the answer‘. Rather, we understand the long-term goal of transformation as 
validating and building on people and resources within the setting” (Lederach 1995). 
  
Since apartheid began in 1948 under National Party (NP), it involved manipulation of 
territory and population by well-organized minorities (Kivimaki & Auvinen, 2010). With the 
aim of introducing apartheid, the NP introduced techniques of partition and racial grouping, 
imposed a sequence of laws like the Group Areas Act of 1950 that allocated races to 
dissimilar residential and business sections in urban areas, and the Land Acts of 1954 and 
1955 restricting non-white residence to specific areas. Other laws also banned most inter-
racial social contacts, imposed discrimination of public facilities and the separation of 
educational standards, shaped race-specific job classifications, restricted the powers of non-
white unions and curtailed non-white participation in the government (Price 1991). It is on 
these grounds that South Africa was established into minorities and majorities considering 
that the political system was made in such a way that the democratic space through repressive 
laws and partisan security forces were restricted. Consequently, through a combination of 
force and ethnic solidarity the majorities fought the minority government on grounds of the 
right of self-determination to fight against the apartheid regime (Kisiangani2004). 
  
Aftermaths of the conflict transformation in post-apartheid South Africa were conflicts over 
distribution of resources that are tied to conflicts over reconciliation. In the attempts to 
transform the apartheid conflict, the government of South Africa implemented mechanisms 
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like Justice and Truth Reconciliation and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) to bring 
about reconciliation and restoration. One of the ways was through the distribution of 
resources to the South African people who were previously marginalized. However, this has 
caused a controversy in that the privileged minorities during apartheid (South African whites) 
view it as a sort of reverse discrimination and not a mechanism to bring about reconciliation 
and restoration (Erasmus, 2005).  
  
2.6 Conclusion 
The literature review was limited to conflicts in the pre-colonial era and the apartheid regime. 
It later on examined the post-apartheid conflict transformation. Analyzing the authors' views 
on conflict and conflict transformation, the study offers various definitions of conflict and 
conflict transformation and the various types of conflict. The last section of chapter two 
examined the link of the conflict in the post-apartheid era to conflict traced from the pre-











 This chapter will critically analyses at the contemporary legal structure of South Africa 
considering that the legal systems has a bearing on all the other state sectors and argue there 
is need for the legal structure to be re-arranged. It will also examine the rationale of 
reconstructing the economic sector of South Africa.  
 
3.2 The rationale of transforming apartheid structural arrangements 
 
Even though the democratic dispensation in South Africa has brought about formal, political, 
egalitarianism, and freedom to the nation, some of the evils of apartheid rule are still 
predominant in the post-apartheid era.  These include occupational segregation, inequalities 
in pay for equal work, lack of or severely limited access to training and development 
opportunities. In an attempt to deal with some of these discrepancies, various apartheid 
structural arrangements ought to be transformed so as to undo the evils and inequalities of the 
past. This section of the work concerns itself with transforming the legal structure that seems 
applicable to all the other sectors that need transformation and mentions some transformation 
in the economic sector. The choice for transforming the legal system is because one cannot 
talk of education, fare wages, poverty alleviation, security system, economic development, 
health services among others without reference to what the legislature says; the legal system 
has a bearing on all state sectors. 
 
The current nature of violent conflict in South Africa has evidently transformed since post-
apartheid, these conflicts are nonetheless rooted in apartheid. Transforming the legal system 
which is still attached to the structural arrangements of apartheid, can be one of the ways to 
get rid of these conflicts in post-apartheid. This is due to the fact that when one analyses the 
conflicts such as xenophobia, black on black, taxi violence, social violence, political 
assassinations, domestic and gender violence etc, these are triggered by income inequality, 
fair wages, poverty, poor service deliveries and scarcity of resources. These usually tend to 
be the main causes of violent conflict in post-apartheid South Africa. As such, transforming 
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the legal system which is still attached to the apartheid era, entails also transforming 
education, fair wages, poverty alleviation, security systems, economic development, public 
services which have a bearing on all state sectors. The need for change in the legal system is 
on the grounds that perhaps it could help get rid of the causes of conflicts rooted in the 
apartheid structural arrangements still in existence. 
 
As discussed in chapter two, the nature of violence in post-1994, such as xenophobia, black-
on-black violence, taxi violence, crimes across the country, inability to heal past wounds, and 
poverty, reflects the nature of violence in the apartheid era. In regards to occupational 
segregation, Nicoli Nattrass in Rich, (1996:125) noted that ‘a new political age has dawned in 
South Africa, yet the country remains plagued by inequality, weak growth and chronic 
unemployment.’ Though Nattrass (1996) does not say whether or not the inequality, weak 
growth and chronic unemployment exist across all races many people in the post-1994 era are 
still poor and unemployed. Statistics South Africa (2011) reported that ‘unemployment has 
climbed to its highest to 25.5% leaving more than over four million jobless since 2008. One 
thing that may lead to conflict of any nature is if promises of improvement in economic, 
political and social milieu are not fulfilled. Many South Africans expected that they would be 
better off after the defeat of apartheid but to their dismay, the same evils that they fought 
against, especially poor working conditions and poverty still persist. With this dissatisfaction, 
some South Africans are still looking for a government that would liberate them from these 
misfortunes hence the high rate of strikes in the mining sector and farms. 
 
In the ‘Witness’ Newspaper of November 16, 2012, Cloete shows that although there are 
good farmers in South Africa, the agricultural sector is rife with exploitation as evident in the 
frequent reports of poor living conditions, poor wages, destroyed landscapes and horrible 
environmental conditions. Therefore, inequalities in pay for wages and exploitation, 
especially in the agricultural sector, pose a problem that does not answer or respond to the 
living conditions of many South Africans. People who have been plagued by violence and 
atrocities of some sort would not wish to be treated the way they had experienced before. In 
‘The New Age’ Newspaper of 4 March 2013, Omphemetse Molopyane observed that ‘we 
have come from a violent past not of our own making; unfortunately violence attracts 
attention in all spheres of life. The experience of the recent past has proved that being 
peaceful, disciplined and orderly when you want attention is useless and ineffective.’ Hence, 
those caught up in exploitation, low wages, and poor working conditions resort to violence 
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because it is the only way through which they can attract the attention of the public. This is 
no different from the liberation struggle during apartheid when the oppressed majority of 
South Africans rose up in violent protest in order to be heard even though it cost some their 
lives; a situation that was also witnessed in the Marikana saga. 
 
The majority of South Africans still feel that the police force that was gradually changed to 
police service has witnessed a leakage in their duties of serving rather than forcing people to 
keep law and order. Max du Preez acknowledged that ‘for many decades white policemen 
and soldiers, tasked with killing the enemies of the apartheid state, were glorified and for 
decades the guerrillas and militia fighting for the state with violence were glorified...the most 
important question we ask now is how we have addressed our problems of violence and 
crime since then; how we try to overcome the past’ (The Mercury, March 5, 2013). 
 
In 2012, the country witnessed more than two-hundred protests, most of which turned violent. 
The best way to address our culture of violence and crime, Max du Preez suggests is ‘to have 
an efficient police service...we should start with the total transformation of our police service 
as the first step to lowering the violence, crime and abuse of women and children in our 
society’ (The Mercury, March 5, 2013). The point is people act violently in post-1994 
because they think it is the only way they can draw government attention to listen to their 
grievances. 
 
As a general claim for the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997, it is asserted that 
‘To give effect to the right to fair labour practices referred to in section 23 (1) of the 
Constitution by establishing and making provision for the regulation of basic conditions of 
employment; and thereby to comply with the obligations of the Republic as a member state of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO); and to provide for matters connected therewith.’ 
Despite the vehement intensity laid down in this Act, there are nevertheless, enormous unfair 
labor practices and poor basic labor conditions of employees in many employment fields. 
According to Statistics South Africa (2011), during the years 2010 to 2011, employment 
decreased by 14 000 with the formal sector gaining 56,000 and informal sector losing 46,000 
jobs respectively. Approximately over 102,000 people across South Africa are under-paid, 
have unsafe working conditions especially those in the mines, just to mention but a few 
(ibid). These and many other examples are just a replication of what happened during the 
apartheid period in which labor discrimination was rampant and oppression and allocation of 
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jobs was determined by color of skin. In as much as the law looks vibrant, it is not adhered to 
by the enforcers of the law when it comes to applying it in practice. 
 
In regard to employment opportunities, not all of South Africans of working age and proper 
qualifications are employed; in fact a big population is unemployed. The labour survey in 
Statistics South Africa (2011) reported that ‘unemployment has climbed to its highest to 
25.5% leaving more than over four million jobless since 2008. One would be puzzled as to 
why such happens when one of the priorities of the government is to create more jobs for 
South Africans. While the economic growth performance in the first decade of democracy 
continues to be justifiably acclaimed, there remains severe and unchangeable welfare 
challenges. This welfare challenge is more acute in the area of labour markets. The South 
African economy is an economy characterized by one of the highest unemployment rates in 
the world – officially at 26.7 % and 38.8 % when discouraged workers are included – is a 
clear cut reminder of the post-apartheid challenges of South Africa’s economic challenges in 
view of going forward (Bhorat, Pauw, &Mncube, 2007:1). 
  
There are various reasons for unemployment in South Africa according to Statistic South 
Africa (2012) and these  include the labour demand versus the supply mismatch in the  slow 
adjustment of the skill structures in a period of rapid structural change that characterizes the 
post-transition (ibid). Due to the fact that the apartheid regime restricted black people to 
attain skills in such a way that NP deprived the black people of good schools where they 
could get qualifications and attain specialized skills. Presently, the majority of the black 
population still face the aftermath of the apartheid regime in that the victims of the apartheid 
are still left uneducated, working in blue collar jobs and the amount they earn is not sufficient 
to educate their children up to university level. They are left with no choice but either drop 
out of school or look for small unskilled jobs for survival. Hence a slow adjustment of the 
skill structure in a period of rapid structural change, characterized in the post-apartheid era. 
Wage and employment is also another cause of unemployment whereby the rising real wage 
rates are triggered by strong trade unions, minimum wage and affirmative action legislation 
which plays a vital role in shaping better conditions of employment and yet at the same time 
plays a chief role in effecting the job losses versus job creations (ibid). 
 
Another cause for unemployment in South Africa is the nature of economic growth whereby 
if South Africa’s gross domestic product growth rate develops very low, this might have an 
39 
 
effect on the job creations since there are few economic opportunities and hence not much 
room for transformation (ibid). Consequently, there is high unemployment and poverty 
levels. Labour Force participation growth rate is yet another cause of unemployment in South 
Africa in that if the employment growth does not match the population growth, it implies that 
there is employment but it does not cater to everyone who want it and as a result there is 
increased levels of unemployment (ibid). Since there is already a scarcity of jobs in South 
Africa the marginalized workers are willing to get any job in order to survive and meet the 
basic needs even though the working conditions may be poor.  The difficulties inherent in the 
labour market such as unemployment, working conditions, unfair wages, and labor 
discrimination need reform. Ironically, the labor regulatory reform is almost always on the 
agenda of significant policy issues in South Africa. 
 
As early as 1924, the Industrial Conciliation Act, which was comprehensively established to 
deal with dispute resolution, was promulgated. ‘This Act excluded African employees, and 
was established to resolve disputes of interest. Interest disputes are disputes about the 
creation of new rights, for example, wage increases and new conditions of employment’ 
(Bhorat, H., Pauw, K., &Mncube, L. 2007:2). even though this Act introduced a new step in 
improving working conditions of employees, it nevertheless favored a fraction of the 
minority population to the disadvantage of the majority black population. From then on, 
amendments of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 were effected in 1937 and again in 
1956. The 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act created an industrial tribunal to arbitrate disputes 
although it was limited to job reservation disputes and not all labor disputes’ (Bhorat, H., 
Pauw, K., &Mncube, L. 2007:2). Due to the constant opposition of oppressed workers in the 
1970s, the Labour Relations Act came into force in 1977 and  in 1979 it was amended to 
remove the exclusion of Africans from the 1956 Act and introduced the ‘concept of ‘unfair 
labour practice’ and charged the Industrial court with adjudicating unfair labor practices’ 
(Bhorat, H., Pauw, K., &Mncube, L. 2007:2). These dispensations marked a new era for 
South Africa whereby the labor relations system assumed co-operation as opposed to the then 
prevailing confrontation. The Labor Act of 1977 is important because it only established 
certain limited rights for black workers. 
 
Samuel Weber in Carpenter (2008:601), pointed out that ‘what is just is thus defined in terms 
of right, rightfulness and righteousness, but also as the implementation of this right, including 
realization, application, enforcement, and sanction; justice is both an ethical principle and a 
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legal institution.’ In general, this is because the conceptions of justice and law have 
historically been viewed as being necessarily removed from the particulars of context. Weber 
continues: ‘Law is abstract, law is universal, law is "this celestial voice that dictates to each 
citizen the precepts of public reason, and teaches him to follow the maxims of his own 
judgment and not to be incessantly in contradiction with himself. The laws are the driving 
force…of the body politic”.’ In the view of Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Carpenter (2008:601), 
the historical consideration of law is to be representative of a general will which is radically 
distinct from all particularity and individuality:‘. . .The general will, to be true to itself, must 
be general in its object as well as in its essence; that it should have its point of departure in 
the whole in order to return to the whole, and that it loses its natural rectitude once it stoops 
to (tombesur) an individual and determinate subject.’ In this definition, Rousseau managed to 
link the relationship between the public and the private but his view drifts to seeing this 
relationship as a social pact that gives the body discreet absolute power over its subjects. It is 
this essential conciliation between public and private spheres that the law is deliberated to 
establish. 
 
With the emergence of the structures of labor dispute resolution in South Africa, the 1995 
Labour Relations Act (LRA) created the institutions and processes for dispute resolution. 
“These institutions include; the Commission for Conciliation,Mediation and Arbitration (the 
CCMA) and the Labour Courts (the Labour Court and the LabourAppeal Court)” (Bhorat, H., 
Pauw, K., &Mncube, L. 2007:3). The CCMA was charged with the responsibility to 
authorize Private Agencies and Bargaining Councils to perform any or all of its duties. 
Through this, parties were able to choose which institutions to turn to in case needs arise. The 
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In Figure 1 above, the Labour Relations Act (LRA) provides for the determination of disputes 
of rights through adjudication by the Labour Courts or arbitration either by the CCMA, 
private dispute resolution institutions or Bargaining Councils. By and large, disputes have to 
be conciliated before they proceed to arbitration or adjudication.  ‘If disputes of rights are not 
resolved at conciliation, they are referred to either arbitration or adjudication. The reason why 
some disputes go to arbitration and others go to adjudication in the Labour Courts is the 
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public policy aspect of certain kinds of disputes (for example, retrenchments). Hence issues 
which could affect public policy fall under the jurisdiction of the Labour Court (Bhorat, 
Pauw, &Mncube, 2007:4). 
 
Due to ideological and contextual changes in South Africa over the years, amendments of the 
LRA continued to be shaped culminating in that of the 2002 that places the matter of 
representation in arbitration in the hands of the CCMA. However, “it is sometimes argued 
that the CCMA has not created proper rules relating to the right of representation as was 
intended by the enabling legislation and this has created a loophole allowing an unrestricted 
right to representation before the CCMA” (Bhorat, H., Pauw, K., &Mncube, L. 2007:5). As 
can be seen in the figure above, not all cases are referred to the CCMA. “For example, cases 
where an independent contractor is involved; cases that do not deal with an issue in the LRA 
or Employment Equity Act; where a bargaining council exists for that sector; where a private 
agreement exists for resolving disputes, and so on, would do not go to the CCMA” (Bhorat, 
H., Pauw, K., &Mncube, L. 2007:5); “the new constitution, so hard-won and so essential, 
may not be worth much more than the paper it’s written on. After all, no document in itself-
regardless of the values it enshrines-can guarantee success” (Keeva 1994:52). 
 
Yet some observers conclude: 
  
In spite of these achievements, the CCMA faces several challenges. For example, as 
Ngcukaitobi (2004) argues, the CCMA has not been able to resolve disputes as expeditiously 
as had been hoped at the time of its establishment. Brand (2001) suggests that the difficulties 
experienced by the CCMA are due to financial and human resource constraints. Resource 
constraints also impact on the quality of the administrative service provided by the CCMA. 
Furthermore, as indicated by Molahlehi (2005) the CCMA commissioners in the process of 
narrowing issues, are under immense case load pressure and the need to meet case 
efficiencies. 
  
It is paramount that law practitioners understand the constitution that would really boost the 
legal system’s reliability. This implies equipping lawyers with skills they need in their field. 
During the apartheid era for instance, the parliament was the supreme maker and arbiter of 
the law. It had been a common practice that ‘if a judge made a ruling that did not sit well with 
the all-white body, it simply passed a new law. For lawyers, things were cut and dried: The 
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law meant exactly what it said; intent was immaterial and there was no authority above the 
parliament to which one might appeal’ (Keeva, 1994:51). South Africa as a country has the 
resources both human and material, but the challenge is whether or not these resources are 
well used. In the case of human resources, capacity development, especially in the field of 
law and lawyers, is still an aspect that deserves closer attention.   
  
Considering that during the apartheid regime, laws and regulations were imposed and the 
South Africa people were forced to abide by the laws, failure to do this resulted in 
imprisonment or even death. During the apartheid regime, the lawyers relied on the 
deliberations of parliament to an extent that for lawyers everything was presented and based 
on the laws set by the NP government. There were few times that they engaged in all legal 
procedures to establish a particular case’s credibility. This indeed affected the legal system in 
the post-apartheid era. In this era, some of the lawyers today are faced with the difficulty of 
adapting to the real practice of law considering that there are still some laws still attached to 
the apartheid regime. In as much as we strive to transform the legal framework of South 
Africa, there is even the greater demand to capacitate South African lawyers with all the legal 
trainings they need in order to reconstruct a brighter South Africa. The definition and 
protection of rights however is not enough; there is the most important need to understand 
human rights and the supremacy of the constitution. Lawyers and judges therefore, have to 
understand that they are only accountable to the constitution. Lawyers and judges lapse when 
they decide to be accountable to the President instead of the constitution, as a result, traces of 
ignorance and illegitimacy can be identified in their legal practices. 
 
In addition to the severe laws and regulations put in place, resulting in South Africa being 
sanctioned economically by United Nations and the Great powers since the late 1980s, South 
Africa underwent some tremendous economic sanctions hoping to act as a tool for liberation. 
Since its inception in 1980, the sanctions had immense effects to an extent that the African 
National Congress (ANC) urged the world community to end its sanctions against South 
Africa. Due to this sanction, South Africa’s white-controlled economy was potentially very 
vulnerable to the economy of the country since it relied heavily on foreign capital. The 
foreign capital related directly to trade as Davis (1993:16) indicated that ‘from 1964 to 1974, 




Foreign investment averaged 14 percent during the first five years of the 1970s and peaked at 
24.5 percent in 1975-76 before collapsing to 2 percent during the unrest after Steve Biko was 
killed in 1977.’ Above all, although slow, sanctions have been a potent force for South 
African liberation. These sanctions relate to the current economic bearing of South Africa. 
George Soros (one of President Mbeki’s economic advisers), told the World Economic 
Forum in Davos, Switzerland in 2001 that ‘South Africa is in the hands of international 
capital. While average white household income has risen by 15% since black majority rule, 
according to government statistics, average black household income has fallen by 19%’ 
(Pilger 2007:17). While the average white household income has risen by 15% since black 
majority rule, according to government statistics, the average black household income is 
improving at a slow rate by 19%’ (Pilger 2007:17).  The underlying point is that the 
economic structures need to be transformed too because some of the vices for which the 
liberation was intended is not improving. The affected population want their working 
conditions, unfair wages, or any other associated evils improved. The government needs to 
uplift the economic situations of the poor by transforming the legal and economic structures 
of this society. 
  
Some of the government leaders admit that the black society is still poor and the Minister for 
Trade and Industry has accepted the truth of poverty among blacks. In an article titled 
Widening gap of rich, The Witness (02.11.2012:2) reports that President Jacob Zuma denies 
that the notion of an increasing gap between the rich and the poor is true. While speaking at 
the official opening of the National House of Traditional Leaders in Parliament the President 
said: 
 
‘…the income gap was a lie that had been repeated several times in the past 18 years. “We’ve almost come to 
believe it is true that ever since 1994 the gap has been widening…it’s not scientifically correct,” he said…the 
growing gap between the classes was “spin” meant to unfairly criticize the government…there was no 
measurement of the wealth gap before 1994, as only white people were counted in the census…”We [black 
people] were pushed into the homelands…we were not counted and we did not even know how much we 
are,”…In fact, poverty was worse [before 1994] than it is now…people are getting grants, which they did not 
get before…If that is not closing the gap what is?”   
  
There is indeed truth in that the situation did not remain the same after 1994. Whatever the 
President means by “it’s not scientifically correct”, the struggle pre-1994 was meant to 
change the economic and oppressive situation of the citizens. The nature of South Africa’s 
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transition, combined with the inability of the justice system to deal successfully with those 
responsible for human rights violations, should instead make it necessary to develop a more 
creative approach to deal with the past other than denying an apparent evil such as economic 
oppression. 
  
The Bill of Rights, which constitutes the second chapter of the South Africa constitution, 
spells out the rights of people that must be respected and protected by the government. The 
promulgation of this article points out ‘the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination 
regardless of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. It also guarantees 
freedom of movement and speech, freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of 
religion and the right to access basic services, education and healthcare’ (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
  
It is true that the law protects every South African citizen but access to legal proceedings by 
the poor South African is a great concern. Poor South Africans form the majority of the 
country yet legal presentations in the court demand a lot of money. Therefore, even if a poor 
man or woman is aware of the stipulations of the law, may not proceed to this path to claim 
his or her rights due to financial constraints. As though this is not enough, in the course of 
fighting for their rights, some of the poor people who got some work to do in order to 
survive, get retrenched from their jobs should they participate in legal strikes. For instance, 
according to The Mercury News Paper, Dineo Faku (2012.Nov.02:20) indicates that ‘the 410 
Xstrata Alloys workers dismissed yesterday at its Kroondal chrome operation add to about 
27,000 workers axed for embarking on prolonged strikes since protests erupted in early 
August’. Whatever the circumstance that led to that dismissal, the Labour Relations Act (Act 
66 of 1995) provides that ‘every employee has the right to strike and every employer has 
recourse to lock-out if: (a) the issue in dispute has been referred to a council or to the 
commission as required by this Act…’ 
 
3.3 Economic Reconstruction 
In regards to economic reconstruction and development in South Africa, which has been 
divided into nine provinces, the provinces differ greatly in terms of development indicators 
and economic output. Due to industrial and mining output, Gauteng province, which covers 
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the smallest area, is by far the richest in per capita income. Poor regions such as KwaZulu-
Natal, North-West province, the Eastern Cape tend to be more rural with higher fertility and 
higher unemployment rate (Rich 1996). It should be laid bare that the economic sources of 
South Africa consists of the primary sector (mining and agriculture) and the secondary sector 
(manufacturing, construction and electricity, gas and water, and the tertiary sector which 
includes wholesale and retail trade, transport, communications, financial services, community 
personal and social services and the economic activity of the different levels of government 
(ibid). 
 
The slow growth in the global economy can partly be attributed to the political turmoil of the 
time. Particularly, ‘policies of import substitution and inadequate levels of investment in 
black education and training have contributed significantly to the structural problems faced 
by the South African economy today’ (Rich, 1996:128). For a country to maintain its 
economic standard, it must be a growth led economy. South Africa however, has a problem 
of wavering productivity growth as it invests a considerable share of its income, but receives 
progressively less from it in terms of output. To reverse this situation, transformation in 
economic dispensation has to focus on equipping people with high-level manpower and 
management skills to combat the country’s labor inefficiency and intensity. Tsikata (1998) in 
Nattrass (1998:10) concludes that ‘South Africa has a “paradoxical” export structure with a 
remarkably low and declining share of exports that use unskilled labor, and a relatively high 
share than use more skilled labor.’ This, she attributes to South Africa’s comparatively high 
wage level (relative to productivity) which puts the country at a competitive disadvantage in 
low-wage, unskilled-labor-intensive activities. Because South Africa has taken the path of 
trade liberalization, exports are becoming relatively less labor-intensive whereas imports are 
rising across the spectrum especially in labor intensive sectors. In a nutshell, for South Africa 
to have its own economic independence, emphasis has to be directed to skilled labor. 
  
Employment and job creation, that is the main bridge between economic growth and the 
opportunities of human development, can be seen as ‘the most fundamental of economic 
opportunities as it provides people with incomes that enable them to establish command over 
a whole range of goods and services that may enhance their dependents’ standard of living’ 
(Nattrass, 1997-1998:43). Not only is employment viewed entirely for its potential income 
generation but also as a way of securing a livelihood and it allows people an opportunity to 
make a productive contribution to society, that is, to exercise their skills and creativity. 
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Nattrass (1998:1) claims that ‘South Africa’s jobs crisis stems ultimately from comparatively 
weak long-term growth, and a steady increase in capital-intensity. As economic growth has 
fallen-from around 6% in the 1960s to less than 1% p.a. in the 1980s and early 1990s-the 
capacity of the South African economy to create jobs has decreased dramatically.’ The 
comparably weak growth, Nattrass continues, can be attributed to a range of factors: poor 
trade and industrialization policies, restrictions on the education and learning of black South 
Africans, obstacles placed by apartheid in the path of black entrepreneurs, and inefficient 
state intervention in the economy. South Africa is considered to have one of the greatest 
unemployment rates in the world because of the ‘relatively low growth of economy over the 
past decade-and-a-half’ (Nattrass, 1997-1998:44) and because ‘apartheid policies created an 
uncompetitive economy geared towards producing consumer goods for a wealthy minority’ 
(Rich, 1996:132). 
 
Therefore, for South Africa to improve its economic standing there is need to focus on skills 
development, turning to exports instead of depending on imports, create employment and job 
opportunities for its citizens, improve the already developed industrial strategy, wage strategy 
and to try as much as possible to combat corruption. 
  
 3.4 Conclusion 
 Chapter three of this study analytically examined the rationale of transforming apartheid's 
structural arrangements. This chapter argued that in an attempt to deal with some of the 
discrepancies of occupational segregation, inequalities in pay for equal work, a lack of or 
severely limited access to training and development opportunities, various apartheid 
structural arrangements ought to be transformed so as to undo the evils and inequalities of the 
past. This section of the work concerned itself with transforming the legal structure that 
seems applicable to all the other sectors that need transformation and partially mentioned 






THE NATURE OF CONFLICT IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter four seeks to critically analyze the nature of conflict in post-apartheid South Africa. 
There will be a concentration on the contemporary conflicts such as black on black violence, 
xenophobia, taxi violence and political violence or assassinations that are all connected to the 
apartheid regime. In addition, the study assesses the link between the apartheid era and the 
current nature of post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
4.2 Black on Black 
Years of ever-growing suppression and the immorality of the apartheid regime led to an 
atmosphere where violence became prevalent in South African society. Initially what was 
defined in the period of the mid-1980s and early 1990s as black-on black-violence was a 
more complicated phenomenon, born out of rivalry among black organizations which had 
started to take a foul and violent turn in the late 1970s.  During the apartheid regime, the 
National Party (NP) not only divided the South African population into races but it went 
further to subdivide the black racial groups into categories. The black African groups were 
subdivided in ethnic categories such as the Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele and so on.  Just as the 
Afrikaner right wing found it impossible to create a depoliticized stability, so blacks were 
entangled in ideological and strategic conflicts (Heribert & Moodley, 1986). Prior to 1994, in 
the struggle against the principle of white supremacy, the black population who were 
oppressed was determined to attain national liberation at any costs. 
 
As result, different political parties emerged from the oppressed group (blacks) and as they 
fought against white supremacy, they ended up fighting each other. In the wrath of apartheid, 
the difference between political and criminal conduct was indistinct. The opposition (the 
marginalized blacks) who regarded themselves as ‘freedom fighters’ justified their conduct as 
legitimate and an appropriate weapon against the racist regime. Although, there was a 
common goal of fighting for unity, there were numerous disarrays amongst the black 
opposition which in turn resulted in conflicts among the blacks.  For instance, the emergence 
of the National Forum in 1983 and of the United Democratic Front a few months later 
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revived the debates amongst the Congress-oriented characteristics and black consciousness 
adherents (ibid). Also, in the mid-1980s, violence in the Eastern Cape and in the 
Witwatersrand industrial complex, between supporters of Black Consciousness (AZAPO 
followers who came to be named ZimZims) and United Democratic Front (UDF) and the 
African National Congress (ANC). In KwaZulu-Natal, there was an all-out turf war among 
the supporters of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the ANC, UDF and COSATU alliance. 
To complicate matters, there arose the phenomenon of necklacing. Minnaar, (2001:49) states 
that, “necklacing is a particularly painful death and the victim suffers excruciating pain in the 
process with death sometimes being caused not only by the burns but by asphyxiating either 
from the fumes released by burning rubber or the sudden extraction of the oxygen 
surrounding the tyre as it bursts into flame”.  It was predominately a ruthless method of 
killing to which dubious enemy agents and traitors were subjected. 
 
Yet another persistent nightmare was that in the South African scenario the black/white color 
divide infiltrated every feature of life and uninhibited violence would turn into indiscriminate 
white-black killings. The spectra had become an authenticity in the form of black killing 
black (Marahaj, 2008).  The rivals of the ANC, UDF and COSATU alliance were quick to 
point out that the common denominator in this supposedly black-on-black violence was the 
ANC and its allies. Furthermore, others wanted to use this to condemn the armed struggle by 
disputing that the black-on-black violence was an avoidable consequence of the armed 
struggle and the approach of the ANC to ‘make South Africa ungovernable and apartheid 
unworkable’ (Maharaj, 2008; 24).  It was only later, in dribs and drabs, that it emerged that 
some of the black people taking part were actually working for the apartheid security forces, 
and that some were trained and armed by the apartheid army at remote military bases. To 
make matters worse, the first necklace that took place was triggered by an apartheid agent 
and the element in the apartheid security forces were associated in influencing the violence 
(Ibid). 
 
Violence was rampant and swept through the townships, hostels and rural areas of Natal 
pulling everybody into its vortex. The state meanwhile seemed ineffective and inactive and 
disinclined to take action (Marah, 2008). It was against the environment of this reality that 
even in post-apartheid there are still tendencies of black on black violence. Numerous young 
black South Africans, specifically those who were born in the late 60’s and early 70’s did not 
have the chance to grow their skills or achieve any level of educational or professional 
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proficiency (Stan, 2007). A majority of them were sired in the revolutionary anti-apartheid 
movement of the 70s categorized by militancy and rebellion. The termination of the apartheid 
regime left these young people in the wrecked lower rungs of social progress, muffled as 
individuals in the chocking economic dungeon of poverty and existential insouciance. The 
triumphant privileged elites of the ruling party (the ANC) took over the reins of power and 
failed to address the needs of these young people and the escalating black families who 
supposedly were waking up from the long night of depersonalization and cultural suffocation 
(Stan, 2007). The fault line is the actual anger amidst young black South Africans. 
Immediately after the apartheid era, the anger amidst the past generations was directed 
against fellow South Africans, driven by the impenitent stand of the IFP which felt that the 
ANC under President Mandela had sold out to the white settlers (Ibid). 
 
Consequently, the black South Africans revolved themselves in those initial days in what 
several people thought would play into the fabricated white diverged of the black personality 
as vaunting, destructive, violent and resilient to order and good government (ibid). One 
would regard it as a mini-apocalypse as young black South Africans turned against each other 
in an orgy of violence and blood-letting (ibid). Currently, black South Africa is confronted 
with a shattered social system and putrefying economic structures and self-indulgence in the 
filthy squalor of want in the midst of wealth and feels the settler migrants pose a threat to 
their existence (Stan, 2007). The resentment of the native South African to fellow blacks is 
yet another reflection of the lack of assimilation within the South African society (ibid). 
Millions of black South Africans are losing hope in the newfangled authenticity ushered in by 
black preponderance rule (Ibid). A lack of integration of the South African society resulted in 
these ‘blacks’ finding new methods of expression through violence against fellow black in 
places like Pretoria, Diepsloot and Alexandra (ibid). 
  
4.3 Taxi Violence 
In order to have full knowledge on the manifestation of taxi violence, it is essential to 
consider the history dating back to 1977 (Abraham, 2010). Prior to 1977, the Motor Carrier 
Transportation Act of 1930 banned the transportation of goods or passengers by road for 
profit without permission from the South Africa Local Road Transportation Board. As such, 
the transport industry was dominated by the South African Transport Service (ibid). 
Consequently, any taxi proprietor who conducted business outside the jurisdiction of the local 
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Transport Board was doing so illegally (ibid). This made it unbearable for African transport 
proprietors since it was difficult to meet all the requirements of the regulations being laid 
down by the Motor Carrier Transportation Act (Ibid). This prompted tax operators who were 
functioning unlawfully to form numerous informal associations and as such, the associations 
controlled loading practices and prices (ibid). 
  
Additionally, according to Abraham (2010), the legislature only allowed the Africans who 
qualified for a taxi permit to use small vehicles capable of transporting four passengers at a 
time. Other modes of transports such as buses and trains in the 1970s were insufficient and 
costly, this made the demand for taxes to escalate (ibid). This resulted in the realization of the 
NP in the 1970s that participation in the transport industry was becoming less feasible and 
increasingly politicized (ibid). By 1977 the Van Breda Commission of Inquiry was created 
and endorsed deregulation of the taxi industry with terms of legislation (ibid). Consequently, 
countless taxi associations arose in the wake of lack of official control and as such leading to 
enormous corruption and consequential violence amid the competing associations (Ibid). 
  
For the black population, the deregulation of the taxi industry was an avenue for them to 
accumulate capital considering that the industry swiftly befitted a contested terrain, inundated 
with operators anticipating to become wealthy (Makubetse& Jackie (2004). As some were 
able to ‘strike it lucky’, the greatest part of the industry was characterized by exploitation and 
aggressive rivalry among operators trying to steal passengers and plying the same routes 
(ibid). Furthermore, the absence of state regulation prompted groups of operators uniting to 
form a local taxi association which mediated loading practices and prices (ibid). Nonetheless, 
it was not long before taxi associations started to deploy their organizational strength to 
increase income  through the use of violence (ibid). Between 1987 and 1994 the situation was 
dire.  Official endeavors to deal with the taxi industry were virtually non-existent (ibid). 
  
Ultimately, when violence finally exploded, the government became part of the problem 
rather than the solution (ibid). The ones who were in charge in helping to curb the taxi 
violence, like the security forces and government officials, were concentrated on dealing with 
the issue of racism in South Africa. Still, the police conduct throughout the late apartheid era 
was negligent (ibid). To make matters worse, the security forces, especially the police, used 
their positions of authority to encourage rifts among the association and to weaken black 
communities (ibid). It is no surprise that in numerous areas, the police were biased in other 
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ways, largely due to their inaction which basically entailed a failure to disarm the attacker.  
Their response to the initial warnings of the attacks was for the police to fan the conflict and 
make it worse (ibid). 
  
Following transport deregulation in 1987, taxi violence became a familiar feature of the 
South African scene right from the beginning (Duigan, 2001). Towards the end of apartheid, 
taxi wars were frequently related to the mainstream of political violence that characterised the 
run-up to the April 1994 general election (ibid). One of the most inflexible and most 
politically inspired of the wars played itself out in the Cape Peninsula at the height of 
political violence, between 1990 and 1992 (ibid). The violence that beset informal settlements 
in the Cape Peninsula between 1990 and 1992 was supposedly linked to money-making 
rivalry over routes between two taxi organisations, the Langa and the Guguletu and Nyanga 
Taxi Association (Lagunya), which epitomized the more developed African operators and the 
Western Cape Black Taxi Association (Webta), which epitomized the more traditional 
African operators from rural areas (ibid). The reality however, was more complex with the 
taxi conflict providing a springboard for the state-sponsored destabilisation of African 
communities in a region where there was no Inkatha presence (ibid). 
  
In addition, the taxi violence influenced and was influenced by political conflict right from 
the outset (ibid). Deregulation and the subsequent sudden rise of the taxi industry transpired 
against an increasingly violent background in which local associations and the taxi industry 
quickly became entangled (Duigan 2001). For instance, taxis that plied the long distance 
routes between KwaZulu-Natal and Johannesburg were attacked for being pro-Inkatha (ibid). 
Likewise, taxis which transported migratory workers from the Inkatha subjugated hostels on 
the Reef were subjected to violent attacks from the chiefly ANC supporting neighbouring 
communities (ibid). Taxi associations started to arm their drivers, and so cycles of attack and 
counter-attack were perpetrated until specific associations became affiliated with particular 
political movements (ibid). The political form of late-apartheid taxi wars was so pronounced 
that taxi violence, like train violence, was seen as an integral component of political violence 
(ibid). It was only in 1993 and onwards that violence-monitoring organizations such as the 





Taxi violence turned out to be progressively prevalent and less controllable by the authorities 
even in the post-apartheid era (Abraham, 2010). There were numerous endeavors to rearrange 
the taxi industry but these attempts were slow. After 1994, the government established the 
National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) to investigate the cause of and possible solutions to the 
violence (Ibid). The findings and recommendations presented by NTTT to the Minister of 
Transport in 1996. The utmost significant recommendation was that the taxi industry be 
deregulated (ibid). This resulted in strong resistance from a number of taxi associations and a 
rise of taxi violence between 1998 and 1999 (Ibid).  One of the attempts to help formalize and 
change the regulations for the taxi industry was through the National Land Transport Act of 
2000. Part of this process involved a four year period of recapitalization(ibid). There were 
delays that arose from the taxi industry’s incapability to form a consistent and solid 
association representing all the taxi owners, likewise disagreements between taxi owners 
added to the nature of the proposed re-capitalization scheme (ibid). The recapitalization 
programme has had a number of limitations, including the lack of financial assistance from 
banks, which have led to its fairly slow implementation (ibid). 
  
Abraham (2010) goes on to state that in 2007 there was an announcement by the Department 
of Public Transport that there were intentions to put in place a fast, comfortable, and low-cost 
urban transport system called the Bus Rapid Transit System (BRTS). It was envisioned that 
the BRTS would play a principal role in the change of the public transport within cities. 
Conversely, taxi associations continued to be resilient to government interference in the taxi 
industry, since the BRTS is perceived as a threat to the livelihood of many taxi operators 
(ibid). This is clearly evidenced in May 2010: there were two assassination incidents in 
Soweto, one leading to the death of a traveller on the Rea Vaya Bus Rapid Transit route from 
Soweto to Central Johannesburg (ibid). The BRTS should not be observed as the answer to 
public transport in South Africa, but as the government’s effort to diminish conflict in the taxi 
industry, providing that prevailing taxi operators ‘buy into the system’.  It continues to be 
seen whether this will in the long run be achieved (ibid). 
 
4.4 Xenophobia 
Xenophobia is one of the forms of conflict in the new democratic South Africa. According to 
the Oxford Dictionary, the term 'xenophobia' is defined as a 'hatred or fear of foreigners' 
(South African Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 1994). More frequently many 
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scholars such as Bronwyn (2002), Lubbe (2000), Kollapan (1990), and Tshitereke (1999) use 
the term to signify a strong ‘dislike of outsiders’. It is characterized by bad attitude towards 
immigrants, and an aversion, a fear or even animosity. Kollapan (1990) however, cautions 
that xenophobia cannot be differentiated from violence and physical abuse; therefore the term 
xenophobia must be reframed to an incorporate practice. It is not merely an attitude, it is an 
activity. It is not only a dislike or fear of outsiders, bus is a violent practice that leads to 
bodily harm, damage and even death (Ibid). Xenophobia being outlined as an attitude, 
conversely has no remarks on the consequences of such a mentality (Ibid).  Certainly, this is 
disingenuous since xenophobia in South Africa is not constrained to a fear or dislike of 
foreigners but also an intense tension and violence by South Africans especially black South 
Africans towards immigrants particularly black immigrants from other African countries 
north of the border (Tshitereke, 1999: 4). 
 
The extreme tension and violence by South Africans towards migrants, (the migrants in this 
case refers to blacks from Zimbabwe, Zambia, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, etc.,) is on the 
alleged grounds that black African immigrants pose a threat to their jobs, health care, 
education and so on. During the apartheid regime, most black South Africans did not have 
appropriate and adequate service like basic needs, health care, education and housing (Lubbe, 
2000). Now that they, in a democratic dispensation, are looking forward to improving their 
lives, it would seem that African immigrants are competing with them for these already 
scarce resources and therefore putting a strain on resources like hospitals, schools and 
employment (Ibid). Generally, this feeling of failure of the economy and infrastructure to 
cope with the demands does not only prevail from the general public (Ibid).  Also, African 
immigrants are seemingly competing with South Africans for jobs in a country where 
unemployment is already very high (Ibid). Due to the fact that these immigrants come into 
the country illegally, they are ready to do the most menial work for low wages (Ibid). This 
tends to pose a threat to the South Africans who are already struggling to look for jobs, 
because of the high demands for cheap labor that is offered by the immigrants, there are 
outbursts of violent attacks.   
  
The nature of the violent conflict of xenophobia is linked to the apartheid times basically on 
two grounds. First, the apartheid regime led by NP already had succeeded in dividing the 
black people and that in the past the black South Africans were deprived of the resources. 
Even then, they used to fight among themselves so as to attain the autonomy and freedom 
55 
 
that they were constantly denied during the apartheid era. This could be a displacement of 
anger against their fellow blacks who are not of South African origin. The intensification in 
xenophobic hostility targeted at those who are considered to be non-citizens amounts to a 
denial of rights and entitlement expressed through prejudice and stereotypes (Neocosmos, 
2006). It demonstrates itself through provocation to and actions of clear marginalization, 
violence against people due to the fact that what is considered to be in a particular context, 
their ‘foreign’ status (Ibid). 
  
In the past, discrimination and segregation affected South Africans because ‘foreign status is 
affirmed on the foundation of the crudest of racist stereotypes, which propose that the issue is 
not a sure one applicable to immigrants as defined by legal discourse (Mail & Guardian, 3-9 
March 2000). Therefore, xenophobia is rather a form of discrimination closely connected to 
racism and affecting anybody or any group which for whatever reasons is considered not a 
native (Neocosmos, 2006). South Africa has faced the problem of xenophobia ever since 
liberation in 1994 (ibid).   
 
In May 2008, xenophobia ostensibly became a wildfire that began in Alexandra and quickly 
spread countrywide (McConnell, 2009).  Following the next days and months in the 
aftermath of the xenophobia attacks, it was reported that over 70 migrants were murdered and 
there were tens of thousands of immigrants displaced as they were expelled from their homes 
and communities by South Africans (McConnell, 2009). As though it is not enough, foreign-
national businesses were demolished amounting to over R1.5 billion in damages (ibid). 
Xenophobia to this date still takes place in South Africa although on a lesser scale. 
Immigrants from elsewhere in Africa are given names such as ‘kwerekwere’ and are still 
being discriminated against in society. Much of                 that risk stemmed from the 
institutionalized racism of the time due to apartheid since the race-based structure of the 
South Africa encouraged a sense of separation amid the black societies and a sense of unity 
tolerated of predominate common experience. Also, due to the fact that South Africans were 
instilled during apartheid with tendencies of isolation from others who did not have anything 
in common (Baechler, 1999), probably is the reason why most South Africans are 
xenophobic towards immigrants from elsewhere in Africa (SAMP, 2006). 
 
Certainly xenophobia is in so many ways linked to the apartheid structures in such a manner 
that the conflict in South Africa was racial and apartheid in itself and was a system of 
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legalized segregation that intended to protect white power and the white ‘race’ Weldon 
(2006). As seen in chapter one, there were sequences of laws such as; Act No 55 of 1949 
which prohibited mixed race marriages,  The Population Registration Act of 1950, allocated 
segregated geographical spaces in which to live and were implemented between 1949 to 
1954, which separated the South African people into racial and ethnic groups (ibid). Racial 
segregation clearly permitted lines to be drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’, resulting in 
stereotyping and discrimination triggering the formation of deep-rooted radicalized identities 
(ibid). This explains the xenophobic violence in the post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
4.5 Nexus between Present Conflict in Post-Apartheid South Africa and the Ills of 
Apartheid 
For better analysis, this subsection of chapter four groups the violent expressions in South 
Africa into political, social and economic violence. In the first section, the chapter discusses 
the issue of political violence and assassination. In the second section, the subsection of 
chapter four looks into social violence. Finally, the chapter examines economic violence. 
 
4.5.1 Domestic, gender and xenophobic violence 
In post-conflict societies, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, as well as 
civilians, are deemed essential for post-conflict reconstruction (Jennings 2007:205, Whyte 
2009:19). This is to ensure that a post conflict society is rid of illegal firearms and that former 
fighters are encouraged to participate properly in civil society without resorting to violence. 
In South Africa, this disarmament was supposed to be a major priority, but by 2003 about 12 
million firearms (two-thirds of which were illegally owned) were in circulation in South 
Africa (Whyte 2009:20). The country failed to carry out effective post-conflict small arms 
disarmament and so the weapons used for war and political freedom have become weapons of 
violence and crime in the present South Africa. 
  
The peace building effort in South Africa failed to provide adequate reintegration 
programmes for ex-combatants and civilians who see violence as the reliable means of 
furthering one’s agenda (Harris 2003:2). The ills of apartheid and the lack of justice for the 
aggrieved masses translated into violent reactions in post-apartheid South Africa. Ex freedom 
fighters and young people, brought up in the violent culture, transferred their aggression to 
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the society and more directly at the domestic level. Children and women become the victims 
of such violence (Harris 2003:2). The numerous horrible cases of rape in South Africa point 
to poor handling of ex-combatants in South Africa. 
  
The laws of apartheid marginalized and restricted women from participating actively in the 
economic realm. This puts them in a lower place than their male counterparts and 
discrimination made them vulnerable to abuses and violence (MRC Policy Brief 2009), yet 
during the transition process, the role of women in toppling the apartheid regime was under-
accounted for. Sexual violence such as rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse and domestic 
violence was silent (Whyte 2009:19). The peace building effort was inadequate in 
condemning and creating measures to prevent women abuses. In the male-dominated society, 
the humanity of women was jeopardized. 
 
Studies have shown that societies with a high level of inequality tend to have high levels of 
violence. Duponchel (2009:5) notes that since 1994, inequalities have grown from a Gini 
index (CIA Fact book) of 59.3 to 65. This makes South Africa one of the most socio-
economically polarized countries in the world. The inability of the disadvantaged population 
to confront the wealthy class that is well protected by the state, led to various forms of 
aggression towards the weakest in society (Duponchel 2009:6).  The weak sets of people in 
society are often ‘women, children, the elderly and outsiders’ (Duponchel 2009:6). Thus, 
beside the numerous cases of child abuses and gender-based violence, foreigners have 
become targets of xenophobic violence. In May 2008, over 60 foreigners were killed, 
hundreds were wounded and thousands were displaced (Duponchel 2009:2). 
 
Duponchel (2009:6) noted that ‘competition for limited resources between groups leads to 
prejudices against the out-group’. Landau (2011:1) argues that xenophobic violence occurred 
in poverty stricken parts of South Africa such as in Alexandra Township, Johannesburg and 
informal settlements and townships across the country. Johannesburg’s Mayor in his 2004 
State of the city speech stated, ‘While migration contributes to the rich tapestry of the 
cosmopolitan city, it also places a severe strain on employment levels, housing and public 
services’ (quoted in Landau 2011:7). For some South Africans, foreigners come to add to the 
competition for the limited resources in the country (Pillay 2012:16).  Foreigners are also 
perceived to be better of or favored by the economic condition of the state (Pillay 2012:16; 
Duponchel 2009:6).  The state’s failure to materialize the promises it made to rid its people of 
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their socio-economic misery led an aggrieved populace to project their grievances on 
‘outsiders’ (Landau 2011:3). Thus, foreigners become threats to some South Africans who 
find it hard to rise above the poor living conditions they find themselves in.  Besides, the 
upsurge of foreign immigrants in the post-apartheid era brought about a belief among some 
South Africans of how white foreigners came and took over the country’s economy and have 
benefited greatly from it (Duponchel 2009:5). Hence, such fear possibly contributes to the 
reality of xenophobic violence in the country. 
 
4.5.2 Political violence/assassination 
Despite being a democratic state, post-apartheid South Africa still witnesses political 
violence. Political parties tend to resort to violence to settle disputes as well as attain their 
interests. The continued tension between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
points to the reality of political violence in South Africa. Speaking with regards to the 2009 
assassination of two IFP party councilors, Enock Sibongiseni Shange and Nthuthuko Ngcobo, 
the IFP held that the party is being targeted via a sinister plan by adversary parties. The ANC 
and IFP parties have always tread on a tense line since before the end of apartheid. Today’s 
political violence and inter-party conflicts date back to the apartheid era. 
 
The apartheid era was characterized by state terror and resistance (Maharaj 2008:14). To 
enforce the stringent apartheid laws on non-white population, the apartheid regime employed 
various methods of violence to quash any hint of rebellion. The armed rebellion of opposition 
movements were met with tightened repression and state terror.  Non-Whites were easily 
arrested and imprisoned without trial while others were killed at whim (Duncan 2005:9). 
Between 1974 and 1989, about 300 anti-apartheid leading activists were reportedly 
assassinated by covert state police and military ‘hit squads’ (Duncan 2005:10). This set the 
ball rolling on extra-judicial killing of political opponents in South Africa. 
 
Realizing the minimalist efficiency of the state’s direct violence in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
ruling NP government devised ‘divide and rule’ tactics by instigating black-on-black 
violence. Relying on the supposition that ‘Africans were inherently factious and unfit to 
govern’ (SAFLII, Article 19, 1997:6), the National Party promoted black-on-black violence 
by pitting liberation political parties against each other (Maharaj 2010:25). This was meant to 
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hinder unity among the liberation movements and to further prove to the world that the 
African is savage and unfit to be treated as human (Article 19, 1997:10). 
 
Insidiously, the National Party fomented political violence via funding, arming and training 
rival vigilante and political parties (SAFLII, Article 19, 1997:6). Specifically, the NP found 
the Inkatha movement in the KwaZulu homelands to be instrumental in its bid to sow chaos 
among black Africans. Similar to the colonial mechanism of indirect rule, Inkatha-aligned 
chiefs were used by the state to run the KwaZulu homeland. The Inkatha movement is a Zulu 
cultural movement that dates back to the 1920s (WRITENET 1996:1). It drew its support 
from the Zulu monarchy and traditional chiefly structures in the KwaZulu homelands, and 
from land-owning petty bourgeois and African traders (WRITENET 1996:1). The movement 
found a sustained foothold among the illiterate rural population and migrant workers in 
KwaZulu homelands (Adam &Moodley 1993). 
 
Formally, the Inkatha movement’s policies were aligned to that of the ANC with whom they 
maintained good relations (Adam & Moodley 1993:1). However, as the ANC grew and 
became dominant, the Inkatha movement sought to hold major sway in the KwaZulu 
homelands in a bid to create a strong Zulu society. The movement sought to avoid being 
subsumed under the umbrella and leadership of the ANC (Adam & Moodley 1993). In the 
1980s, the South African apartheid government found the Inkatha movement, under the 
leadership of Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, to be a valuable ally.  He had served as the Chief 
Minister (Minister of Police) of KwaZulu from 1972. Afraid of being sidelined by ANC 
dominance, Buthelezi embarked on a campaign to stamp Inkatha’s dominance in KwaZulu-
Natal (Adam and Moodley 1993:1). 
  
He succeeded in garnering popular support for himself and his party by not accepting 
nominal independence and not allowing his chieftaincy to be swept away by the ANC as 
happened to other homeland leaders in Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophutatswana (Article 
19, 1997:8). In his capacity as Chief Minister of KwaZulu, he used these powers to ensure 
that the "traditional" Zulu chiefs functioned in practice as servants of the Inkatha movement. 
While he depicted himself as being anti-apartheid, he was willing to thwart resistant 
movements in the regions under the Inkatha’s control (WRITENET 1996:1).  With Buthelezi 
ties with the government, the Inkatha movement served as a clandestine marionette of the 
South African NP government who hoped that the former’s moderate position would help 
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check the hard-line views of the ANC (Article 19, 1997:7). The 1991 Johannesburg Weekly 
Mail, and the commission of inquiry under Judge Richard Goldstone in 1993, made a series 
of reports noting that the IFP was being directly sponsored by the state police security branch 
and was being trained by the South African Army at the Caprivi Strip in Namibia (Article 19, 
1997:10). 
  
In the mid-1980s and early 1990s, the KwaZulu-Natal region as well the Gauteng region was 
embroiled in political violence as the Inkatha movement sought to fortify its dominance 
(Maharaj 2010:25). KwaZulu Natal in particular was the epicenter of the violence in South 
Africa and the region witnessed more violence than any other region (ICE 2011). Inkatha rule 
and control over the KwaZulu-Natal provincial administration gave it an edge over other 
political parties (WRITENET 1996:1). The Inkatha movement opposed the ANC and other 
resistant movements seeking popularity in the KwaZulu homelands. As a pro-capitalist party, 
the Inkatha movement opposed the socialist ideologies of the ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance. 
The United Democratic Front (UDF) represented the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal when the latter 
was banned from political activities (ICE 2011:12). It opposed COSATU’s May 1986 strike. 
The Inkatha movement also opposed radical students in KwaZulu homelands who challenged 
the education system (WRITENET 1996:1). Leading activists and supporters of UDF and 
ANC were victims of political violence in the region. In the late 1980s, widespread violence 
raged between ANC/UDF/COSATU alliance and Inkatha supporters in the KwaZulu 
homeland and Gauteng areas. The animosity against whites tended to be transferred to fellow 
blacks as blacks killed blacks. This set the motion for inter-party conflict, violence and 
assassination in South Africa. 
  
In KwaZulu townships, violence ensued between ANC and IFP supporters. Given that most 
IFP supporters in the KwaZulu were Zulus, the violence took on an ethnic dimension. Thus, 
via ones ethnic affiliation, one could easily identify the political affiliation of the other 
(Olivier 1994:19). Considering that there were many Zulu-speaking supporters of the ANC in 
KZN, much of the violence was amongst people of the same ethnicity and even families. 
Besides, the apartheid regime’s Group Area Acts had categorized the black population into 
ethnic categories such as Zulu, Ndebele, Xhosa and so on (Henrard 2002:20). Based on the 
Group Acts, the various ethnic categories were expected to engage in separate development. 
In line with Bonthuys (1993:128), Henrard (2002:20) argues that the Grand Apartheid 
strategy made ethnicity a tense and sensitive issue in South Africa. This tension was more 
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palpable in the KwaZulu homeland in the 1980s and the 1990s where the Inkatha aligned 
Zulus insisted on stamping its dominance in a bid to avoid being influenced by the non-Zulu 
ideologies of the ANC. 
 
With the vision of an impending active political participation of political parties and 
democratic election in the 1990s, the Inkatha movement took on the name Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP) and declared that it has become a national party in August 1990 (Maharaj 
2010:25).  A bitter IFP and ANC scramble ensued for supporters and popular support 
especially in KwaZulu-Natal (ICE 2011:12). The parties attacked supporters of opposing 
parties. Relying on its advantage in the KwaZulu region, the IFP embarked on a mass 
recruitment campaign targeting the hostels of mine workers. Hostel residents who refused to 
join the IFP party were attacked, expelled and sometimes murdered by IFP supporters. Given 
that the KwaZulu region was dominated by Zulus affiliated to the IFP, non-Zulu migrant 
workers that were not affiliated to the IFP fell victims of IFP attacks (Olivier 1994:18). 
 
In the Gauteng region, for example, IFP supporters took over the hostels while committed 
non-IFP supporters took refuge in the Phola Park squatter camps. The IFP forces also 
attacked the ANC aligned Phola Park squatter camp residents (Article 19, 1997:9). The 
homes of UDF/ANC supporters were raided. This saw a number of counter attacks from the 
residents of Phola Park. In all this, mounted evidence continued to establish IFP links with 
the government. Notably, the rise in violence corresponded with vital events in the process of 
political shift. The South African police failed to intervene to protect and safeguard citizens 
from Inkatha attacks when they are not doing the mayhem themselves. This points to the 
police force’s active involvement in the Inkatha military expeditions (Adam &Moodley 1993; 
Article 19, 1997:10). Analysts hold that such violence were government sponsored and aimed 
at disrupting peace processes (Article 19, 1997:9, Maharaj 2010:25). Given the mounting 
evidence of Inkatha’s link with the government, the IFP failed to serve as a counterbalance 
party to the ANC (Adam and Moodley 1993). Contrary to the state’s wish, the IFP failed to 
be recognized as a credible party to engage in negotiation with the NP government as the 
ANC. 
 
The state provided arms and training to various pro-government black organizations to thwart 
the plans of anti-government organizations (Article 19, 1997:7). The apartheid state also 
exploited the interests of anti-UDF/ANC gangs such as the Black Cats in Ermelo, the A-
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Team in Chesterville, the Eagles in Harrismith and the AmaSinyora in KwaMashu (Article 
19, 1997:7). It provided such gangs with arms to further their violent struggles against the 
UDF and ANC. Moreover, in black areas, the state allowed the development of vigilante 
organizations. The vigilantes were recruited from conservative blacks who serve as police 
reservists (instant constables) (WRITENET 1996:1). The vigilantes carried out extrajudicial 
killings. Generally, everyone seemed to possess the license to kill (Adam and Moodley 
1993). The government encouraged the reality of black-on-black violence to argue for the un-
governability and savagery of the black race (Adam &Moodley 1993). 
 
The election period in South Africa was characterized by violence, intimidation and informal 
repression which drew the country close to civil war (Article 19, 1997:7). As noted by 
Brewer (1994:4) ‘the right wing (the state and its allies) threatens mainly through its recourse 
to violence, which is used both to destabilize an already tense situation by means of political 
assassination (such as that of Chris Hani) and random killings and atrocities, and also to 
prevent reformers, black or white, from winning free elections’. Young radical blacks also 
engaged in radical attacks on moderate black leaders and whites. Both the Afrikaner 
WeerstandsBerweging movement (AWB) and the IFP made separate threats of open war 
should the ANC win the general election (Brewer, 1994:4). Hardline bastions of apartheid 
instigate young black radicals to push their violence to an extent of civil war so as to 
destabilize the on-going negotiation between the state and the black liberation movements. 
 
A few weeks before the April 1994 elections, South Africa witnessed a crescendo of violence 
especially in KwaZulu-Natal. Most parts of the KwaZulu region were declared unsafe for 
ANC to campaign (WRITENET 1996:1). The South African Police reportedly colluded with 
Inkatha supporters to attack ANC supporters. The KwaZulu police forces allegedly 
‘murdered political opponents of Inkatha, tortured prisoners and failed to intervene to stop 
Inkatha attacks’ (Article 19, 1997:8). About 14,000 people died and 22,000 were injured 
between 1990 and 1994. 90% of the political violence occurred in KwaZulu-Natal (ICE 
2011:13). The outcome of the election saw a narrow majority win of 50.3 percent by the IFP 
in the KwaZulu homeland. In a bid to avoid further conflict and ensure a peaceful transition, 
the IEC in collaboration with the ANC agreed to ignore the misconducts of attacking non 
ANC supporters in KwaZulu-Natal. Hence, KwaZulu-Natal came under the leadership of the 




Although political assassinations and inter-party violence has declined since 1994, there 
continues to be cases of political conflicts, violence and assassinations in post-apartheid 
South Africa.  Post-election violence took on the nature of political cleansing in rural areas as 
dominant parties sought to eliminate the support for minority parties (WRITENET 1996:1). 
Political leaders became targets for hit squads and violence is used to resolve political 
disputes.  As identified by the non-governmental Human Rights Committee, the ANC could 
not campaign in 30 areas of the KwaZulu-Natal province and likewise the IFP cannot 
campaign in 22 areas(Ibid). The uniqueness of post-election violence is that they became 
more targeted at individuals. IFP local party leaders invited their hit squads to eliminate their 
political opponents (WRITENET 1996:1). As observed in Article 19, (1997:11), Chief David 
Molefe, a moderate IFP leader, was killed at Impendle in October 1995 by hard-liners due to 
his moderate political stance that favours peace processes with the ANC. The fact that he was 
a Sotho, not a Zulu raises suspicion if the attack was not motivated by ethnic differences. On 
Christmas Day 1995, 18 ANC supporters were massacred at Shobashobane on the South 
Coast allegedly by IFP forces. The security official under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi 
remained in office after the 1994 elections. They continued to permit, promote and participate 
actively in violence (WRITENET 1996:1). 
 
Due to the political violence that continued after the 1994 election, local government 
elections initially planned for November 1995 were postponed twice until June 1996 due to 
the scramble for local advantages by political parties. Between 1994 and 1995, about 2,437 
people were killed – 1,600 deaths in 1994 and 837 in 1995 – and about 500,000 people were 
displaced by political violence (WRITENET 1996:1). 
 
By August 1997, the hostilities between ANC and the National Consultative Forum led by 
General Bantu Holomisa transcended individual assassination to open battles between the 
two parties in Richmond area (Article 19, 1997:11). Hundreds of people were displaced from 
their homes. Thus, violence tends to be the ultimate means of resolving inter-party conflicts 
in post-Apartheid South Africa. Activists have been reported to have received several death 
threats. The Landless People’s Movements also reports that its leaders have become victims 
of political assassination as its leaders, who are vocal in demanding for land reform, are being 
murdered. At the local political level, violent struggles seem to be the status quo. Political 
leaders seek to eliminate oppositions by assassinating political opponents. In the 
Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal provinces, political assassinations tend to be more 
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prominent (Quintal 2012). Nevertheless, the decline of political violence in post-apartheid 
South Africa could be attributed to the effort of the political compromise made by the country 
through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
 
4.5.3 Social violence 
Murders such as the 2007 killing of Lucky Dube, and the April 2010 assassination of Eugene 
Terre Blanche. the 2008 xenophobic attacks, the Marikana killings of 2012 and the various 
cases of police brutality serve as reminders of the reality of violence in South Africa. South 
Africa ranks as one of the top in the world table for violent crime (Kaminer and Eagle 
2010:13). Between April 1994 and April 2007, the SAPS (2007:7) recorded about 300 000 
murders among other forms of violent crimes (Whyte 2009:3). Elmari Whyte (2009:18) notes 
that: 
 
Based on SAPS figures (2007:7), an average of 19,884 murders and 27,077 attempted 
murders, 53,685 rapes, 9,183 indecent assaults, 247,459 assaults with the intent to cause 
grievous bodily harm, 255,137 common assaults, and 125,062 aggravated robberies were 
reported per annum between 2001 and 2007. Collectively this translates into an annual 
average of 1596.5 reported violent crimes per 100,000 South Africans over that period. These 
rates would be even higher per 100,000 Black South Africans, as the majority of these crimes 
take place in Black “mega townships” on the outskirts of major South African cities (SAPS 
2007: 35). 
Various observers have argued that the foregoing violent expression has its roots in the 
physical and structural violence of the apartheid regime and the failure of the peace building 
process to address the legacy of apartheid (Whyte 2009:18; CSVR 2009:5). Whyte (2009:6) 
argues that a primary explanation for the occurrence of violence in post-conflict societies is 
the psychological effect of the conflict in creating or perpetuating a pre-existing cycle, 
predisposition to, or culture of violence. Decades of apartheid’s racially oppressive laws, 
physical violence and repressive force, as well as the long-term struggle against apartheid, 
has created a culture of violence in South Africa. In such situations, violence is deemed as the 
right means of dealing with political and socio-economic problems (Whyte 2009:3). 
 
As referred to by Fanon in relation to colonialism in the Wretched of the Earth: On Violence 
(1965), Apartheid in South Africa was enforced and maintained by violence. Since the 
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National Party assumed power in 1948, South Africa was organized around a plethora of 
laws, acts, systems and structures that violated the humanity of non-Whites. Racially 
oppressive laws were woven into the order of South African society, an order which has been 
referred to as structural violence. Among other examples of structural violence in South 
Africa is the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 that outlawed the Communist Party 
and its ideology; the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953 that prohibited public opposition 
to any laws; and the Customs and Excise Act of 1955 as well as the Official Secrets Act of 
1956 that censored the information disseminated by the media (Whyte 2009:13). 
 
Such structural violence determined every aspects of people’s life. Via the South African 
Police and Defense Force, the government enforced its racially oppressive laws and 
ideologies. Via state terror, the state oppressed and repressed non-Whites and opposition 
movements (Maharaj 2010:10). Non-Whites were easily arrested, detained and abused. 
People in custody were tortured to submission and in some cases death. When non-Whites 
stood up against the ills of Apartheid, they were forcefully and legally suppressed. Notably, 
the protest against pass laws organized by the Pan African Congress (PAC) in 1960 saw the 
massacre of 69 people at Sharpeville, an incident famously known as the Sharpeville 
Massacre (Whyte 2009:14, Maharaj 2010:10). In 1976 at Soweto, the South African police 
killed over twenty young people who were peacefully protesting against the use of Afrikaans 
as the language of tuition in schools. Such physical violence sank deep into the people’s way 
of life. 
 
Without any legal and alternative means of expressing their grievances, violence became the 
most tempting option for the aggrieved populace. When prohibited from non-violent protests, 
opposition movements such as the ANC party via its military wing Umkhonto we Sizwe 
adopted violent measures to further their liberation struggle against the state. The state’s 
violence nurtured disrespect for the rule of law. The inability of effectively challenging the 
state led some political parties and gangs to turn their frustration to their fellow people of the 
same racial category. As elaborated in the previous section, the black-on-black violence that 
ensued in the 1980s and early 1990s characterized the lives of people in cities and townships. 
Moreover, throughout the incidence of black-on-black violence in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
the South African Police failed to interfere or denounce the violence committed against non-
whites (Whyte 2009:15). While whites were protected from violence, non-whites were 
allowed to suffer violent crimes as long as it did not affect the white population. Blacks in 
66 
 
townships had to rely on informal and extra-judicial means of addressing socio-economic and 
political grievances. This gave rise to gangs and vigilante groups that adopted illegal violent 
means to confront their everyday problems. 
 
The lack of policing in townships and the state’s indifference to what happens to the life of 
blacks could be said to have a role to play in the minds of non-Whites who were not given an 
opportunity to participate in a humanizing community. The lack of proper policing in black 
townships in particular, tended to legitimize violence and introduce a criminal culture. 
Significantly, the hotbeds of political violence during the shift in the 1980s and early 1990s, 
Western Cape especially in Nyanga Township, regarded as the murder capital of the country, 
Gauteng and KwaZaulu-Natal are regions that record more violent crimes in the post-
apartheid era (Pillay 2012:14). 
  
Children born in apartheid societies that were riddled with violence tended to see violence as 
a legitimate means. Besides, the white capitalist-driven mining industry turned male peasant 
farmers into migrant workers; a situation that distorted the African family set up (Diale 
2012:1343). Family ties and cultural values were distorted. Analysts have argued that the lack 
of father figures for some children has been a major precipitant of violent behavior in young 
people (Department of Social Development 2011 citing Mackey and Mackey 2003:63). 
Children without father figures are reportedly prone to various challenges and states of 
depression. The lack of father figure predisposes girls to low self-esteem and high level of 
risky behavior while it causes aggression, violence and criminal activities in boys 
(Department of Social Development 2011). In a society characterized by constant political 
and economic struggles, children grow up to adopt violence as the required means of 
survival. From the experience of being victimized, abused or witnesses of violence at early 
ages, children inculcate violence as a societal norm (Department of Social Development 
2011). Violence became normalized as a way of contending with social problems (CSVR 
2009:5; Whyte 2009:15,19). 
 
Today, years of violent struggle caused violence to become the primary and rewarding means 
to an end (Whyte 2009:18). From an early age, young people are socialized to deal with their 
challenges via the use of violence (Department of Social Development 2011). South African 
men are raised to see themselves as superior to women. While men are encouraged to be 
brave and strong, women are encouraged to be mild and respectful (MRC Policy Brief 2009). 
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Men are identified by heavy drinking and an ability to use violence to defend one’s honor. 
The value and sacredness of life becomes trivial for some South Africans who are willing to 
easily inflict pain or take the life of another to settle social, economic and political issues. 
 
Studies have shown that the feeling of low self-worth and inferiority complex has a bearing 
on people’s propensity for violence (CSVR 2009:5). The dehumanization of non-whites by 
the apartheid regime created a low self-esteem and an inferiority complex among some non-
whites. Non-whites especially blacks, who were in the frontline of the apartheid 
discrimination and oppression, were made to see Whites as superior humans. The Group 
Areas Act, Bantu Education and so on emphasized the inferiority of blacks and the 
superiority of Whites. Thus, for some blacks, to make headways in life is through non-
conventional means such as violence. People use violence to pursue their quest for respect 
and power (MRC Policy Brief 2009). 
Inauspiciously, the peace building effort in South Africa managed to quell political violence 
at the expense of social and economic violence. According to Whyte (2009:2), the 
requirements for building a lasting peace in South Africa was under-diagnosed and narrowly 
conceived by the post-apartheid peace-builders. Although, the TRC was only a part of a 
larger peace building effort in post-apartheid South Africa, it had a crucial role to play in the 
peace building initiative in South Africa (Henrard 2002:18). The work of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) focused narrowly on political violence while neglecting 
non-political violence (Whyte (2009:1). The TRC was narrowed to individual offenses rather 
than an oppression that was institutional and structure.  The blanket amnesty granted to the 
whole institutional structure of apartheid by the TRC failed to punish or hold the apartheid 
regime culpable for the ills of the past. Rather, the ills of institutional and structural apartheid 
were swiftly shoved under the carpet for the sake of starting anew. 
  
Mamdani (2000: 177) argues that the truth of apartheid espoused by political activists and the 
apartheid government in the process of negotiation and crafted in the work of the TRC is a 
diluted truth, a truth that diminishes the real. In fact the evil of apartheid was propagated only 
as ‘a harsh and cruel dictatorship, a gross denial of human rights’ (Mamdani, 2000: 179). To 
avoid political conflict, the peace building effort chose to ignore the distinctive and structural 
ills of apartheid and somehow took it as a legitimate practice of the past. The TRC only 
tackled issues considered as crimes during the apartheid regime. Issues such as Land laws, 
Pass laws, Group Areas Act, Forced removals, were neglected because they were legal in the 
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eyes of the apartheid order (Mamadani, 2000:180). Moreover, the commission only 
recognizes some 20,000 people as victims of apartheid while ignoring the vast number of 
people who suffered the ills of apartheid (Mandani, 2000:180). The over 3.5 million people 
who were forcefully removed and the various unreported cases of apartheid-violence on 
entire racial categories were subsumed in the narrow political compromise of the TRC. 
 
Such moves left the disadvantaged masses aggrieved as the forceful and oppressive structures 
of the past were not held culpable for their current situation. In fact, the peace building effort 
in South Africa was mute about race which served as a foundation of apartheid laws and 
oppressions (Valji 2004). This negligence can be said to be responsible for the tense relations 
between the whites and non-whites today. Mark Shaw and Peter Gastrow (2013:235) recount 
the story of the gruesome attack by four drunken young African men on a white suburban 
family in June 13 1998. The white family was attacked and the parents were shot dead and 
their young daughter was raped while the son hid in the bathroom. For most whites the attack, 
as well as other cases of such attacks, was racially motivated (Shaw & Gastrow, 2013:235). 
In fear, some whites have migrated to other countries maintaining that the white race is under 
jeopardy in the new order (Shaw & Gastrow, 2013:236). Others express their fear behind the 
high walls, barbed wires and security guards used to secure their homes (Shaw & Gastrow, 
2013:237). This fear continues to alienate and increase the tension between whites and non-
whites (Pillay, 2012:23). Thus, instead of creating social cohesion and reconciliation, the fear 
and security measures may continue to engender a social divide and conflict between races. 
In a post-apartheid society that outlaws overt racism, race takes on a silent disastrous 
influence in the country (Harris 2003:3). 
 
Due to the fact that the TRC only demanded individual confessions to politically motivated 
crimes that were committed during the apartheid regime, the entire white population who did 
not confess to any crime tended to feel sanctimonious and not responsible (Mandani, 2000: 
182). The work of the TRC tended to exonerate the non-confessed Whites. Yet, they 
benefitted from the apartheid order without questioning the system. In such situation, their 
complacency, indifference and lack of empathy towards the oppressed population only end 
up fostering the outrage of the victims (Mandani, 2000:182). Mandani (2000) and Ramose 
(2011) insist that in the Ubuntu understanding of law, the whole family and community takes 
responsibility for the wrongs committed by an individual member even if the individual is 
deceased. Thus, the whole white community should take the fall for the crimes committed by 
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their individual members, a crime they benefitted from. Even if the perpetrators or the 
apartheid regime no longer exists, the passage of time does not wipe away any of the 
injustices or crimes that were committed by a group (Ramose 2011). The TRC somehow 
intends that South Africans repress the past structural injustices of the apartheid regime. Yet, 
even psychologically it is evident that repressed feelings come out in the future and become 
more horrible. Thus, it is only a matter of time for feelings, not properly dealt with, to 
explode if has not yet exploded in the experiences of various spates of violence in the 
country. In accord with Mamdani (2000:183), the work of TRC has failed if not destroyed the 
bridge for any attempt at social reconciliation in South Africa. 
 
Nevertheless, the victims of apartheid were denied the right to participate in the truth and 
reconciliation initiative. In fact they had no say in the granting of amnesty to perpetrators. In 
The Healers, Ayi Kwei Armah emphasizes the need for participatory healing and 
reconciliation. For victims to get healing, it is necessary that they participate in the process 
unlike the TRC program that isolated the individual victims from the TRC commission. Yet, 
the victims ought to participate for a proper healing. Worst still, the main commission which 
was set to deal with the question of victim reparation only had recommendatory powers 
(Mamdani 2000:182). The victims ended up waiting and struggling to get the promises made 
to them as though it was a privilege for them to be victims. On the other hand, the granting of 
amnesty by the Amnesty Commission to perpetrators was final and binding. For Mamdani 
(2000) this move was a clear case of perpetrator’s justice. The grievances of the masses 
continue to be reflected in violent expressions. 
 
4.5.4 Economic violence 
Vivek Arora and Luca Antonio Ricci (2006:23) observe that despite the improved economic 
growth of South Africa since 1994, unemployment remains high. The post-apartheid South 
African economy was an economy that developed via racial division and the marginalization 
of some racial groups. Via violence, whites benefitted from the political economy of 
apartheid and in the post-Apartheid era they continue to reap the advantages of the past. In 
the present South Africa, unemployment, poverty and poor living conditions are concentrated 
among the apartheid disadvantaged groups especially the blacks. It remains a challenge to 




The apartheid constraints as endorsed in the Bantu Education Act of 1953 that established an 
inferior education system for Africans; and Bantu Authorities Act of 1950 and Native 
Administration Act of 1957 that enforced a separatist development program for Africans, 
limited the ability of non-whites to develop socially and economically (Duncan 2005:9). 
Moreover, via the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956, the non-white population were only 
able to be employed in menial and low paying jobs while whites enjoyed the privilege of 
being employed for different kinds of skilled and better paying job opportunities (Seekings 
2007:2, Whyte 2009:13).   Inevitably, such a non-proportional arrangement has effects that 
spill over to the current South Africa. The decades of Bantu education, under-education and 
reliance on low wage employment created a huge undereducated and poor population in the 
present South Africa. 
  
Worse still, blacks were forcefully dispossessed of their lands and confined to impoverished 
regions of the country during apartheid (Seekings 2007:2). Blacks lived in townships without 
basic infrastructure while whites lived in suburbs that were well-resourced. The forceful 
dispossession of properties and marginalization of the disadvantaged groups led to the current 
problem of landlessness and poverty in the country. In a bid to democratize, post-apartheid 
South African government called for forgiveness and the forgetting of the past (Ramose 
2011). It somehow adopted Robert Nozick’s idea of distributive justice by ignoring the cruel 
means by which apartheid’s beneficiaries amassed their riches. In the post-apartheid South 
Africa, the country endorses a right to property as outlined in the 1993 constitution and the 
1996 constitution. No property could be expropriated without a just and equitable 
compensation (Henrard 2002:33). Hence, the government tended to legitimize the violence of 
apartheid. 
Fanon in his Theory of Racialization argues that racism is a shaping principle of society 
(Kane 2007). For Fanon, racial inferiority is in the end realized in the economic realm (ibid). 
Consequently, class and race interconnect in such a manner that to be white is to fit in the 
rich class and to be black entails fitting in the poor class (ibid). Fanon (1965:29) notes that 
the colonial world (and the South African Apartheid regime as well) is separated into 
sections. One section is the whites settlers who use force to accumulate wealth and conquer 
the natives. The other section is the natives who are oppressed and marginalized in the 
colonial world. The settlers have accumulated wealth over the years and have oppressed the 
natives (ibid). In South Africa, this division worked in favor of the ‘white’ minority (ibid). 
Despite the end of the South African apartheid regime in 1994, black South Africans still 
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battle to fit into a new South Africa that constitutes both the oppressed and the white 
oppressors (ibid). 
 
By not making radical changes to resolve the apartheid injustices, beneficiaries of apartheid 
continue to benefit from it today (Valji 2004; Mandani 2000:183). The feeling of not being 
responsible makes some apartheid beneficiaries claim to be victimized by policies such as the 
Affirmative Action and any mention of reparation for victims of apartheid. The grandson of 
apartheid architect (Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd) Willem Verwoerd (2000) argues 
proudly that white youths are beneficiaries of hard work (cited in Valji 2004). Such a claim 
lacks reference to the historical privilege of the white population that endures into the post-
apartheid era and points to how some whites do not feel responsible at all for the present 
economic inequalities. The unsympathetic and indifferent attitude of some whites further 
compounds the grievances of disadvantaged races. 
 
When an oppressive regime had been brought down, the public in most cases have high hope 
that the new regime will do exactly the course for which they struggled. In view of the past 
apartheid injustice based on group discrimination, post-apartheid South Africa found it 
imperative to redress the disadvantages of the past (Henrard 2002:24). The Reconstruction 
Development Program RDP was established in 1994 to reconstruct the country’s economy as 
well as reduce poverty, inequality and deprivation in the country (Seekings, 2007:2). In 1996, 
the RDP policy which was conceived to be radical and was against the disadvantaged 
population, was replaced by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
macroeconomic strategy, a capitalist friendly policy (Whyte, 2009:17). 
 
The GEAR strategy was aligned closely to the International Monetary Fund’s structural 
adjustment programs. The GEAR strategy favors a neoliberal market economy which 
emphasizes economic growth.  The post-apartheid South African government adopted a 
neoliberal approach to economic development, an approach that intends to address the issue 
of poverty via economic growth. Commendably, South Africa’s economy has developed 
immensely.  However, while the formal economy grew and benefitted few rich elites, living 
human conditions were jeopardized for the masses (Seekings & Nattrass, 2002:5; Whyte, 
2009:17). Thus, the growth in economy which drives GEAR does not translate to reduced 




The GEAR strategy has failed enormously to bridge the gap between the rich and poor. While 
the current economic structure requires skilled labour, the majority of the population has 
suffered years of apartheid’s Bantu Education which produced a huge number of 
undereducated and unskilled masses (Seekings, 2007:1). Thus, unemployment and poverty 
remains high. This continues to put the country at the risk of violence. As identified by SAPS 
(2007:22-27), the main causes of violent crimes are unemployment, poverty as well as the 
abuse of drugs and alcohol (Whyte, 2009:18). The drugs and alcohol-related violence 
committed by people from low living conditions points to the country’s failure to address the 
poverty and inequalities in the country. Alcohol and drug abuse has become a recourse for 
some people who try to deal with their trauma and socio-economic challenges (MRC Policy 
Brief 2009). 
 
Although Affirmative Action and the Black Economic Empowerment meant that the class 
divide is no longer based on race, the policies created a few non-white elites to the detriment 
of a huge mass of poor people (Whyte 2009:20). The few black rich people belong to a 
middle class that is divorced from the daily reality of ordinary Africans. Via the BEE 
programme, former NUM leaders such as NUM Secretary General became top business 
managers (Wehmhoerner 2012:3). While inter-racial inequalities declined, intra-racial 
inequalities grew (Seekings and Nattrass 2002:11) As observed by de Wet (de Wet 
1997:356), the poor masses of South Africa feel poorly represented and abandoned by the 
post-apartheid government which they placed huge hopes on. The government is seen as been 
engrossed in pleasing the Whites, enriching themselves and their cronies as well as remaining 
in power (CVSR 2009:8). The poor masses have also seen that non-Whites who used 
violence to challenge apartheid are currently occupying important positions in the state are 
favoured by the Affirmative Action and BEE programs. In accord with Whyte (2009:19), this 
taught South Africans the effectiveness of violence in attaining what one wants. 
  
Social service delivery remains uneven in various parts of the country and is worst especially 
in township areas where the disadvantage groups are mostly found (Pillay 2012:12). People 
continue to protest against poor social service delivery (Wehmhoerner 2012:3). Pillay 
(2012:14) notes that in accordance with the 2007 study of the Freedom of Expression 
Institute “6000 protests were officially recorded during the 2004/05 financial year of which 
almost 1000 were banned…15 protests are being held per day somewhere in South Africa – 
besides the number of unrecorded protests”. It remains a challenge reconciling the grandiose 
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and utopian promises made by political liberators with the actual reality of ordinary citizens 
in South Africa (de Wet 1997:356). 
 
4.5.5 Economic violence: Marikana violence 
A recent corroboration of the nature of economic violence in post-apartheid South Africa is 
the recent incidence that happened at Lomnin Mine, Marikana on the 16th of August, 2012. 
Thirty four (34) platinum striking mine workers were shot dead and seventy eight (78) were 
injured by the police (Satgar 2012:33). Lonmin mine workers protested against the unfair 
salary they got monthly. They called for an increment of salary from 4,734 rand per month to 
12,500 rand per month (Wehmhoerner 2012:3).  The miners threatened to continue striking 
until their demands were met (News24, 2012). What then lead to the turnout of events in the 
mine? The mainstay of South Africa’s economic sector, the mine relied on cheap black 
labour even before the apartheid era. Mineworkers particularly, have undergone historical ill-
treatment. During the apartheid era, beside the low income they earn, five Soweto hostels 
which accommodated 13,000 workers, housed about three times that number (Article 19, 
1997:9). About 125,000 migrant workers were housed in 31 hostels in the townships around 
Johannesburg. Such poor treatment persisted in the present South Africa as mineworkers 
were expected to live on a 4734 rand salary despite the arduous work they engaged in. The 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) which was expected to play the role of expressing 
the grievances of mine workers, have failed to adequately represent the workers 
(Wehmhoerner 2012:2). 
Privileged by the Black Economic Empowerment programme, some NUM members gained 
important political positions or joined the class of rich black businessmen (Wehmhoerner 
2012:3). While the Union leaders live lavish lifestyles, the union members suffer from low 
wages and, when they demand an increment, they are told that their wage demands are out of 
proportion (Wehmhoerner 2012:3). The Union failed to advance the interest of mineworkers 
for the increment of salaries. The National Union of Mineworkers that was famous during the 
apartheid era for standing up for the right of its members gradually lost its leadership role 
(Wehmhoerner 2012:2), and it lost popularity in the eyes of mineworkers who saw their 
leaders as solely bent on personal interests. 
  
Discontented and excluded NUM leaders formed a new union, the Association of 
Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) in 2002. The AMCU is considered to be a 
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more militant union with the interests of the mineworkers at heart (Radnika 2013). In 2012, 
the AMCU grew in strength to the detriment of NUM. The AMCU promised the 
mineworkers an increment of salary to 12,500 rand per month as compared to their monthly 
salary of 4,734 rand. This resulted in the upsurge of AMCU’s support in the Lonmin mines of 
up to 19% in July alone. The AMCU began its campaign to materialize the promises made to 
the mineworkers (Malala, 2012). It organized the Lonmin strike as well as strikes across 
South African mines with popular support from mineworkers. With the slow response of the 
Lonmin management to their request, the mineworkers adopted violence to drive their 
agenda.  It was even reported that traditional doctors, commonly known as “sangomas” 
anointed the strikers with concoctions ostensibly to make them impregnable (Malala, 2012). 
The strike saw the death of about 34 mineworkers and others injured (Pierre, 2012). 
 
The violence adopted by the striking mineworkers as well as the deadly force with which the 
police used to respond to the violence reflects a society that has come to normalize violence 
as the reliable means of gaining success. This attests to the way violence has become weaved 
into the fabric of the society in such a way that the line between violence and legal police 
force is blurred. Wehmhoerner (2012:2) notes that the Lonmin violence in general led to the 
death of 42 people including 2 police officers that were hacked to death by the strikers. As 
noted by (Satgar 2012:34), ‘most of the 34 miners mere shot in the back while fleeing from 
the police’ depicting a state willing to use violence to enforce its neoliberal views. 
  
4.6 Conclusion 
Chapter four sought to critically analyze the nature of conflict in post-apartheid South Africa. 
There was a concentration on the contemporary conflicts such as black on black violence, 
xenophobia, taxi violence and political violence or assassinations that are all connected to the 
apartheid regime. In addition, the study assessed the link between the apartheid era and the 








LINK BETWEEN CONFLICT AND TRUTH RECONCILIATION IN THE POST-
APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the connection between apartheid and truth 
reconciliation commission in the post-apartheid. Later in the chapter, the study ponders on 
the challenges that emerge in the process of transformation in post-apartheid period. There 
will observations of some of the crucial challenges that emerge in the process of this 
transition. 
 
5.2 The link between apartheid and Truth and Reconciliation Commission   
      
As mentioned in chapter one, apartheid begun after the1948 election victory of the NP, which 
used that notion and program as the emphasis of its election campaign (Davenport 1991: 519; 
Worden 1994: 87). Though, segregation policies and endeavors to categorize the South 
African population were previously conspicuous centuries before, effectively since the early 
roots of colonialism in South Africa (Henrard 2002; Brown 1988-1989: 40; Worden 1994: 
112). Certain racially discriminatory regulations were implemented by the end of 18th 
century but then again it has been debated that  ‘it was only in the period between the end of 
the Anglo Boer War in 1902 and the 1930s that a cogent ideology of segregation emerged 
and was implemented’ (Worden 1994: 72). Much as apartheid begun as an Afrikaner project, 
which certainly is clear in numerous of its privileged measures for Afrikaners, it succeeded to 
attain broader white support, as it likewise necessitated a distinct advantage for the white 
English population (Herard 2002). 
  
In addition, apartheid is described by its fundamental policy of ‘divide and rule’ which was 
pointed at ensuring white existence and hegemony by separating the non-white population 
along racial and even ethnic lines (Kashula & Anthonissen 1995: 98; Bennett 1995: 7). Thus, 
the corresponding majority was separated into a host of minority groups which could not pose 
a threat to the white minority anymore (Herard, 2002). Therefore, apartheid can be 
characterized as a system to disempower the non-white population (ibid).  The policy of 
apartheid was inter alia portrayed by the official language policy, which omitted any 
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indigenous language and was reduced to English and Afrikaans, by the job reservations for 
Afrikaners in the public service and by the effort to encourage the Afrikaner people through a 
much classified education system  (Pelzer 1980: 136-139, 163). 
  
As the apartheid regime and its policies were gaining momentum in the 1960s to 1980s, so 
were the negotiations also getting increasingly intense in the 1980s between the NP 
government and the ANC and other parties from the resistance movement (Herard, 2002). 
Ultimately, this resulted in President de Klerk’s speech on 2nd February 1990, at the annual 
opening of Parliament, which set in motion the extended constitutional negotiation process 
resulting in the first non-racial general elections in April 1994 and the first democratic 
constitution for the South Africans (de Klerk, 1994: 4-6; Manby, 1995 1995: 35). 
  
The post-apartheid government led by President Nelson Mandela suggested a mechanism be 
put in place to address the conflict and political violence that had haunted South Africa for 
decades, namely a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) led by Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu (Abraham, 2008). The “TRC was established by means of the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995” (Abraham, 2008). TRC as a method of transitional 
justice was given the responsibility to provide a complete vivid image of the nature, causes 
and magnitude of the conflict including the gross human rights violation committed during 
apartheid. Over 25,000 people had been hanged for political crimes between 1960 and 1994 
and approximately 80,000 people have been detained without trial (Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Report, 2010). In the aftershock of such a large-scale violence, the necessity for 
public reckoning with past horrendous events is more vital to democratization than the 
criminal law’s more traditional objectives of prevention and retribution (Osiel, 1997). 
  
In addition, the main responsibility of the TRC in terms of the promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act (Act no. 34 of 1995) was basically “to establish the truth in relation to 
historical events” and also to provide as “complete a picture as possible” with regards to the 
historical events (Pisani& Kim, 2004). This truth-finding obligation was restricted to a 
particular period (1960 to 1994) and on an exact type of past events which are gross 
defilements of human rights. The act stated that the analysis should elucidate the nature, roots 
and the extent of human rights defilements. It included the past history, conditions, factors 
and settings of such violations and also the intentions for and conditions in which they had 
happened, as well as the fate or locations of the victims (Pisani & Kim, 2004). TRC served 
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the central role of providing “a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society 
characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice and a future founded on the 
recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development 
opportunities for all South Africans regardless of color, race, belief or sex” (Asaf et al, 2010). 
  
In post-conflict societies, Truth Commissions are considered to be necessary transitional 
features to facilitate peace building (Valji, 2004:1). In 1994, the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was established to look into the human rights violations of the 
past. Much of South Africa’s peace-building effort is judged by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s effort to deal with the human rights violation of the past. Though the TRC was 
only a part of the peace-building effort of the country, it is considered a primary tool for 
reconciliation. The Commission was mandated to investigate record and deal with gross 
human right violations that occurred between 1960 and 1994. 
  
Mamdani (2000:177) in The Truth according to the TRC, observes that the TRC was 
composed of two halves; an Amnesty Committee and the main Commission. The Amnesty 
Committee was charged with focusing on perpetrators. The Committee bears the onus of 
granting amnesty to perpetrators of politically motivated violence within a stipulated time 
frame of 1960 to 1994. The main commission also known as the Committee on Reparation 
and Rehabilitation on the other hand focused on the victims (Henrard, 2002:23). The main 
Commission was expected to gather information and evidence about the victims of human 
rights violations as well as proffer recommendations on how to pay reparations to the victims. 
  
As noted by Desmond Tutu in What about Justice, the acts required to be brought before the 
Amnesty Committee were politically motivated crimes. Acts that were committed for 
personal gain, ill will, spite and malice were not considered for amnesty. The perpetrators 
were required to be remorseful and also disclose their crimes. The committee has the final 
right over amnesty even if the victims oppose it. Through the TRC, the country traded truth 
telling for amnesty rather than mete out punishment for past crimes committed. By so doing, 
the Commission avoided the conflict that could have erupted if the country, which was on the 
verge of civil war, tried to punish the past crimes of influential members of rival political 
parties (Hernrard, 2002). Influential political figures and members of political parties that 
committed gross atrocities were spared of punishment for the sake of peace. The amnesty 
legislation was considered the necessary condition for a successful transition to a new 
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democratic South Africa (Henrard, 2002:23). Valji (2004:1) observes aptly that the TRC has 
managed to save South Africa from the jaws of civil war. 
  
Nevertheless, such a move has been greeted by controversial debates over its expedience in 
solving both the short and long term issues created by the apartheid era (Whyte, 2009:8, 
Henrard, 2002:23). The TRC has been criticized severally for focusing exclusively on 
political reconciliation and national unity at the expense of economic and social reparation to 
the victimized populace. The narrow focus of the TRC on political violence did not provide 
room for non-political violence to be tackled (Whyte, 2009:18). Subsequent sections shall 
consider how the TRC and other peace building efforts of South Africa failed to rid South 
Africa of the devastating effect of Apartheid. 
 
5.3 Challenges that Emerge in the Process of Transformation in the Post-Apartheid Era 
Even though South Africa’s process of transformation is riddled with challenges, there has 
been a measure of recorded success in the post-apartheid era. Over eighteen years later, South 
Africa still relishes a steadfast growth. A lot has been accomplished since 1994 (KwaZulu 
Natal Health, 2012). Since the removal of the apartheid regime, the post-apartheid era is a 
time of great promise and great hope although the idealism of that time diminishes questions 
about the transition’s concrete results, or dearth thereof, are serious concern (Asaf et al, 
2010). Certainly, there has been enormous progress as millions more of South Africans today 
have the basic needs such as access to clean drinking water; the number of households with 
electricity has improved from 50 per cent to 80 per cent, the banking system has started to 
make credit available to the black and there is an increasing black middle class (Asaf et al, 
2010).  
 
Evidently, there has been transformation since the demise of apartheid. Currently, over 
eighteen years after the ratification of the constitution, there are challenges that have emerged 
in the process of transformation in the post-apartheid era. One of the crucial challenges that 
emerged in the process of transformation in the post-apartheid era is redressing the 
widespread poverty of the black population of South Africa. In this regard, there has been 
significant progress since 1994. Between 1995 and 2005, the number of people living below 
the poverty line, as well as the depth of poverty, decreased tremendously (Asaf et al, 2010). 
In spite of the gains though, the “inherited” inequality of apartheid remains to cause the black 
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populace to “bare (sic) the brunt of unemployment and poverty” (Friedman &Bhengu, 2008: 
71). In as much as the degree of poverty has demonstrated promising transformations, the 
distribution of income continues to be disconcerting (Asaf et al, 2010). 
  
In addition, Asaf et al (2010) argue that the level of income inequality in South Africa sits at 
a greater level than it was during the apartheid era, equally within the aggregate and within 
each of the four commonly employed racial categories. In terms of the racial equality, 
contrary to initial expectations, inter-race income inequality continues to be a bigger factor of 
disparity than intra-race differences. That is to say, the aggregate difference amidst the white 
and non-whites is the prevailing reason for South Africa’s extremely high Gini coefficient. 
The post-apartheid era also faces a structural problem. Whereas the primary source of poverty 
reduction is growing social transfers, these increases are significantly outperformed by 
increases in income of those in the 70th income percentile or higher and yet the increased 
social transfers tend to enormously impact only those below the 30th percentile (Ibid). 
  
Consequently, despite the decreasing number of people living in poverty, the distribution of 
income remains unequal (Asaf et al, 2010). As a result, a growing number of South African 
people are being elevated out of poverty, nonetheless just hardly and only by growing 
provision of social transfers (Ibid). Social transfer can do a lot to counterbalance South 
Africa’s incredibly high level of gross income inequality. Minus larger non-white 
involvement with the economy in a non-menial ways, there is little hope for true enablement 
or independence for the majority of the South African populace (Ibid). In the transition from 
apartheid in 1994, the new South Africa under the leadershop of the ANC regime deemed to 
establish a greater political equality in itself, though necessary, was not sufficient to unwind 
the inherited social and economic inequalities (Acemoglu et al, 2007). With the aim to try 
and deal with the legacy of apartheid, direct intervention in the distribution of assets and 
opportunities was considered desirable and the central mainstay of this intervention became 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Today, it is currently termed as Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BBBEE).  In 2001, the BEE Commission defined BEE as follows 
(BEE Commission Report, 2001: 2); 
 
‘It is an integrated and coherent socio-economic process. It is located within the context of 
the country’s national transformation program, namely the Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP). It is aimed at redressing the imbalances of the past by seeking to 
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substantially and equally transfer and confer the ownership, management and control of 
South Africa’s financial and economic resources to the majority of the citizens.   It seeks to 
ensure broader and meaningful participation in the economy by black people to achieve 
sustainable development and prosperity. 
  
The initial aim behind the Black Economic Empowerment was to shorten the income 
inequalities  between races. Prior to 1994, the blacks were the most marginalized and 
deprived of decent jobs, education and so forth. Empowering them especially economically 
seemed to be one way that could help in creating a balance between the races.  To a large 
extent, there has been an economic transformation and progress recorded in the ruination of 
the bequest of the past, the degree to which this economic accomplishment has been by all 
the citizens especially those who were marginalized still remains inadequate for the 
requirements of a stable and prosperous society (KwaZulu Natal Health, 2012). It is the few 
privileged blacks who seem to be benefitting from the BEE strategy and leaving majority of 
the blacks still in abject poverty. 
 
Kubendrie Linda Aiyer (2004) wrote that, the system of democracy cannot be confined to the 
political level. For democracy to survive, it must occur and function in all social and 
economic organizations (Mbanga & Potwana, 2005). It is obvious that there have been 
endeavors by the government to create employment opportunities, empower the historically 
oppressed and eradicate discrimination in the work place through passing several acts like 
employment Acts: 1998, the Skills Development Act of 1998, Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of 2000 and the Black Economic Empowerment Act 
of 2003 (United Nations Development Program, 2000). The challenge is that such acts have 
only managed to affect a few numbers of the South African citizens, leaving the majority still 
lacking jobs, in abject poverty and not empowered. 
 
One of the other challenges is the unequal access to education. In post-apartheid South 
Africa, the education system is still discriminative in that not all South Africans today have 
access to equal education. It is no surprise that even to date; there are still historically 
privileged white schools and poor black schools still in existence. These influence the 
segregation even at tertiary institutions. Also, considering that South Africa in the apartheid 
era deployed segregated educational institutions at all levels for its four racial groups 
irrespective of shared languages and cultures (Adam &Moodley, 1986). For instance, during 
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the apartheid era, institutions like University of Natal – Pietermaritzburg and the University 
of Durban were only for whites  – Westville was for Indians and blacks. This was in keeping 
with the forced separation of groups in residential areas and in political rights (ibid, 233). It 
seems as though the trend of segregated educational institutions still continues even in the 
post-apartheid era. The gross inequality in education simply reveals the larger inequality in 
life chances in that the materially impoverished backgrounds of black students also severely 
handicap them in competition with whites, as do the many legal barriers. Also, the massively 
higher school drop-out rates for the black population clearly show the vast economic gap 
between the white and blacks. 
  
The education system has done little or nothing at all to compensate for the social inequality 
and instead reinforces it by a differential allocation of resources along racial lines. Even in 
the post-apartheid era, it is the few privileged blacks who can afford to take their children to 
good quality schools. The majority of the black population however cannot afford to go to 
such schools.  Even though there have been provisions of schools in the rural areas, the 
students in rural areas still remain less privileged in that sometimes there are missing text 
books, there are limited numbers of teachers, inadequate facilities such as classrooms, water, 
toilets, electricity, tables, chairs, laboratories, a lack of transport to and from school since 
schools are scare in such areas so students are forced to walk long distances with in some 
cases no security hence both students and teachers fear for their lives. Obviously, with such 
dire conditions, it tends to affect the performances of students leading to failure or even 
discouraging them from pursuing further education. 
  
In addition to the above, the recent crisis in the Eastern Cape explains the challenge in 
unequal access to education. Students spent months without studying due to inadequate 
facilities including text books and teachers themselves were on strike demanding pay 
increase. Putting these under-privileged students together with those from urban areas who 
have access to facilities and are more privileged, to sit for the matriculation examinations, 
and marking them using the same standards is unfair. Under privileged students have fewer 
chances in enrolling in institutions and in finding decent jobs. In as much as the challenge of 
the unequal access to education is blamed on the apartheid structures, there are still factors 
such as corruption and poor accountability in the post-apartheid era that account for the 




A high rate of unemployment is yet another challenge that South Africa is facing since its 
political transition in 1994 (Burger & Fintel, 2009). This is linked to the unequal access to 
education for the majority of the South Africans who do not have access to education because 
they cannot afford the money, or the lack the facilities especially for those in the rural areas 
such as the Eastern Cape. Even those that have the opportunity to have education, end up not 
reaching higher institutions to earn a qualification and a decent job. Most end up stopping at 
matriculation and the lucky ones with a degree qualification. As an aftermath of the racially 
divided past, there has been an impact in most of the facets of life as well as the labour 
market and the education systems (Ibid). 
  
The alarming unemployment in post-apartheid South Africa has partly contributed to the 
escalating violence and crime. Frustrations because of the scarcity of jobs have resulted in 
people committing a variety of crimes ranging from theft, robbery pickpocketing and murder 
in order to sustain their living. Others are stressed to the extent that they are forced to take 
drugs or indulge in drug smuggling. One would regard the current situation as a survival of 
the fittest. People will do anything to earn a living and this poses a big challenge because it 
elicits crimes and violence. Not only does the government have to find the means of creating 
employment but also curb the violence and crime with limited funds and so many challenges 
to be tackled.   
  
5.4 Conclusion  
 The purpose of this chapter was to examine the connection between apartheid and truth 
reconciliation commission in the post-apartheid. Also, the study pondered on the challenges 
that emerged in the process of transformation in post-apartheid period.  The research 
observed some of the crucial challenges that emerged in the process of transformation. These 
included redressing the endemic poverty of South Africa’s black population in which the 
level of income inequality in South Africa sits at a higher level than it was during the 






CONCLUSION, SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to offer some recommendations that can address the issue of conflict in 
South Africa. This chapter argues that to really tackle the issue of conflict and violence in the 
country, it is imperative to address the underlying issues that cause violence. To this end, the 
first section considers measures to combat economic inequality and poverty. It looks at 
affirmative action policy and pro-poor economic policies that address past injustices, 
inequalities and poverty as well as give people reasons to desist from violence. The second 
section looks into the question of land reform which is arguably one of the most important 
issues that was poorly addressed by the government. This section considers the need for a 
proper land reform program to tackle the issue of violence in South Africa. The third section 
considers the need for the active involvement of the South African community in ridding the 
country of violence. Finally, the fourth section investigates some measures that ought to be 
taken by the government to wrestle the issue of violence and finally concludes with an 
expository summary of the entire discourse. 
 
 
6.2 Reconciliation in Conflict Transformation in the Post-Apartheid South Africa 
Post-conflict societies where violence persists bedevil post-conflict peace-building efforts. In 
South Africa, the high rate of violence undermines the country’s peace-building efforts, 
claims to democracy and an agenda for political, social and economic development. It 
becomes necessary to solve the root causes of violence in the country. The MRC Policy Brief 
2009 maintains that the prevention and reduction of violence ought to be at the heart of the 
country’s transformation and continuous peace-building agenda. 
  
Kristi Samuels (2005:731) suggests that state building and peace building is a complex and 
time consuming task. Peace-building measures involve changing structural– social, 
economic, and political contradictions, improving relations between the conflict parties and 
changing attitudes and behavior so as to ensure lasting peace (Abdi, 2012). Addressing the 
underlying issues that engender the country to violence is a challenging task. The problem of 
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violence is that it demands attention into complex peace-building measures, such as 
economic reconstruction, land reform, addressing underlying impacts of apartheid on the 
populace, addressing race issue, developing structures that promote nonviolence, among 
many others. These measures are so complex that it is difficult to make clear policy directions 
to follow. Yet, the complexity of the task is not an excuse for the state and policy makers to 
fail at promoting and developing a fair and violent-free society. 
 
6.3 Confronting the State’s Socio-Economic Inequalities 
Most authors have referred to the prevalence of violence in the country as a consequence of a 
‘culture of violence’ that has taken deep root in society. Harris Bronwyn (2003:1) argues that 
poverty, lack of justice and inequalities are huge impediments to establishing a human rights 
culture that will counteract the culture of violence. To combat the culture of violence in South 
Africa, Pillay (2012:11) contends that the state ought to broaden its view of security beyond 
deterrence, incarceration and punishment. Here, the state ought to adopt a broader range of 
socio-economic and political strategies to ensure security. This entails the adoption of a 
human security paradigm that transcends a state-centric view of security. Rather than the 
protection of the interests of the state and state elites, the government should concentrate 
more on protecting the interests and desires of individuals and groups. 
 
Kaldor (2007:182) notes that human security entails the security of individuals and 
communities. The 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) identifies seven elements of human security: ‘economic security, food 
security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and 
political security’ (Kaldor 2007:182). By ridding people of the fear of social, economic, 
political and environmental insecurities, people tend to be in a better place to abandon 
violence. 
 
In his exploration of the relationship between poverty and conflict, Richard Jones (2006:152) 
notes that societies emerging from prolonged conflict are in most cases plagued with poverty. 
In the case of South Africa, those plagued by poverty are the non-white population especially 
the blacks who have endured years of political, social and economic oppression. Jones 
(2006:152) insists that poverty initiates and sustains conflict. In poor societies, people tend to 
be susceptible to engaging in violence to assert their grievances or be manipulated by 
85 
 
political elites for narrow interests. As violence characterizes the South African society, the 
economy is also affected negatively as investors and skilled workers find the country 
increasingly unsafe to engage in economic endeavors. The country could experience 
economic downtown that causes more poverty as investors and business people find the 
country uninhabitable in terms of business. Hence, as poverty triggers violence, violence 
facilitates further poverty. 
 
6.4 Affirmative Action 
Although Seekings and Nattrass (2002:25) note that inequalities in post-apartheid South 
Africa are more class based than race based, racial inequalities remain a conspicuous 
economic organizing feature of post-apartheid era. Income inequalities and class differences 
are better explained in terms of racial differences. Due to their historical position of 
advantage, the white minority are better off economically than their non-white counterpart, 
the ‘Blacks’, ‘Indians’ and ‘Coloureds’.  The black population, that constitutes the majority 
of South Africa’s population has been at the forefront of apartheid’s discrimination and 
oppression, and poverty is more prominent within this population. 
 
By belonging to a deprived group, people suffer discrimination whether they had a first-hand 
experience of the injustices or not. It could be maintained that individuals born in post-
apartheid South Africa did not suffer the hardship of racism (Seekings&Nattrass 2002).  But 
such persons are born into families that had previously experienced racial difficulty (ibid). In 
contrast to someone from an advantaged group, an individual from a deprived context is 
limited in his or her ability to afford education and health fees, and to obtain basic resources 
for sustenance and exploration of one’s gift (ibid) while a person coming from an advantaged 
family can easily acquire a piano to enable him/her explore one’s talent in music. In addition, 
economic disadvantage consigns people to be concerned mostly about survival issues, while 
an advantaged member of a group has wide ranging opportunities and concerns that are 
boarder than ‘bread and butter’. It thus seems unfair that disadvantaged groups should be 
considered emancipated from the shackles of apartheid without an effort to address the social 
and economic division between the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups (ibid). 
 
The South African Employment Equity legislation has made strides to address the injustices 
of the past via affirmative action. Affirmative actions as described by Alexander Neville 
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(2007: 95), are measures that necessitates a fair discernment and provision of opportunities 
for previously disadvantage groups to reinstate their dignity as well as their socio-political 
and economic stance in society relative to a previously advantaged group (ibid). Neville 
(2007: 93) maintains that the affirmative action in the South African Employment Equity 
legislation is commendably geared towards the imperative of the redistribution of economic, 
social, and political power and resources that constituted the central reason for the struggle 
against racial capitalism in general and apartheid in particular. 
 
However, the South African Affirmative Action has been criticized for failing to provide a 
platform on which the vast black middle class could grow hence reducing poverty among 
disadvantaged groups. Regarding the affirmative action and the continuation of racial 
identities in post-apartheid South Africa, Neville (2007) argues that the South African 
Employment Equity legislation mainly profits and aids only a few upcoming black middle 
class while neglecting the masses at the periphery. Affirmative action in South Africa is seen 
to favor only few upper and middle class individuals via a Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) program targeted on the middle and upper class black business men (ibid). Some 
influential blacks were even offered shares in South African and Multinational corporations. 
While such lucky blacks ascended the pinnacles of riches, the masses remained in poor 
situations. 
 
The government claims to be pro-poor but its inclined to economic policies that favor the 
rich, some black middle class men and some ex-freedom fighters whom government tends to 
be indebted to. As observed by de Wet (de Wet 1997:356), the poor masses of South Africa 
feel poorly represented and abandoned by the post-apartheid government which they placed 
huge hopes on. The government is seen as been engrossed in pleasing the Whites as well as 
remaining in power. As observed by Neville (2007), the enormous majority of the people 
have gained little or nothing from the Affirmative Action because it favors a few elite 
minorities. The masses of people still live in abject poverty and unemployment. These tend to 
undermine South Africa’s Affirmative Action policy which is supposed to play a vital role in 
the country’s peace-building effort. 
 
Neville (2007) also observes that affirmative action has formed a strong sense of prerogative 
in the youth who approach education and the sense of self-determination with laxity. The 
masses generally depend on the government for handouts and solutions for their daily 
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problems and challenges (Neville 2007). To make matters worse, some people are appointed 
to jobs that they are incompetent or incapable to efficiently handle just because they are from 
the deprived groups. This raises questions around the validity and implementation of 
affirmative action as a favorable programme to contend with past injustices. 
 
Neville (2007) goes further to argue that the unintentional consequences of using racial 
identities for affirmative action makes it a less reliable and consistent means of addressing 
racial injustices in South Africa. Neville argues that by stating and considering the South 
African people as ‘Blacks’, ‘Coloureds’, ‘Indians’, and ‘Whites’, the South African 
Employment Equity Act in some way perpetuates the racial categories of apartheid South 
Africa and one way or another ensconces the racial bias (Neville 2007:94). In his words, by 
using ‘race’, we give advantage to middle class black people as against working class people, 
we also entrench the racial categories that undermine the possibility of attaining a truly non-
racial democratic South Africa (Neville 2007: 103). 
 
Neville’s argument is in line with Appiah’s essay titled Race, Culture, Identity: 
Misunderstood Connections (1994). Here, Appiah (1994) is instructive in arguing that since 
racial essences do not exist, it is not worth making impact in society. Appiah (1994) goes 
further to argue that the use of racial identities as distinction between people in a society has 
social and personal impact. Using racial labels on people in some way has social 
consequences on how people are perceived (ibid). Individuals and people see themselves 
based on these racial labels into which they are categorized. Given that ‘black’ has a 
connotation of inferiority and ‘white’ a connotation of superiority, the continuous use of 
‘blacks’ and ‘whites’ in post-apartheid society continues to make such distinctions relevant in 
today’s South Africa. 
 
For Neville (2007:101), the racial labels used to assign rights in the South African 
Employment Equity Legislation bring alive and perpetuate racial distinctions and as such 
somehow perpetuates racism. Despite a common consensus that there is no racial essence, 
racism could persevere in the daily dealings of people if racial identities are used to allocate 
rights. Because racial identities, terms and concepts are derived from the false idea of racial 
essences, it follows that they are false as well. For Neville (2007), if racial terms fail to refer 





Neville (2007) believes we can build a non-racial South Africa by discontinuing the use of 
racial terms and groupings. Neville (2007) suggests that transformation measures are more 
desirable in South Africa than affirmative action. He advocates a class centered attempt at 
combating racial and economic injustices. Rather, than targeting some (racial) group, the 
approach to solving the problem of poverty and economic disadvantage of the predominantly 
black majority, Indians and coloreds could be by taking a policy that targets low-income 
groups regardless of racial distinctions. Since the majority of masses are from economically 
disadvantaged backgrounds and are people who have experienced racial injustice, it is 
beneficial to use class to solve the issues of economic disadvantage (Neville 2007). For 
Neville (2007), this will go a long way to promote national unity and social integration and 
cohesions. 
 
Though Neville (2007) raises important points around the necessity of Affirmative Action in 
South Africa, it is vital to ask if the affirmative action is wrong in principle or is it a 
contentious issue because of the way it is executed in the country? Also is it because we fear 
the unintentional consequences by overlooking addressing racial injustices by using racial 
identities? In agreement with Fanon in On Violence (1965), the colonizers brought violence 
with them so as to gain principal control of the colonies. It is only necessary that to achieve 
racial justice, radical measures are required to effect any type of decolonization. The 
Affirmative Action contextualizes Fanon’s notion of violence, which is a radical means of 
addressing the inequalities created by past injustices. Appiah argues that racial injustices of 
the past should be addressed to the extant as those injustices still play a significant part in the 
ordering of society (Appiah and Gutmann 1996). In Group Rights and Racial Affirmative 
Action, Appiah (2011) argues in support of affirmative action as a mechanism of addressing 
racial injustices. Appiah (2011: 265) argues that affirmative action intends to address 
individual wrongs or injustices experienced by being a member of a group. For Appiah, it is 
not just worth arguing for healing and reconciliation which entails the dignified living of a 
previously disadvantaged group (Appiah and Gutmann 1996). Remedies to racial injustice 
that do not look at the economic and social limitations of the disadvantaged population are 
false-remedies (ibid). 
 
Amy Gutmann in Responding to Racial Injustice (1994), argues that the use of racial 
identities to address past injustices could be seen as a colour conscious policy (Appiah and 
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Gutmann 1996). Colour conscious policies recognize the ways in which skin colour and other 
superficial features of individuals adversely and unfairly affect their life chances. If people 
have been unfairly treated in the past due to colour (not race), it is fair that colour conscious 
policies are used to address such injustices that mirror existing social inequalities. Fanon in 
the Theory of Racialization, argues that racism is an organizing principle of society (Kane 
2007). For Fanon, racial inferiority is in the end realized in the economic realm (ibid). 
Consequently, class and race interconnect in such a manner that to be white is to fit in the 
rich class and to be black entails fitting in the poor class (ibid). A person born into a black 
family inescapably has a challenging future economically and socially than an individual who 
is born into the white family (ibid). 
 
Addressing racial injustice via class consciousness as suggested by Neville (2007) could 
easily disregard the distinctive concerns and apprehensions of people who have undergone 
the aftermath of racial discrimination. Additionally, class consciousness only endeavors to 
tackle economic injustices not racial injustice. In using class conscious policies, a person 
from a previously advantaged background, having massive lands and greater opportunities, 
can claim to come from a low-income group if he or she is not working (ibid). Class 
consciousness in South Africa could end up creating a South Africa where ‘whites’ who have 
historically enjoyed good education, opportunities and information would continue to have an 
edge economically and socially (ibid). For example, a white person by virtue of coming from 
a supposed superior background, could end up being regarded superior, competent and 
favoured in terms of employment as compared to a black person from a supposed inferior and 
degrading background (ibid). Given that whites in the past had advantages and privileges in 
terms of education and information, they (In as much as they are of a low-income group) 
could effortlessly know where to go to in search of a job. Here, one’s color could continue to 
have a subtle bearing on one’s socio-economic status. As argued by Mahmood Mamdani 
(2000:183), the riches and possessions of the beneficiaries of racism still continue to be intact 
and they stand at a more advantaged footing than the disadvantaged victims in socio-
economic relations. 
 
It is also necessary to use colour conscious policies to address the psychological feelings of 
racially oppressed and marginalized groups. This will go a long way in addressing the 
negative feelings of the disadvantaged towards the white oppressors. If colour conscious 
policies were enhanced violently and forcefully during the apartheid regime, colour conscious 
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policies ought to be used also as a radical approach towards addressing the injustices (Appiah 
and Gutmann 1996). That racial categories are not vital and that efforts are being made for 
national unity does not wipe away the poverty and stigma created by racism (ibid) 
. 
The fact that the implementation of Affirmative Action in South Africa has failed to some 
extent does not necessarily make the policy erroneous. The South African governments 
require better methodologies to Affirmative Action that would empower racially 
disadvantaged masses to achieve equality socially and economically as compared to the 
advantage of privileged groups. Affirmative action policies ought to be redirected to the 
advantage of the disadvantage people in society (Seekings and Nattrass 2002: 24). 
 
6.5 Pro-Poor Economic Policies 
Seekings and Nattrass (2002:17) insist that the government should desist from making 
grandiose plans for economic growth that fail to translate to poverty alleviation. To really 
tackle the issue of violence in South Africa, the country ought to adopt pro-poor policies that 
are aimed at addressing the issues of poverty and unemployment. Labour market policies 
ought to adopt pro-poor economic growth policies that reduce unemployment via sustained 
job creation (Seekings 2007:1). Arora and Ricci (2000:34) note that in pursuit of a neo-liberal 
economic agenda, the South African labour market policies favour big firms at the expense of 
small firms. For Arora and Ricci (2000:34), the extensive labour regulations imposed on 
small enterprises have an enormous effect on the rate of unemployment in the country. Thus, 
the state ought to reform labour market policies that hinder small firms and low-wage 
creation. The less tightened policy reforms will create an avenue for small firms to blossom 
and create job opportunities for the unemployed. This means that labor policies need to 
tolerate wage inequalities between firms. This will enable small and growing firms to have 
job opportunities for the unemployed thereby helping in the project of employing the many 
unemployed masses in the country (Seekings and Nattrass 2002:17). By tolerating wage 
inequalities, overall income inequalities are reduced. The reduction of labour market 
regulations could help to improve the country’s employment rate as people get the freedom to 
start up small business ventures without the monopolization of the market system by few rich 




Seekings and Nattrass (2002:20) advocate for a greater participation of workers in the 
economic life and decision making of firms. This entails a worker-ownership firm structure 
than a capitalist firm structure. As noted by Seekings and Nattrass (2002:20): for example, if 
a clothing firm decided that it could no longer compete profitably on international markets, 
the government should consider offering the workers (who face retrenchment) the option of 
taking over the firm and working for a share of profits rather than the wage. This would 
enable them to earn less than the going wage - as they would be drawing a share of profits 
rather than the old wage which had put the firm under pressure in the first place. Such an 
arrangement would at least keep people employed, albeit at lower earnings. 
 
The government has tried to create opportunities for young people to attain better education 
and skills to meet with the high demand for skilled labor. Yet, a lot is still required of the 
government in terms of creating opportunities for people from poor backgrounds to receive 
better education (Seekings and Nattrass 2002:10). The government should further recommit 
itself to the delivery of social services to the most vulnerable population who are easily 
predisposed to violence. Seekings and Nattrass (2002:4) argue that the ANC government 
continues to blame the apartheid legacy for its poor performances even though the party 
failed to tackle the issues fully. Some South African residents claim to be poorer in post-
apartheid South Africa than they were during the Apartheid regime (Landau 2011:11). Thus, 
although the circle of poverty was set rolling by the apartheid regime, current state 
institutions end up worsening the rate of poverty and frustration in the country. A lot is still 
expected of the government in terms of making adequate pro-poor policies that will help 
solve the root cause of violence. 
 
6.6 Land Reform 
The question of ‘land reform’ in South Africa is a controversial issue. It brings alive one of 
the most pertinent concerns of post-apartheid South Africa in the quest to address racial 
injustices and inequalities of the past (de Wet 1997: 355). Prior to the 1994 democratic 
elections, whites (5%) owned 87% of the land and the black majority owned 13% (Diale 
2012:1342). de Wet (1997:355-356) highlights that at present, white South Africans, 
including companies and some 55,000 commercial farmers (97 per cent of whom are white), 
have access to 102 million hectares of land, while1.2 million black households have access to 




By dispossessing them of lands, blacks were reduced to providers of cheap labor at white 
farms, mines and industries. In the post-apartheid South Africa, the country endorses a right 
to property as outlined in the 1993 Constitution and the current 1996 Constitution of South 
Africa. Thus, no property could be expropriated without a just and equitable compensation 
(Henrard 2002:33). While the constitutional arrangement gave blacks the right to own lands, 
it failed to provide adequate means for them to own lands and the means of production (More 
2011: 9). Hence the majority of South African lands remain in the ownership of white settlers 
while natives live at the periphery. While contending with the land question in post-apartheid 
South Africa, Ramose (2011:1) insists that until land is restored to the original owners, the 
liberation agenda is incomplete and South Africa will continue to lag behind in really 
considering itself a home grown democracy. 
 
In its 1997 Green Paper on South African Land Policy, the government outlined its vision of 
land reform (de Wet 1997:356). Via a land reform policy, the government hopes to contend 
with apartheid’s engendered inequalities and poverty in pursuant of distributive justice and 
reconciliation. The land reform programs involve three aspects; restitution, redistribution and 
land tenure reform (de Wet 1997:357). Restitution has to do with restoration of the original 
lands (where feasible) to the original habitants who lost their lands after 1913 due to the 
racial discriminatory legislation such as the Native Land Act and the Group Areas Act (de 
Wet 1997:357). Redistribution on the other hand has to do with providing ‘the poor with 
access to land for residential and productive purposes in order to improve their livelihoods’ 
(de Wet 1997:357). The program is meant for those who do not qualify for restitution. These 
people are expected to receive a 17,500 rand grant to enable them to procure lands. The Land 
tenure reform seeks to provide rights for rural and urban poor who have insecure tenure as 
labor tenants, renters and squatters (de Wet 1997:357). 
 
Among the three aspects of land reform policy considered by the South African government, 
the land restitution policy is the most contentious part. The complexity of this policy 
continues to make the ruling ANC government tread a careful line in its consideration of the 
policy which may contribute positively or mar the country’s reconciliation and reconstruction 
efforts. De Wet (1997:355) recognizes that to effectively carry out land reform in South 
Africa, a further resettlement program will need to take place which involves huge 
government expenditure and can spiral a whole lot of unintended consequences. In 1993, the 
93 
 
World Bank estimates that to transfer 30 percent of White-owned land to its original owners 
over a five years period would involve moving 600,000 families (de Wet 1997:360). This will 
require a huge financial commitment from the government. It is also feared that land reform 
policy may engender inequality that favors the black population over the whites. Such 
inequality may cause renewed conflict in post-apartheid South Africa as advocates of white 
supremacy may embark on violence against the government. For instance, hardline 
supporters of apartheid such as the Afrikaner Weerstands Berweging movement (AWB) 
could begin an insurgency against the black dominated government to prevent any land 
reform policy that redistributes the land in favor of the black populace. 
 
Some scholars take issue with the way the nation is handling the land reform question in the 
country. Despite the repealing of the 1913 Natives Land Act which led to the indigenous 
people losing their lands, the ANC government continues to lack a clear policy direction and 
political will to address the land issue in South Africa (Diale 2012:1343). The land reform 
program pursued by the ANC government entails buying lands from willing white sellers at 
the current market price. In reality, most white land owners have proven to be unwilling to 
sell their lands and others have charged the government exorbitant amounts to sell lands to 
them (Ntsebeza 2006:2). In an economic system where land prices are rising sharply, analysts 
have observed that the government will be crippled if it has to pay compensations to engage 
in land restitution (More 2011:9). The few land restitution projects carried out by the South 
African Commission on Restitution of Land rights cost the country about R16 billion (Diale 
2012:1346). Yet, it is mind boggling understanding why the government should be obliged to 
compensate white land owners who paid no compensation to anyone when they were 
appropriating lands forcefully from the natives. Until today, the South African government 
under the ruling ANC party has failed to materialize the dream of people’s dispossessed of 
their lands during the colonial and apartheid era (Diale 2012:1341). These have caused many 
observers to note that the ANC government sold out during the negotiation process (Seekings 
and Nattrass 2002:1). 
 
More (2011:1) argues that the South African liberators only attained flag independence while 
failing to address the past injustices and promoting national unity and reconciliation which 
Fanon warns of in his Pitfalls of National Consciousness. ANC’s favoring of a negotiated 
settlement failed to adequately confront the essential objective of liberation struggles which is 
regaining lost territories (More 2011:11). Sadly, the former oppressors dictated to the 
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freedom fighters how things ought to be ordered by insisting on the preservation of the status 
quo during the negotiation process. By choosing to endorse property rights, the ANC 
government tended to go in line with the interests of the former oppressors to the detriment of 
the masses of people (Diale 2012). 
 
The current land reform program pursued by the government is slow. Communities of the 
dispossessed and organizations such as the Landless People’s Movement (LPM) continue to 
pressure the government to meet its demands for land redistribution (Ntsebeza 2006). South 
African natives continue to live as foreigners in a supposedly liberated era. In terms of the 
land redistribution policy, the 17,500 rands is not enough to enable people to purchase lands. 
Besides the demands that people buy lands in groups, people will also need to borrow money 
to complement the acquisition grants so as to purchase farmland (de Wet 1997:360). Hence, 
current land reform programmes lack a proper focus for the poor masses. The Pan-Africanist 
Congress that has challenged the property rights law from its inception continues to advocate 
for a radical and fast land reform program together with people who are landless and dwellers 
of squatter camps (More 2011:9). How can people claim to be free when they live in an 
unequal society where former oppressors maintain the properties they acquired forcefully 
from the oppressed while the former oppressed people live in a poor living condition? 
 
In line with Fanon, More (2011:7) argues that the restitution of land to its original owners is 
the ultimate means of gaining victory against the colonialism/apartheid. Land is an essential 
requirement for life for Africans and an essential component that restores people’s dignity. 
The restoration of land to its original owners signals the return of sovereignty to the 
oppressed (More 2011). As warned by the ANC Youth League, the country might experience 
a Zimbabwean-style kind of land invasion should the whites continue to maintain the lands 
(Diale 2012:1344). Thus, it is possible to hold that there will be continuous racial tension and 
violent expressions in South Africa as long as lands remain in the hands of the colonial 
settlers. Wehmhoerner (2012:5) warns that just as the NUM lost its leadership role for the 
mine workers, the ANC should be worried about its leadership position in the country in 
years to come. The government needs to seriously step up to the challenges in the country. 
 
It is true that land restitution pursued radically without compensation may seem cruel. But it 
is nothing compared to the cruel and forceful takeover of the apartheid era. For Fanon, as 
colonialism entailed forceful appropriation, decolonization also entails a radical re-
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appropriation of properties for its original indigenous people (More 2011:9). Hence, there is a 
need to revisit the section 25 (1-3) of the property clause in the constitution to redress past 
injustices (Diale 2012). This will go a long way in making South African natives and the 
disadvantaged population feel liberated and able to desist from violence. 
 
The land reform question in South Africa is not merely a question of addressing past 
injustices. In The Agrarian Question and the Developmental State, Sam Moyo (2010) 
contends that the failure of attaining inclusive land reforms in South Africa not only concerns 
the issue of land redistribution in Africa but is also for positive production. For Moyo (2010), 
the monopoly of land by a few individuals leads to underdevelopment and less production 
than required. This monopoly of land favors the minority to the detriment of the majority. 
Here, forcefully appropriated lands are used for the production of commercial goods alone 
while ignoring the domestic needs of the people. The people come first before the quest for 
enrichment by a few people. Moyo (2010) argues that when land is available to all and there 
is no monopoly, there is more production, home marketing is broadened and the capabilities 
of people are enhanced. 
 
Nevertheless, a radical land reform programme ought to be well-planned to ensure an 
adequate resettlement program. Moreover, the white population ought to feel a greater sense 
of responsibility for the inequalities in the country. This will ensure that the white population 
does not feel victimized. The fact that the peace building efforts in the country via the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission failed to hold the white population responsible for apartheid 
as expressed in an earlier chapter makes this task a difficult one. Hence, a commission ought 
to be set to ensure that the much desired land reform program is carried out humanly and 
effectively. The land reform program would go a long way to address social and economic 
issues. 
 
6.7  Social Measures towards the Prevention and Reduction of Violence 
The Ministry of Safety and Security observes that 80% of violent contact cases occur 
between people who know each other (Pillay 2012:10). Thus, it becomes essential for 
community members to get involved in working towards a violenc-free society. In accord 
with Pillay (2012:10), the police alone cannot solve the issue of violence in the country 
because they are not everywhere. In fact in some townships there continues to be reports of a 
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low presence of police forces in the region. In one of Cape Town’s townships, Khayelitsha, 
about 14 people were killed within a year by vigilantes (Wehmhoerner 2012:3). The 
insufficiency of policing and the failure of the judiciary to deal with criminals lead vigilantes 
to take matters into their own hands. Besides increasing police presence in such regions, it is 
imperative to nurture a society that seeks to address their everyday issues via non-violent and 
judicial means. 
 
There is no doubt that the memory of past racial tension and violence is alive in the minds of 
individuals and societies that had been embroiled in conflict for decades. These memories 
ought not to be ignored for the sake of starting anew because it is those memories that 
engender the present South African violence. The disastrous influence of apartheid’s violence 
and struggle against it engendered a violence-prone culture in South Africa. Those from 
disadvantaged groups who continue to live in poor conditions or lack justice in post-apartheid 
South Africa still feel the need for liberation and are fighting against the systems that keeps 
them in vulnerable positions. Given that such people lack the feeling of being redeemed in a 
post-apartheid system, violence continues to be a resort for them.  Moreover, as elaborated in 
the fourth chapter, non-Whites were allowed to commit violence against each other without 
the intervention of the state police during the apartheid era. Hence, there is a need to re-
humanize the people who have lost their sense of humanity in the process (Landau 
2011:235). This will enable people to treat others – fellow citizens and outsiders – as humans 
with dignity and respect. Peace-building programs ought to put in place measures to deal with 
the memories and psychological impacts of post-1994 violence. 
 
This effort will require the active participation of South African communities. It becomes 
necessary to transform social values, norms and practices of the community. More 
community initiatives ought to be established in various communities to promote and 
improve positive values, trust and solidarity (Pillay 2012:10). The government should 
encourage programs such as violence-awareness campaigns, youth and child development 
programs, community development programs and substance abuse prevention programs, to 
help in the reduction of the rate of violence in the country (Department of Social 
Development 2011). It is important to also reduce intolerance and discriminations that are 
based on race, ethnicity, nationality, gender or sexual orientation. While it is expedient for the 
government to emphasize unity and oneness, it is also true that the society needs to respect 
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differences. Here, while unity is celebrated, diversity should also be noted as the prime 
element in the united South Africa (Landau 2011:235). 
 
It is also important for the government to encourage local support systems and conflict 
resolution mechanisms in the community to help people resolve conflict with non-violent 
means. Key agents of socialization lik3 families, churches, educational institutions and so on 
ought to contribute to the positive sway and transformation of the norms, values and mindset 
of people in society (Pillay 2012:11). Cultural factors such as traditional male sexual 
entitlement and patrimony should be revisited to redirect them to positive expressions (CSVR 
2010:11). Communities should cooperate with the government to root out violence. Political 
and charismatic leaders should be more vocal in condemning and speaking against violence. 
 
Inappropriate youth socialization and inadequate child rearing has been observed as some of 
the causes of violence (CSVR 2010:10). There is a need for sustained family support 
programmes with a focus on households headed by children and single parents especially 
those headed by teenage mothers (CVSR 2010:14). Such high risk families ought to be 
supported by the government to ensure that they do not face untold hardships that drive them 
to the edge of adopting violent measures to express their frustration and needs. This could be 
achieved by improving the quality of education for such children with an emphasis on 
conflict management. This could be done especially at the critical stages of primary and high 
school education so as to encourage the children to be better and well-informed citizens. 
From early childhood, children should be taught to learn how to resolve conflict without 
recourse to violence. Conditions that predispose young people to violence should also be 
addressed. Social workers should be used to intervene in dysfunctional families to ensure that 
children are not left in the hands of abusive parents and dysfunctional homes. 
 
6.8  Democracy and the Rule of Law  
Based on the notion that democrats are peace loving and rarely go to war with each other, the 
international community promotes democratization (Fearnely and Chiwandamira 2006:15). 
Despite the misgiving of some academics about such one-size-fits-all kind of approach to 
post-conflict situations, democratization is still viewed by many as a solution to attaining 
lasting peace in post conflict societies. Democracy prides itself among all other forms of 
governance as a form of governance that harnesses and addresses competing interests. It is 
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necessary that South Africa ensures that it does not pay lip service to the principles of 
democracy. Significantly, a nation’s structures and its ability to address issues attest to its 
democratic claims. As it will be discussed, there is a great need to establish proper structures 
such as a full participatory democracy, rule of law, effective service delivery commission and 
conflict monitoring agencies to facilitate the development of a non-violent society. 
 
Post-apartheid South Africa embraced democracy in its efforts to promote reconciliation in 
the country. The process of South Africa’s transition from apartheid to a new South Africa 
was informed by democratic principles as evident in the lengthy negotiation process that led 
to a new constitution and policies that place emphasis on reconciliation (de Wet 1997:355). 
However, the glaring fact that undermines South Africa’s democracy is that few people often 
take the status of ‘people’ and dictate how things ought to be. This is evident in the activities 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission where the victims of apartheid had no say in the 
way the commission was to grant amnesty to perpetrators. The government adopted neo-
liberal economic policies that favor few rich capitalists. 
 
Generally, in the peace building effort, the interests and views of the masses were side-lined 
for the sake of starting anew and treading carefully to avoid the political conflict and racial 
tension (Landau 2011:3). While it is a necessary move, limiting people from political 
participation denies them the fundamental right to participate in decision making as 
democracy espoused. In such top down situations, discontent grows among the masses as 
there continues to be a wide gap between the ideas of the governing leaders and the masses. 
People’s grievances may then be pursued via violent expressions against the government, 
fellow citizens and outsiders. This is evident in the various numbers of violent protests, 
xenophobic attacks, rape and violent crimes across the country. 
 
In line with Samuels (2005:728), full participatory democratic governance is required in 
South Africa so as to achieve long-term peace. It is necessary for people to be actively 
involved in the social, political and economic decision making life of the society. There ought 
to be greater inclusiveness of people and openness in political dialogue. This will enable a 
majority of people to have a sense of belonging in the system as well as claim responsibility 




The rule of law is one aspect of a nation’s system that is essential for ensuring a peaceful 
resolution of competing interests. As noted by Neil J. Kritz (2001:803), the rule of law is 
crucial to post conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts. The rule of law prevents the 
recurrence of conflict by providing necessary societal structures and institutions to create 
confidence, ease tension and assure each combatant group that their interests will be 
protected (Neil 2001). The rule of law establishes principles that constrain the power of 
government and obliges it to conduct itself according to a series of prescribed and publicly 
known rules. It prevents the accumulation of power by a party, holds all parties accountable 
and provides non-violent means for the resolution of conflict (Kritz 2001:804). 
 
To tackle the issue of violence, South Africa ought to work hard at building a powerful, 
incorruptible, just and independent judicial system that everyone is accountable to. The law 
enforcement and criminal justice system ought to be powerful and immune from political 
manipulation, transnational criminal operations, and private sector criminals (Kritz 
2001:806). In such a situation, people then feel confident in the power of the judicial system 
to settle their dispute rather than taking up violent means. Given that many of the places in 
South Africa where violence is rampant lack adequate criminal justice system and conflict 
management mechanisms, there is a need for a greater criminal justice system and conflict 
management mechanism (Landau 2011:97). Here, the practice of mob justice and the role of 
vigilantes groups will be rendered irrelevant as the criminal justice systems are readily 
committed to ensuring that people’s rights are respected. The establishment of the rule of law 
will ensure that different political parties and movements feel confident enough to address 
their issues using the judicial set up without recourse to violence. Here, adversaries address 
their issues in legitimate and non-violent means. 
 
Conflict and violence monitoring groups ought to be set to ensure that brewing conflicts and 
violence are arrested and addressed on time before they escalate into disastrous 
consequences. The government should use legitimate special units to investigate and arrest 
hit squad activities (WRITENET 1996).  It is also necessary to improve crime intelligences 
and strategies to tackle organized violent acts. This will enable the arrests of warlords, 
corrupt police, vigilante groups and other perpetrators of violence. It is necessary to ensure 
proper policing in townships where people experience aggravated forms of violence such as 
street robbery, cruel rapes and lethal assaults (CSVR 2010:12). Nevertheless, it is important 
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to improve police integrity and encourage professional use of force by police officers. This 
will help to reduce the cases of police brutality. 
 
Generally, the fight against violence requires social commitment and political will and 
dedication. The society should be more vocal and active in condemning violent expressions 
of anger. Media and advertising industries should be encouraged and sanctioned to use role 
plays to promote non-violence while desisting from promoting role plays that encourage 
violence (CSVR 2007). Given that weapons such as guns contribute to the violence, laws 
around gun acquisition and carrying of guns needs to be tightened. Alcohol adverts should be 
prohibited. Bullying and violence in schools should be prevented. Prison should be managed 
in a more humane manner to promote a non-violent environment in prisons. This will ensure 
that when inmates are re-introduced into society, they do not go back to carrying out violent 
and criminal acts. The government needs to also encourage and invest in research programs 
geared towards understanding violence and identifying ways to addressing the root causes of 
violence in South Africa. 
 
6.9 Summary and Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this research was to offer a broad analysis of the rationale to 
transform some of the apartheid structural arrangements to a more egalitarian structure. The 
study has explored some of the apartheid structural arrangements such as the legal structure 
that seems applicable to all the other sectors that need transformation and partially mentioned 
some transformation in the economic sector.  Transforming the legal system which is still 
attached to the apartheid era entails also transforming education, fair wages, poverty 
alleviation, security systems, economic development and public services which have a 
bearing on all state sectors. There is the need for change in the legal system on the grounds 
that perhaps it could help get rid of the causes of present conflicts which are rooted in the 
actuality of the apartheid structural arrangements still in existence. 
 
This study started off by giving a general introduction and background in chapter one. It also 
highlighted the problem of the study stating that, ‘the new trends of conflict in the post-
apartheid South Africa, in conjunction with the tenacity of the old patterns of violence 
(during the apartheid era), tend to pose a threat to the already fragile South African 
democracy (Bronwyn, 2008). The tenacity of violence within South Africa furthermore 
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highlights what has been regarded as a ‘culture of violence’ within the country.  For such a 
culture where violence is advocated as a primary solution to the day to day problems and 
challenges, demands the introduction of identity and group norms together with the structure 
and factors into an understanding of violence during the political transition (ibid).  Conflicts 
in post-apartheid South Africa evidently are linked to the old patterns of violence during 
apartheid. Conflicts such as political violence and taxi violence are traced back to the 
apartheid era. They are still going on and it is these conflicts that trigger cultures of violence. 
The only approach to getting rid of these conflicts in the post-apartheid era is by getting rid of 
the structural arrangements of apartheid. This study served the purpose of examining the 
rationale of transforming apartheid's structural arrangements. 
  
In chapter one, a qualitative research approach was used for this study. This included a 
literature review, newspapers, podcasts, television, and magazines. The study was to 
specifically analyze the existing data on conflict transformation in post-apartheid South 
Africa from 1994 to date. The theoretical frameworks used were; Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction (PCR) and Restorative Justice (RJ). These are theories that laid strategies 
through which South Africa can be reconstructed to a peaceful state considering that South 
Africa has just come from violence of varying degrees. These theories support the principle 
that what has been destroyed through violence has to be mended. They basically argue that 
for post-apartheid South Africa to achieve this goal, it has to set objectives that would support 
the transition from any conflict to peace, restructure economic and social development, 
reunion campaigns, human and institutional capacity building, and establish special 
investment funds to maintain social solidity during the period of economic adjustment and 
poverty reduction and devolution. 
  
The study then went on to look at the literature review in chapter two. This was limited to 
conflicts in the pre-colonial era and the apartheid regime. It also examined the post-apartheid 
conflict transformation. Analysis from the authors' view on conflict and conflict 
transformation, the study offers various definitions of conflict and conflict transformation and 
their various types of conflict. The last section of chapter two examined the link of the 





Chapter three of this study analytically examined the rationale of transforming apartheid's 
structural arrangements. This chapter argued that in an attempt to deal with some of the 
discrepancies of occupational segregation, inequalities in pay for equal work, a lack of or 
severely limited access to training and development opportunities, various apartheid 
structural arrangements ought to be transformed so as to undo the evils and inequalities of the 
past. This section of the work concerned itself with transforming the legal structure that 
seems applicable to all the other sectors that need transformation and partially mentioned 
some transformations in the economic sector. The choice for transforming the legal system is 
because one cannot talk of education, fare wages, poverty alleviation, security system, 
economic development, health services etc., without reference to what the legislature says; 
the legal system has a bearing on all state sectors. In chapter three, there is a proposition of 
reconsidering the economic system. The study advocated for economic reconstruction 
through employment and job creation, which is the main bridge between economic growth.  
Opportunities of human development can be seen as ‘the most fundamental of economic 
opportunities as it provides people with incomes that enable them to establish command over 
a whole range of goods and services that may enhance their dependents’ standard of living’. 
 
Chapter four sought to critically analyze the nature of conflict in post-apartheid South Africa. 
There was a concentration on the contemporary conflicts such as black on black violence, 
xenophobia, taxi violence and political violence or assassinations that are all connected to the 
apartheid regime. In addition, the study assessed the link between the apartheid era and the 
current nature of post-apartheid South Africa. There have been discussions in the study of 
violent expressions in South Africa dissolving into political, social and economic violence. In 
chapter four, in the first section, there is the issue of political violence and assassination. In 
the second section, the subsection of chapter four looked into social violence. Finally, chapter 
four examined economic violence. 
  
Chapter five examined the link between conflict and truth reconciliation in the post-apartheid 
conflict. After the apartheid regime and its policies had gained momentum in 1960 to 1980 so 
were the negotiations also getting intense in the 1980s between the NP government and the 
ANC and other parties from the resistance movement (Herard, 2002). Ultimately, this 
resulted in President de Klerk’s speech of 2nd February 1990, at the annual opening of 
Parliament, which set in motion the extended constitutional negotiation process resulting in 
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the first non-racial general elections in April 1994 and the first democratic constitution for 
South Africans (de Klerk, 1994: 4-6; Manby, 1995 1995: 35). 
  
The post-apartheid government led by President Nelson Mandela suggested a mechanism be 
put in place to address the conflict and political violence that had haunted South Africa for 
decades, namely a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) led by Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu (Abraham, 2008). The TRC was established by means of the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. TRC as a method of transitional justice was given 
the responsibility to provide a complete vivid image of the nature, causes and magnitude of 
the conflict including the gross human rights violation committed during apartheid. In this 
chapter, the link was established on the grounds that in post-conflict societies, TRC is 
considered to be a necessary transitional feature to facilitate peace building (Valji 2004:1). 
   
In chapter five, the study pondered on the challenges that emerged in the process of 
transformation in post-apartheid period, and the research observed some of the crucial 
challenges that emerged in the process of transformation. These included redressing the 
endemic poverty of South Africa’s black population in which the level of income inequality 
in South Africa sits at a higher level than it was during the apartheid era, with unequal access 
to education and a high rate of unemployment. 
  
The last chapter offered recommendations to bring about reconciliation in conflict 
transformation in post-apartheid South Africa. This chapter argued that to really tackle the 
issue of violence in the country, it is imperative to address the underlying issues that cause 
violence. The first section considered measures to combat the economic inequality and 
poverty and it looked at the affirmative action policy and pro-poor economic policies that 
ought to address past injustices, inequalities and poverty as well as giving people reasons to 
desist from violence. In the second section, it looked into the question of land reform which is 
arguably one of the most important issues that was poorly addressed by the government. This 
section considered the need for a proper land reform program to tackle the issue of violence. 
The third section considered the need for the active involvement of the South African 
community in ridding the country of violence. The final section of the study investigated 
some measures that ought to be taken by the government to wrestle the issue of violence and 




The post-apartheid legacy is filled with wounds and scars that will take a long time to heal. 
There is still a lot more to be done despite the efforts have been made to attain national unity 
and equality. The policy of apartheid had assigned power and privilege to the white minority 
for years and, as a result, embodied one of the most damaging modern systems of political 
violence (Abraham, 2008).The entire transition of reconciliation and restoration in the 
conflict transformation of post-apartheid South Africa is going to take a long time to 
completely transform, and this is possibly attributed to the failure of multi-racial groups in 
South Africa to fully integrate (Graeme 1998). Kriel (2007) states that conflict transformation 
in the South African context refers to total change of a discrimination-based society, the 
systemic change of a non-racial society therefore to take effect, multi-racial groups need to 
reconcile with each other, fully integrate and embrace the change from a discrimination-
based society. Blomfield, Barnes and Huyse (2003) further states that there is no accessible 
road map to reconciliation and that there is also no easy recommendation for healing the 
wounds and divisions of a society in the aftermath of sustained violence. From the South 
African experience, it has caused us to explore our own path to reconciliation. Reconciliation 
therefore cannot be enforced nor can anyone else’s map get us to our destination. It is our 
obligation to make it our own solution (Blomfield, Barnes and Huyse 2003). 
  
In as much as post-apartheid South Africa has embraced democracy and has made enormous 
efforts to promote reconciliation in the country, little effort is given to the structural 
arrangements of the apartheid era. There is no doubt that it tends to affect the achievement of 
reconciliation in the country. Reconciliation is difficult to achieve if the apartheid legacy still 
remains to live on considering that apartheid structural arrangements serve as a constant 
reminder of memories of past racial tension and violence and is still alive in the minds of 
individuals and societies that had been embroiled in conflict for decades. 
  
As mentioned by Olusegun (1991), “South Africa has not reached the post-apartheid era, but 
it is moving in a somewhat unpredictable manner to the point where apartheid can be 
declared dead even if not buried.” Evidently, the legacy of apartheid still lives on even in the 
post-apartheid era. For instance numerous people in the post-apartheid era continue to live in 
residential area that are racially segregated, most children continue to attend schools with 
children of the same ‘race’ and even income inequality still remains racially based (Seekings 
2005). This explains that reconciliation in post-apartheid era is arguably realized more on the 
political aspect that is a transformation from autocratic rule to democratic rule.  Seekings 
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(2005) states that post- apartheid South Africa still remains even more racially divided in 
social and economic terms. 
  
Looking at the post-apartheid era, we have witnessed a transformation of violent conflicts, 
such as xenophobia and black on black conflicts, taxi violence, political assassinations, 
crimes across the country, the inability to heal past wounds, and poverty reflect the nature of 
violence of the apartheid era that include racial discrimination, economic inequality, a 
crippled legal system, and political tyranny against black communities. All of these conflicts 
are rooted in the apartheid era. One would say it is a continuation of a horror story 
considering that when we speak of the end of apartheid, we believe that it does not 
necessarily mean the end of racial inequalities but the end of the evils that come along with 
the apartheid era such as the structural arrangement of apartheid. 
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